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Over the past decade, the number and type of unmanned or robotic systems developed for, and 
deployed in, armed conflict and law-enforcement contexts has grown at an astonishing pace 
[…]Unmanned technologies already in use [can be] equipped with weapons to be used against 
targets or in self-defence. Some of these technologies are semi-automated, and can, for example, 
land, take off, fly, or patrol without human control […] In the foreseeable future, the technology 
will exist to create robots capable of targeting and killing with minimal […] need for direct 
human control or authorization […] Although robotic or unmanned weapons technology has 
developed at astonishing rates, the public debate over the legal, ethical and moral issues arising 
from its use is at a very early stage, and very little consideration has been given to the 
international legal framework necessary for dealing with the resulting issues. [Report of the 
Special Rapporteur (Executions), 23 August 2010, A/65/321, paragraphs 17 and 29] 
The Predator [drones] that engaged targets in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen were remotely 
piloted. […] On the other end of the technological spectrum is the autonomous command and 
control system, which uses the unmanned aircraft‘s onboard computer to locate, identify, track, 
and expeditiously attack targets. […]Once technology advances to enable reliable autonomous 
operations, maintaining accountability proves problematic. [John J Klein ‗The Problematic 
Nexus: Where Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles and the Law of Armed Conflict Meet‘ 
(2003) Air & Space Power Journal ff 19, 21] 
The moral rule is not ―when one is about to kill you, preempt him and kill him first,‖ but rather 
―when one is about to kill you, do everything necessary in order to thwart his intention.‖ 
Accordingly, if there is no alternative to killing him, strike first. If there is an alternative other 
than killing him, thwart his intention without striking first, without killing him. [Assa Casher 
Military Ethics (1996) 56] 
Empowering governments to identify and kill ‗known terrorists‘ places no verifiable obligation 
upon them to demonstrate in any way that those against whom lethal force is used are indeed 
terrorists, or to demonstrate that every other alternative had been exhausted. While it is 
portrayed as a ‗limited exception‘ to international norms, it actually creates the potential for an 
endless expansion of the relevant category to include any enemies of the State, social misfits, 
political opponents, or others. And it makes a mockery of whatever accountability mechanisms 
may have otherwise constrained or exposed such illegal action under either humanitarian or 
human rights law. [Report of the Special Rapporteur (Executions), 22 December 2004, 
E/CN.4/2005/7, paragraph 41] 
The Special Rapporteur acknowledges that Governments have a responsibility to protect their 
citizens against the excesses of non-State actors or other authorities, but these actions must be 
taken in accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law. In the opinion of 
the Special Rapporteur, the attack in Yemen (using an unmanned Predator drone) constitutes a 
clear case of extrajudicial killing. [Report of the Special Rapporteur (Executions), 13 January 













With its increasing appeal as a means of countering terrorist attacks, targeted killing is 
emerging one of the most controversial issues in international law today.1 The use of drones 
by States to conduct such killings by means of aerial strikes has also emerged as a novel 
method of modern aerial warfare, and has provoked both criticism and calls for 
accountability.2  
This research will seek to identify the specific elements and requirements that must 
be present in order for an incident of targeted killing to be permissible under international 
law. The ensuing analysis rests on three bases: the jus ad bellum (which is primarily self-
defence), the jus in bello (which is primarily humanitarian law) and law enforcement (which 
involves human rights).  
With a view to addressing these three issues, this thesis surveys recent information 
concerning States‘ use of drones to conduct targeted killings. The analysis includes concrete 
case studies of incidents where suspected terrorists have, intentionally, been targeted and 
killed. In this respect, the research seeks to identify areas in which the extant international 
law has either been violated or has been extended unnecessarily, and without well grounded 
legal cause, beyond the permissible limits.  
The thesis aims to establishing the highest possible standards under international law 
to regulate the use of drones. It therefore seeks to suggest ways by which greater certainty 
and clarity can be brought to the law by determining which specific normative regime – self-
defence, humanitarian law or human rights – is most appropriate for the circumstance in 
which targeted killing is contemplated.  
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I. PREDATOR WARFARE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE USE OF UNMANNED 
DRONES FOR TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the early morning of November 3, 2002, a vehicle reported to have been carrying six men 
drove across the crusty, windswept desert of Qana in the Marib province of Yemen.3 
Deploying its optical capability, a CIA-operated unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the RQ-1 
‗Predator Drone‘ flying overhead focused on the target and took aim.4 It then swooped 
down and with the swift movement of its controller‘s joystick, it launched a ‗Hellfire‘ missile 
deliberately intended to hit the vehicle so as to specifically kill one of its occupants, one Ali 
Qaed Senyan Al-Harethi.5  
But for the fragments of mangled metal and other charred matter swirling about in 
the desert wind, little else remained after the drone attack.6 Having been literally reduced to 
dust, the erstwhile occupants of the vehicle were not easily identifiable.7 Absent the benefit 
of forensic evidence to substantiate their claim, the Yemeni authorities ‗positively‘ identified 
some of the carbonized remains as being those of Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harithi, also known 
as ‗Abu Ali‘.8 The deceased was alleged, during his lifetime, to have been a senior al Qaeda 
operative who was behind the bomb attacks on the US War Ship the USS Cole in 2000.9 
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Hardly a year passed before a similar unmanned drone attack was launched by the 
CIA on Damadola village in Pakistan resulting in 18 civilian deaths.10 Comments by US 
officials are indicative of the fact that the attack was a covert operation targeting Aiyman al-
Zawahiri, a suspected senior Al Qaeda member.11  
These two examples are illustrative of the currency of the resort to lethal robotic 
technology and targeted killing amongst States struggling with threats of terror.12 The 
purpose of these illustrations is to provide a graphic snapshot of emergent State practice 
which elicits important, if daunting, legal questions.13 
Presently, one of the foremost concerns of States is the prevention of terrorist attacks 
and the maintenance of their national security.14 A question, however, arises as to whether, 
and if so in what circumstances, a State may lawfully target (with the intention of killing) a 
selected individual who is suspected of complicity in th  planning of terrorist attacks.15 
Other questions arise regarding what criterion is used in determining the qualification of a 
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particular individual as a legitimate target (whether as a participant, an unprivileged 
combatant or a ‗continuing threat‘).16  
Additionally, issues regarding whether individuals may be targeted while not visibly 
engaged in combat and of the possibility of their being erroneously targeted when they have 
disengaged from hostilities also arise.17  
The above scenario is well illustrated in the targeted killing of Al-Harethi and six 
others, where all were declared members of Al Qaeda and therefore legitimate military 
targets.18 This drone strike received an equal measure of approval19 and condemnations (as 
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extrajudicial killings).20 This represents the importance of the subject of targeted killings of 
suspected terrorists in international law. 
With the development of modern technology, the conduct of military operations is 
bound, invariably, to change.21 Examples of these ever-advancing developments are apt to 
be found in aerial warfare. In recent years, aerial warfare has emerged as a significant factor 
in modern warfare that is determinative of the military strength of a given State.22 This is 
particularly evident in the conduct of aerial warfare where the more advanced the 
technology deployed the better the military advantage one has over the enemy.23  
One such development in aerial warfare is the use of drones for the purposes of 
killing selected individuals.24 Drones can ‗launch, attack, recover and return to base without 
any onboard aircrew.‘25 Drones have been termed ‗uninhabited‘ rather than ‗unmanned‘ 
since there is still a significant human element in the actual control of the drone, despite the 
controller‘s remoteness from the drone.26     
Drones were used in the Gulf and Balkan Wars27 and have since then become 
‗important nodes in military information networks‘.28 More recently they have been used for 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and the provision of real-time information concerning the 
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terrain and terrorist activities.29 The proliferation of drones as a relatively new means in 
contemporary warfare is a fact as their capacity and utility for reconnaissance, surveillance, 
lethal targeting and even weapons deployment has been ‗effectively‘ proven.30  
1. Statement of the Legal Problem 
While the use of unmanned drones for targeted killing is a relatively novel phenomenon, 
aerial means of warfare have been used for more than two centuries.31 Aerial warfare has 
developed greatly since its earliest instance when an Italian commander tossed a grenade 
from his biplane when attacking the Libyan tribesmen.32 Since then, aerial power has been 
amongst the most decisive elements in armed conflicts.33 The use of drones has preoccupied 
the minds of army commanders, military theorists and air force engineers since the World 
War I.34 Gulam and Lee note that the pre-eminent military engineer Clarence Johnson35 was 
said to have remarked that the future of military aviation b longed to the drones.36  
However, the deployment of technology-intensive methods in modern armed conflict 
is a matter of significant importance not only to international humanitarian law (IHL), 
which governs the law of armed conflict, but also to international human rights law and the 
law of inter-State use of force.37 Drones are one such means of modern warfare the legality 
of whose use has raised a considerable debate.38 There are those who justify their use on 
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grounds of efficiency39 and others who steadfastly reject their use on grounds of law and 
humanity.40  
Subsequent to the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Bush Administration inaugurated 
the ‗global war on terror‘.41 This was the first terrorist attack to be accorded the status of 
armed conflict,42 the fact of which was upheld in the Hamdan Case.43 With the literal44 
construction of Common Articles 2 and 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 so as to 
fit the interests of the United States, the law of armed conflict became applicable.45 In 
addition to the controversial nature of the conflict,46 the US military's use of drones which 
can ‗watch, hunt and kill insurgents‘ continues to rise steeply.47 This has been attributed, in 
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large part, to the demands placed on the troops to capture and kill ‗high-value targets‘.48 The 
deployment of drones has mostly been in Iraq,49 Afghanistan,50 and Pakistan.51 
The use of drones for targeted killing is controversial. Proponents advocate for them 
on the grounds of greater surveillance capability and precision, thus better ‗precaution in 
attack‘ and minimal incidental civilian loss.52 Critics consider them prohibited weapons as 
they result in the disproportionate and erroneous killing of civilians.53 Ironically, whilst 
targeted killings are supposedly precision strikes, there is evidence of extensive incidental 
harm caused by drone attacks.54 This does not, however, suggest that missiles fired from 
drones are less humane than other weapons. The critical legal question to be addressed is 
the extent to which the specific use of drones conforms to the constraints of international 
law. 
The issue that arises from the use of drones is not so much a question of whether or 
not drones may be used as it is whether the use of drones for targeted killing conforms to the 
constraints of international law.55 This problem is compounded by the doubtful legality of 
targeted killing policies (through which States identify and kill ‗known terrorists‘ using 
drones) and their increasing proliferation in contemporary State practice. 
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The exponential increase in the use of drones for targeted killing policies in order to 
fight terrorism is a ‗worrying precedent and an issue of serious concern‘. Both the 2003 and 
2004 annual reports of the UN Specicial Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions identified States‘ justification of targeted killings on the basis that the 
targeting and elimination of ‗known terrorists‘ is more efficient and costs fewer lives than 
waging convential war.  
The UN Special Rapporteur finds the above contention problematic in four ways: i) 
there is no verifiable obligation upon States to demonstrate that targeted individuals are 
terrorists; ii) there is no obligation to demonstrate that every other alternative had been 
exhausted; iii) it creates potential for the expansion of the category of persons whi may be 
targeted (e.g. enemies of the State, political opponents etc.); and iv) it undermines the 
accountability mechanisms which are supposed to constrain illegal action under 
humanitarian or human rights law. 
The use of drones for covert targeted killing operations (which preclude international 
public scrutiny) in fighting terrorism is a disturbing precedent which raises grave legal 
concerns. The UN Special Rapporteur has noted that the absence of public scrutiny 
increases the risk of abuse thereby leading to arbitrariness and a lack of accountability. 
Additionally, it makes it difficult for human rights monitors to verify wheteher the 
individuals killed were legitimate targets, and also the number of civilian casualties.   
Targeted killing operations by drone attacks are remotely controlled from distant 
locations, far removed from the immediate conduct of hostilities.56 These operations are 
largely reliant on ground intelligence.57 Concern arises over the reliability of information 
being used to make decisions of who, when and where to attack. This becomes especially 
clear considering that in many instances ground forces (in the immediate context of 
hostilities) make mistakes due to unreliable intelligence.58  
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In the case of drones, the remoteness from the actual context of hostilities poses a 
considerable in complying with international law. With regard to intelligence collection, the 
possibility of mistakes being made and errors arising is increased.59 An illustration of the 
lethal effects of mistakes in such operations is the unfortunate ‗Tall Man Incident‘ of 2002 
where an innocent Afghani peasant was killed using an unmanned drone by CIA operatives 
who were convinced that he was Osama Bin Laden (whose height is 6 feet, 5 inches). A 
related concern is that, by the controllers‘ distance from the area of combat, there are few 
procedural safeguards to verify the accuracy of such intelligence information.60 
Drone attacks raise some difficulty as they are usually deployed as a means of first 
rather than last resort, especially when carried out as (anticipatory) self-defence.61 This is in 
contravention of the requirement in international law that, when lethal force is used, less-
than-lethal measures must have been attempted first.62  
The use of lethal force is only permissible if (at the time used) such force is used for 
legitimate and lawful defensive purposes.63 Thus, for drone attacks in cases where the threat 
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59 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‗Findings of the inquiry into the death of Salah Shehadeh‘ available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2002/Findings%20of%20the%20inquiry%2 
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ethics. For example, what do you do about unmanned slaughter? That is, what do you do when you kill 
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Predator drone strike, and we got someone else instead? In one case, it was an Afghan civilian who was just 
unlucky enough to look like Osama Bin Laden when viewed through the soda straw of a Predator drone.‘; 
UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 83; David Hambling, Air Force Completes Killer 
Micro-Drone Project, Wired, 5 January 2010; Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v Israel, paragraph 40. 
61 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 25, paragraph 86; Roy Schondorf, supra note 42 at 303. 
62 Article 35(1), AP I; ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, paragraph 78; A/61/311, paragraphs 33-45; 
E/CN.4/2006/53, paragraphs 44-54; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 25, paragraph 74 and 86. 
63 Al-Aulaqi v Obama (Complaint for Injunctive Relief) paragraph 2; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 
22, paragraph 74; University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Report on the Expert Meeting on 
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to life is imminent, questions arise as to whether, in fact, there are effective safeguards to 
ensure the reliability of imminence assessments.64   
The use of drones makes it easier to kill the targeted persons with minimal risk to a 
State‘s forces.65 This raises some concern over the criteria used to determine who may be 
targeted and killed, and under what circumstances.66 The ease of killing may lead the 
decision-makers to interpret the legal limitations on killing unnecessarily broadly.67 An 
example is the inclusion of ordinary criminals (for instance alleged Taliban-supporting drug 
traffickers) in ‗kill lists‘ for targeted killing operations.68  
To compound the unilaterally broad interpretation of legal killing, is the fact that 
conducting a drone attack operation on a computer screen (remote from the battlefield) may 
lead to reduced respect for the right to life under human rights and IHL thus encouraging ‗a 
―PlayStation‖ mentality to killing.‘69  
The use of drones for targeted killing poses a challenge as it is governed by the rules 
of IHL pertaining to air warfare. Little progress has been made in the development of a 
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65 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 24, paragraph 80. 
66 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 24, paragraphs 76-78. 
67 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 24, paragraph 79. 
68 Nasser Al-Aulaqi v Obama (2010) 10-CV-01469; Patrick Gallahue ‗The Targeted Killing of Drug Lords: 
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afghan-drug-traffickers-anillegal-and-dangerous-precedent, 13 Sep 2009 (accessed 22 April 2010). 
69 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 25, paragraph 84: ‗because operators are based thousands of 
miles away from the battlefield, and undertake operations entirely through computer screens and remote 
audio-feed, there is a risk of developing a ―Playstation‖ mentality to killing‘; Philip Alston & Hina Shamsi, A 
Killer above the Law, The Guardian, 8 February 2010: ‗Equally discomfiting is the "PlayStation mentality" 
that surrounds drone killings. Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill real people 
remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of their actions, how will this generation 












comprehensive codification of the laws of aerial warfare for reasons which Marco Sassoli 
and Antoine Bouvier state as follows:70 
a) the methods and means of air warfare develop so rapidly that any rules 
quickly become obsolete; 
b) the means of air war fare are so powerful and militarily important that 
States are reluctant to agree to any limitations on their use; 
c) reconnaissance and targeting are much more difficult, although the latest 
weaponry has made targeting substantially more precise than in land 
warfare. Nonetheless, air warfare is intrinsically blind by nature and less 
capable of drawing a distinction between armed forces and civilians.   
Analogous to States‘ need to suppress terrorism is the concern for their obligations to 
comply with their international and domestic human rights and IHL obligations.71 This 
research will focus on the legality of the use of drones within three systems of regulation: i) 
the self-defence rules which proceed from a law of inter-State use of force perspective (jus ad 
bellum); ii) the conduct of hostilities rules which proceed from a IHL perspective (jus in bello); 
and iii) the law enforcement rules which proceed from a human rights law perspective.72 
Proponents of targeted killings under the regulatory rules of self-defence must justify 
its use as a defensive (as opposed to retributive) measure against members of transnational 
organized armed groups operating within the territory of another State.73  
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71 See U. N. Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003) cited in Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, supra note 42 at 63. 
72 Nils Melzer, supra note 3 at 43; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraphs 29-36. 
73 ICJ, Legal Consequences of a Wall Advisory Opinion, paragraph 139; Mordechai Kremnitzer ‗Preventive 
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17 at 91; Emanuel Gross ‗Democracy in the War Against Terrorism–the Israeli Experience‘ (2002) 35 Loyola of 












Proponents of targeted killings under the regime of the conduct of hostilities contend 
that when attacks from terrorists and resulting counter-terrorist responses by States surpass 
the threshold of an armed conflict, it can be justified under the rules of IHL.74  
Proponents of the law enforcement system of regulation take the view that terrorist 
acts are criminal offences which should be dealt with in the interest of respecting and 
protecting the right to life, especially against violence.75 They further contend that when 
lethal force is resorted to by State agents, use of drones would comply with the strict human 
rights standards of law enforcement.76   
This research seeks to find out the legal basis, in international law, for the use of 
drones to conduct targeted killings of suspected terrorists.77 It examines the legal status of 
private actors and other entities that may be involved in drone strike operations,78 places 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Domestic Law‘ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 609, 646; Jefferey F Addicott ‗Proposal for a New 
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74 Israel HCJ, Public Commitee Against Torture in Israel v the Government of Israel, paragraph 16: ‗[t]he general, 
principled starting point is that between Israel and the various terrorist organizations active in Judea, Samaria, 
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intifada (emphasis in the original)‘; Harold Koh, supra note 39 at 8; Philip B Heymann & Juliette N Kayyem, 
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75 David Kretzmer, ibid at 184; Mordechai Kremnitzer, ibid at 14; Nils Melzer, ibid at 58. 
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July 2003, AI Index: MDE 15/056/2003 (hereinafter Amnesty International, Israel Must End its Policy of 
Assassinations); Tom Ruys, supra note 17 at 35; PCATI/LAW, Assasination Policy of the State of Israel, supra note 
17 at 86; David Kretzmer, ibid at 183, 203; Mordechai Kremnitzer, ibid at 6; Nils Melzer, ibid at 58. 
77 Jane Mayer , The Predator War, The New Yorker, October 26 2009 states that targeted killings using drones 
‗represents a radically new and geographically unbounded use of state-sanctioned lethal force.‘; Two key terms 
that are used in this research necessitate clarification because they owing to their being subject to diverse and 
sometimes contradictory interpretations. The definitions provided are context-specific as they are given within 
the restrictive context of this research. The term ‗legality‘ as used in this research is the objective standard by 
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order to discuss the notion of ‗targeted killing‘ in international law with a heightened sense of objectivity, this 
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78 UNHRC, Statement of the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council, 3 June 2010, available at 
http://www.extrajudicialexecutions.org/application/media/Statement-Alston1.pdf.; UNSG, of the Special 












where drone strikes can occur, the nature of the incidental civilian casualties,79 how the 
results of individual drone strikes are assessed before and after the fact, and the organization 
and control mechanisms for supervision, oversight and discipline.80  
The research, importantly, seeks to determine to whether, and if so the extent to 
which, the targeted killing of specific individuals is permissible under international law. The 
research also addresses the implications likely to be had by the use of drones for targeted 
killing on the interpretation, application and formation of international law. 
The use of drones (some of which are semi-autonomous) for the specific purpose of 
targeted killing raises three key concerns: i) the doubtful permissibility of the method of 
targeted killing; ii) the setting of precedent for other States to adopt and endorse similar 
practice; iii) the arbitrary expansion of the permissible limits of killing by States; and iv) the 
discomfiting secrecy with which States carry out these operations in violation of the 
requirement of accountability under international law.  
It is noteworthy that a Hell-fire missile fired by an unmanned drone (with the 
intention of killing a selected individual) is no different from one fired from a F-16 fighter-jet 
or an Apache helicopter. However, the critical legal question addressed in this research 
(which would be the same for every weapon) is the extent to which the specific use of 
drones conforms to the requirements of international law.  
2. Scope of the Study 
It is notable that most of the incidences of targeted killing have been aimed primarily at 
members of non-State organized armed groups.81 In this regard, the study will confine itself 
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to the permissibility of State-sponsored targeted killings of non-State actors under 
international law.  
3. Defining the Contemporary Notion of ‘Targeted Killing’ 
The notion of ‗targeted killing‘, despite the frequency with which the phrase is used, is 
neither defined under international law nor does it fit neatly into any legal framework.82 It 
manifests itself when lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used, with a degree of pre-
meditation, against an individual or individuals specifically identified in advance by the 
perpetrator.83  
The lack of a uniform definition provides States with an avenue to formulate their 
policies more permissively so that the practice of targeted killing may be allowed by their 
domestic laws and regulations.84 This raises serious concerns from an international law 
perspective, especially from the perspective of human rights and humanitarian law. Some 
definitions of targeted killing are broad as they introduce ambiguous categories of 
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individuals such as a ‗specific civilian who cannot reasonably be apprehended‘85 or an 
‗individual terrorist‘.86  
The resulting interpretation of these definitions would be broad and permissive and 
thus their application would encompass all individuals who are deemed to fall within this 
wide and insufficiently defined category of persons.87   
The specific goal of a targeted killing operation should be to use lethal force against a 
specifically known individual. Targeted killing may be defined as the ‗use of lethal force 
attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation 
to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting 
them.‘88  
From this definition, five (cumulative) elements which must be simultaneously 
present are discernable. First, is the element of lethal force which requires a method that is 
capable of causing the death of a human being.89 The second element is the intent, 
premeditation and deliberation to kill. Intent requires the target‘s death to be the object of 
the operation while premeditation qualifies the intent by requiring that it be based on a 
conscious choice.90 The deliberation requirement demands that the killing of the targeted 
individual be the principal objective of the operation.91  
The third element requires the targeting of individually selected persons.92 The fourth 
element necessitates an extra-custodial93 deprivation of life where the targeted individual is 
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89 Nils Melzer, ibid at 3; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 5, paragraph 9; UCIHL, The Right to Life in 
Armed Conflict and Occupation, supra note 63 at 31. 
90 Nils Melzer, ibid at 3; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 9; Mordechai Kremnitzer, supra 
note 73 at 1; Israel HCJ, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v Israel, HCJ 769/02, paragraph 2. 
91 Nils Melzer, ibid at 4; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, ibid at 5; Chris Downes, supra note 18 at 
280; Steven R David, supra note 84 at 2; Tom Ruys, supra note 84 at 15. 












not in the physical custody of the targeting party.94 The fifth element requires the attribution 
of the targeting to a subject of international law.95 It is noteworthy that despite the State-
centric nature of international law, in certain situations and for limited circumstances, 
targeted killings may be attributable to non-State actors.96 
The 2010 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions (Alston Targeted Killings Report) defines the notion of 
targeted killing in the following words: 
A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal 
force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an 
organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who 
is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.  
Targeted killing, as noted in the above report, is carried out by various methods and 
takes place in a variety of contexts.97 It may be committed by governments and their agents 
in times of peace as well as in armed conflicts, or by organized armed groups in armed 
conflict.98 Most cases of targeted killings by drone strikes have been against suspected 
terrorists who are known to be part of an identifiable terrorist organization, and whose 
conduct presents a specific threat to the security of the State.99 
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Thus, the definition of ‗targeted killing‘ which appears to be the most appropriate is 
that which is concise yet broad enough to encompass domestic as well as transnational 
situations of targeted killing. This would enable the definition to escape the shadowy realm 
of half-legality and non-accountability.100 Therefore, when defining ‗targeted killing‘, States 
should ensure that it is analytically formulated in a way that covers broad applications of 
targeted killing operations, and also provides a comprehensive and sufficiently precise 
description of the method (and the individuals involved).101  
This research will thus adopt Melzer‘s definition of targeted killing: ‗the use of lethal 
force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and 
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II. THE NOTION OF TARGETED KILLING IN CONTEXT: APPLICABLE LAW 
AND EMERGING LEGAL DOCTRINE. 
1. Advancement in Technology and Emergent Targeted Killing Policies 
a. The Use of Robotics for Targeting: Enter the Unmanned Drone 
Drones are amongst the cutting-edge military technology in aerial combat presently being 
deployed.102 They are aerial vehicles that can launch, attack, recover and return to base 
without onboard aircrew.103 The United States Department of Defense defines drones as ‗[a] 
powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to 
provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and [which] carr[ies] a lethal or nonlethal payload.‘104  
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Vast numbers of drones and other aircraft have been employed in the recent past in 
situations related to armed conflict.105 Their functions have included armed attack, 
surveillance, intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and, search and rescue operations.106  
Drones were initially designed as stealth mediums of information-gathering for 
reconnaissance.107 This was illustrated during the 1973 Yom Kipur War where Israel used 
drones to observe real-time video imagery of enemy forces‘ positions.108 However, 
technological advancement saw the weaponization of drones which presently have the 
capability to shoot laser-guided missiles.109 Thus, drones represent the air power element of 
the ‗revolution in military affairs‘110 as they embody technological advancement, conceptual 
innovation and organisational adaptation.111  
Gulam and Lee distinguish two types of drones based on the command and control 
characteristics: i) the ‗dumb‘ drone which is entirely controlled by a human operator 
through a data link; and ii) the ‗terminator‘ drone which is wholly autonomous with the 
ability to function independently of human action once assigned a target to kill.112 Although 
the idea of roboticized weapons comes across as being deceptively trivial, drones are a 
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serious reality.113 While addressing an audience at the US Naval Academy, Peter Singer 
stated that [n]othing that you see (from a Power Point presentation) is science fiction… 
[t]his is the real deal.114  
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Philip Alston, seconds the above contention and further cautions against the adoption of a 
‗Playstation‘ mentality to killing human beings.115 For military commanders, drones offer 
greater advantages as compared to manned aerial vehicles, for instance fighter jets, and thus 
will most likely continue to be used by the military for quite a long time.116  
b. Emergent Targeted Killing Policies 
While various forms of targeted killing have been present throughout history,117 in 
contemporary times this phenomenon has been increasingly prevalent. Troublingly, most 
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and are capable of deep penetration strikes against enemy centres of gravity. Finally, the long loitering ability 
of [drones] over a battlespace can mean a persistent presence to rapidly strike targets of opportunity.‘ 
117 Nils Melzer, supra note 3 at 1 and 9; Kenneth Watkin, supra note 17 at 169; Patricia Zengel ‗Assassination 
and the Law of Armed Conflict‘ (1991) 134 Military Law Review 123, 125; Louis Beres, supra note 16 at 847; 












States which conduct targeted killings have not been transparent about the practice,118 
usually choosing to hold it as unofficial or to deny altogether any such policies.119  
There are few States, however, which have either openly adopted policies permitting 
targeted killings, or have formally adopted such policies while refusing to acknowledge their 
existence.120 Examples of these include the United States, Israel and Russia which have 
asserted the legality of targeted killings in excessively broad circumstances, outside the 
limited permissible circumstances.121 
Subsequent to the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US reportedly adopted a secret 
policy of targeted killing.122 This involved operations of targeted killings in the territory of 
other States.123 The secret program is reportedly conducted by the Central Intelligence 
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Agency (CIA) using unmanned drones.124 However, the involvement of special operations 
forces and of the assistance offered by civilian contractors in the targeted killing operations 
has also been reported.125 The use of drone airstrikes for targeted killings has featured 
prominently in the armed conflicts in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq.126 
The United States Legal Adviser to the Department of State has since outlined legal 
justifications for targeted killings based on the right to self-defence.127 Also, the practice was 
defended on grounds of IHL, with the assertion that the US is in an armed conflict with 
transnational organized armed groups.128 This official statement, however, failed to advert 
to some critical legal issues including: i) the scope of the armed conflict in which the State 
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asserts it is engaged; ii) the criteria for individuals who may be targeted and killed; iii) the 
existence of any substantive or procedural safeguards to ensure the legality and accuracy of 
killings; and iv) the existence of accountability mechanisms.129 
In November 2000, subsequent to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada,130 the Israeli 
Government confirmed the existence of a State policy of targeted killings.131 This was 
premised on self-defence and IHL, primarily due to the failure by the Palestinian Authority 
to prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism directed at Israel.132 The Israeli claim 
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was reinforced by the Israeli Defence Force Judge Advocate General‘s legal opinion on the 
conditions under which Israel considered targeted killings to be legal.133  
Israel is yet to substantively disclose the basis for its legal conclusions, and also 
details of the guidelines it uses to make its targeted killings decisions, the evidentiary or 
other intelligence requirements that would justify any killing, or the results of any post-facto 
review of the conformity of the operation with the legal requirements.134 
The main concern is that these targeted killing policies involve ‗overly expansive‘ 
interpretations of the law which leads to applications that do not comport with human 
rights and humanitarian law.135 This is further compounded by the prospect that other States 
would inevitably adopt these policies, which (if accompanied by feelings of legal permission, 
justification or obligation) may have the effect of forming new customary international 
law.136   
2. Who Conducts Targeted Killing and Who May be Targeted Lawfully 
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a. Who May be Targeted Lawfully 
A source of considerable uncertainty regarding targeted killing operations in the context of 
armed conflicts concerns who may be lawfully targeted, and where and when such persons 
may be targeted. Drawing from customary IHL,137 ideally, persons who may be subjected to 
targeted killing must be legitimate military targets.138 This is analogous with the principle of 
distinction which requires the differentiation between civilian objects and military objectives 
and additionally accords civilians and civilian objects immunity from attack.139 Legitimate 
military targets must be objectively singled out for their role in activities related to the 
ongoing armed conflict.140 
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In international armed conflicts, subject to other requirements,141 combatants may be 
targeted at any time and any place. The absence of ‗combatant‘ status in the IHL applicable 
to internal armed conflict creates some uncertainty thus making the rules of targeting less 
clear.142 The IHL applicable to internal armed conflict (as in international armed conflict) 
permits the targeting of civilians who ‗directly participate in hostilities‘.143 This does not, 
however, introduce clarity as to who may be lawfully targeted since there isn‘t a commonly 
accepted definition of the notion of ‗direct participation in hostilities‘. This leaves the way 
(perilously) open of individual State interpretation.144  
The principal areas of contention regarding direct participation in hostilities may be 
summed up as follows: i) what kind of conduct constitutes ‗direct participation‘ making an 
individual subject to attack?; ii) to what extent may ‗membership‘ in an organized armed 
group be used as a factor in determining whether a person is directly participating in 
hostilities?; and iii) the temporal nature of direct participation (how long does direct 
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participation last?).145 The notion of direct participation in hostilities will be explored in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
It is a cause for concern that most States engaging in targeted killing policies have 
opted not to disclose their interpretation of direct participation in hostilities.146 Lack of 
transparency on these criteria obscures any clarity about what conduct could subject a 
civilian to targeting.147 It also provides an avenue for States to unilaterally broaden their 
interpretation of direct participation beyond permissible boundaries.148  
The predicament of these States dealing with terrorist threats must also be borne in 
mind.149 It may be difficult to define direct participation in hostilities narrowly when faced 
with an enemy who disregards the distinction between civilians and legitimate military 
                                                             
145 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 59; Nils Melzer, ibid at 56. 
146 Israel HCJ, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v the Government of Israel, paragraph 34: ‗And what is the 
law in the space between these two extremes? On the one hand, the desire to protect innocent civilians leads, 
in the hard cases, to a narrow interpretation of the term ―direct‖ part in hostilities. On the other hand, it can be 
said that the desire to protect innocent civilians leads, in the hard cases, to a wide intepretation of the ―direct‖ 
character of the hostilities, as thus civilians are encouraged to stay away from the hostilities to the extent 
possible‘; Nils Melzer, ibid at 68; Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 58; ICTY, Tadic Case (Judgment of 
7 May 1997), paragraph 616; UNWCC, Trial of Wilhelm List Case, 58; Israel HCJ, Public Committee Against 
Torture in Israel v the Government of Israel, paragraph 30: ‗As mentioned, our position is that all of the parts of art 
51(3) of The First Protocol express customary international law‘; ICTY, Kunarac Case (Judgment of 12 June 
2002), paragraph 57; ICTR, Rutaganda Case (Judgment of 26 May 2003), paragraph 569; ICTY, Vasiljevic Case 
(Judgment of 29 November 2002), paragraph 24; Philip B Heymann & Juliette N Kayyem, supra note 73 at 65, 67. 
147 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 68; ICTY, Akayesu Case (Judgment of 2 September 1998), 
paragraph 629; Michael Bothe, Karl Partsch & Waldemar Solf New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: 
Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1982) 302. 
148 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 68: ‗although the US has not made public its 
definition of (direct participation in hostilities), it is clear that it is more expansive than that set out by the 
ICRC; in Afghanistan, the US has said that drug traffickers on the ―battlefield‖ who have links to the 
insurgency may be targeted and killed. This is not consistent with the traditionally understood concepts under 
IHL – drug trafficking is understood as criminal conduct, not an activity that would subject someone to a 
targeted killing. And generating profits that might be used to fund hostile actions does not constitute (direct 
participation in hostilities)‘; US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Afghanistan‘s Narco War: Breaking the 
Link between Drug Traffickers and Insurgents: Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2009) 
S. Rep. No. 111-29, 16; Steven Eke, Russia Law on Killing Extremists Abroad, BBC, 27 Nov. 2006. 












targets, and who additionally seeks refuge among the civilian population or uses civilians as 
human shields.150  
In spite of the unlawful tactics of non-Sate armed groups, States must always strive 
to ensure the greatest protection to the civilian population.151 Thus, direct participation 
should be objectively construed to include only such conduct that directly supports the 
combat.152  
The ICRC‘s Interpretive Guidelines on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
stipulates three preconditions which must be met cumulatively for each specific act by a 
civilian to qualify as direct participation in hostilities. These include:153 
(i) There must be a ―threshold of harm‖ that is objectively likely to result from 
the act, either by adversely impacting the military operations or capacity of 
the opposing party, or by causing the loss of life or property of protected 
civilian persons or objects; and 
(ii) The act must cause the expected harm directly, in one step, for example, 
as an integral part of a specific and coordinated combat operation (as opposed 
to harm caused in unspecified future operations); and 
(iii) The act must have a ―belligerent nexus‖ – i.e., it must be specifically 
designed to support the military operations of one party to the detriment of 
another. 
The above criteria are primarily focused on direct conduct to the exclusion of indirect 
conduct, such as preparatory or capacity building conduct, that is generally supportive of 
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the war effort.154 Other conduct, for instance political support to a belligerent party, for 
example an organized armed group which is protected by other human rights standards also 
do not qualify as direct participation.155  
Thus, it is apparent that the criteria of the ICRC Guidelines on Direct Participation 
focuses on the extent to which specific conduct ‗constitute[s] an integral part of armed 
confrontations occurring between belligerents‘156 rather than the lawfulness of such conduct 
under municipal or international law.157  
The import of this is that, when responding to unlawful activities (under municipal 
or international law) which do not meet the criteria of direct participation in hostilities,158 
States must adhere to the ‗lethal force standards applicable to self-defence and law 
enforcement.‘159 
A shortcoming of the ICRC Guidelines is the creation of a category called the 
‗continuous combat function‘ (CCF). This category comprises of members of organized 
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armed groups who may be targeted ‗anywhere, at any time.‘160 This contravenes the human 
rights standards which protect against the arbitrary deprivation of life.161 Additionally, it is 
an internal contradiction of the principle of targeting participants in hostilities only ‗for such 
time‘ as they participate, since it introduces the possibility of targeting selected individuals 
‗all the time.‘162  
A better approach would be to pay attention to specific acts rather than the status of 
the person being targeted (whether an unprivileged combatant or a continuous combat 
function).163 Alston notes the increased risk of erroneous targeting which may arise from the 
creation a category of continuous combatants as some of them may have disengaged from 
hostilities.164 He additionally notes that if States accept the continuous combatant category, 
the onus lies with the State to give strong evidentiary proof of an individual‘s belonging to 
that category.165 In this regard, less-lethal methods should be attempted first before resorting 
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to targeted killing. This will lessen deaths resulting from erroneous information.166 Also, 
precautionary measures must be taken to limit incidental civilian casualties and loss.167 
b. Who May Lawfully Conduct Targeted Killings 
Targeted killings are usually State-sponsored and carried out by State agents within the 
context of an impending attack, in the conduct of armed hostilities or in situations of law 
enforcement.168 States undertaking targeted killing in the anticipation of an imminent attack 
or in response to an attack are acting in self-defence; therefore their actions are defensible 
under the international law of the use of force.169 Those carried out within the context of the 
conduct of hostilities are also defensible under IHL and human rights law, while those 
conducted as measures of ‗law enforcement‘170 are defensible within the complementary 
overlaps between IHL and human rights law.171 
                                                             
166 UNHRC, de Guerero Case, paragraph 13; Tom Ruys, supra note 17 at 21; Mordechai Kremnitzer, supra note 
73 at 14; Israel HCJ, Muhammad Abd al-Aziz Hamdan v The General Security Service (1996) HCJ 8049/96, 
paragraph 6 (less lethal measures must conform to the law); Israel HCJ, Wa‟al Al Kaaqua, et al. v the State of 
Israel (1999; Israel HCJ, Abd-al Halim Bilbeisi v The General Security Service (1996) HCJ-VR 336/96 (discussing 
the permissibility of torture in ‗ticking bomb‘ scenarios); Israel HCJ, Khader Mubarak and The Public Committee 
Against Torture in Israel v The General Security Service (1996) HCJ 3124/96 (on the prohibition of the use of 
torture during interrogation); UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 78. 
167 Articles, 26 and 27, Hague Regulations IV; Article 57(2), AP I; Article 19, GC IV; Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
& Loiuse Doswald-Beck, supra note 140 at Rules 15-21 ; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 10, 
paragraph; Marco Sassoli & Antoine A Bouvier, supra note 139 at 165 and 170. 
168 Nils Melzer, supra note 3 at 5. This has given rise to the term ‗State-sponsored targeted killing‘ which relates 
the notion of targeted killing with the principal group that employs it.  
169 Michael N Schmitt ‗State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law‘ (1992) 17 Yale 
Journal of International Law 621, 645; Mordechai Kremnitzer, ibid at 3; Nils Melzer, ibid at 51; Chris Downes, 
supra note 18 at 286; Louis Beres, supra note 16 at 160; Emanuel Gross, supra note 73 at 1194. 
170 Nils Melzer, ibid at 88-89: ‗the generic concept of ―law enforcement‖ can be said to comprise all territorial 
and extraterritorial measures taken by a State to vertically impose public security, law and order or to 
otherwise exercise its authority or power over individuals in any place or manner whatsoever. As there is room 
for overlap between the factual concepts of law enforcement and of hostilities in the case of military 
confrontations between States and non-State actors, it will be important to clarify which normative paradigm 
must be applied in such situations‘; For examples of extraterritorial applications of law enforcement, see 
Article 12, GC I; Article 12, GC II; Article 13, GC III; Article 27, GC IV. 
171 IACiHR, Abella (La Tablada) Case, paragraphs 158 and 159; Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards (Turku Declaration), UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55 (December 2, 1990), paragraphs 50-57; 
Marco Sassoli & Antoine A Bouvier, supra note 139 at 264 ; Nils Melzer, ibid at 89: ‗In situations of armed 
conflict, the law enforcement paradigm continues to govern all exercise by States of their authority or power, 












Various State agents participate in different circumstances of targeted killing. Most 
killings are conducted by military or civilian intelligence agents. A significant amount of 
controversy has been generated by the carrying out of targeted killings by State agents (such 
as the CIA and Mossad) who are not members of regular armed forces.172  
Alston‘s Targeted Killings Report notes the argument that as non-members of the 
armed forces, the intelligence agents who conduct drone attacks are ‗unlawful combatants‘ 
who are committing war crimes.173 He, however, finds this unsupported by IHL and further 
to be presumptive of the fact that the operation is pursued in the conduct of hostilities.174 
Targeted killings by State agents who are not members of the armed forces are 
therefore of dubious legality. They need to be carried out in conformity with the law 
applicable to the specific purpose of that particular operation.175 Otherwise, they would 
engage State responsibility.176 Under human rights law, killings conducted by State agents 
outside an armed conflict would constitute extrajudicial executions if they do not conform 
to human rights standards.177 It is thus incumbent on States (both the targeting State and the 
territorial State) to investigate and prosecute incidences such as the above.178 
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Under IHL, while civilians (including intelligence agents) are not entirely prohibited 
from participating in hostilities, such participation has consequences.179 First, this 
participation makes intelligence agents legitimate targets as they are ‗directly participating in 
hostilities‘.180 Secondly, unlike State armed forces they may be susceptible to prosecution, 
under municipal law, for their unlawful conduct.181 Therefore, any targeted killing in 
violation of IHL (regardless of its being conducted by State armed forces or by intelligence 
agents) may subject the perpetrator to prosecution for war crimes.182 
Targeted killing operations carried out by intelligence agents in the conduct of 
hostilities are different from those carried out by armed forces since the former are usually 
(subjectively) indifferent to IHL.183 This increases the possibility of violations of IHL, and 
thus there is a greater likelihood of prosecution both for war crimes and for violations of the 
laws of the State in which such killing occurs.184 Moreover, when intelligence agents are 
used by States in targeted killing operations to avoid the scrutiny of IHL and human rights 
law requirements, it could also incur State responsibility for violating those requirements.185 
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It is important to note that regardless of justification for the use of force, the 
lawfulness of each targeted killing operation must (additionally) be objectively assessed on 
the basis of its compliance with the rules protecting individuals from arbitrary deprivation of 
life.186 These include the rules of human rights and IHL (in situations of armed conflict).187 
This is supported by the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility which precludes the 
invocation of self-defence as a defence for violations of IHL.188   
3. International Law Applicable to the Notion of Targeted Killing 
In analyzing the permissibility of targeted killing in international law, it is appropriate to 
advert to the relevant provisions. As mentioned above, three branches of international law 
are pertinent: i) international law of the use force; ii) IHL; and iii) human rights law. This 
section only identifies relevant provisions without going into the details of the specific legal 
requirements for the use of lethal force with the intent to kill a selected individual. This will 
be dealt with substantively in subsequent sections. 
International law on the use of force applies to situations where drone attacks may be 
resorted to by a victim State in self-defence (including anticipatory self-defence).189 IHL is 
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applicable in situations amounting to an armed conflict.190 Human rights law applies both in 
peace time as well as in situations falling short of an armed conflict. It also applies alongside 
IHL in situations of armed conflict.191 The law of armed conflict has been an intrinsic part of 
human civilization for several centuries and, in fact, it was the first part of international law 
to be codified.192 The Lieber Code inaugurated, in international law, a semblance of codified 
regulations pertinent to the laws of armed conflict.193   
The international law on the use of force significantly constrains the right of states to 
embark on an armed conflict.194 It is noteworthy that initially war was considered a right 
implicit in the sovereignty of States.195 Parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, however, 
undertook to ‗condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounce it as an instrument of national policy.‘196  
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The Nuremberg Judgment, which was reiterated by a subsequent United Nations 
General Assembly ratification,197 also renounced war, thereby rendering it ‗illegal in 
international law‘. It additionally proscribed acts committed by those persons initiating an 
aggressive war.198 Presently, Articles 2(4)199 and 51 of the United Nations Charter explicitly 
restrict the use of force only to cases of legitimate self-defence.200 
a. International Humanitarian Law 
IHL is applicable only where there is an armed conflict in existence.201 Therefore, when 
targeted killing is employed as means or tactic of killing individually selected terrorists, it 
must be proven that there is an ‗armed conflict‘ in which the State and the terrorists are 
engaged.202 In this regard, the US has stated that it is engaged in an armed conflict with Al 
Qaeda.203 Additionally, within the operation of IHL distinction needs to be made between 
combatants,204 civilians205 and other non-combatants.206  
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Thus, the combatant status of members of armed groups must be ascertained so that 
they can be targeted lawfully.207 Should the individuals against whom targeted killing 
operations are aimed be lawful targets, other IHL principles of precaution, proportionality, 
necessity and humanity must be complied with.208  
A violation of the requirements of IHL engages both State and individual 
responsibility.209 State responsibility is governed under the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility while individual responsibility is governed under customary IHL and Article 
8 of the ICC Statute which criminalizes grave breaches of IHL.210   
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b. Human Rights Law 
Human rights law largely developed from existing custom but it received a great boost in the 
wake of World War II.211 This has been attributed to the atrocities that befell multitudes of 
people prior to and during the war.212 Human rights initially developed in order to grant 
positive rights to individuals, and to ensure that the State respected the rights of its 
citizens.213  
Human rights law acknowledges certain benefits which individuals should enjoy and 
confers rights upon them.214 The body of human rights is made up of conventional law (both 
universal and regional) and customary law.215 The ‗most fundamental‘ of human rights such 
as the right to life make up the core of the customary law.216 
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Human rights law is founded on the protection of the life and dignity of the person. 
Targeted killing involves the ‗use of deadly force‘217 which impinges on the right to life. This 
‗stands as the first right that is to be protected by the State‘.218 It is also a norm of jus cogens 
thus making any violation presumptively unlawful.219 The practice of the ICJ,220 the UN 
human rights supervisory system,221 and other regional courts is indicative of a strong 
argument not only for the erga omnes character, but also the customary nature of obligations 
arising from the jus cogens right to life.222  
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Human rights, as expressed in international conventions, are premised on the 
protection of every human being‘s ‗inherent‘ right to life.223 All the conventions consider the 
right to life to be non-derogable,224 thus (even in targeted killing operations) this right cannot 
be curtailed during times of public emergency. This means that any act or omission which 
contravenes the right to life is unlawful, and further that, only under very limited 
circumstances (strictly controlled by the law) can the wrongfulness of such conduct be 
precluded.225 
In spite of the non-derogable nature of the right to life, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,226 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCR), the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR),227 the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)228 and the African Charter 
on Human and People‘s Rights (AFCHPR)229 do not formulate this right in absolute 
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terms.230 Rather, each of these conventions prohibits only the ‗arbitrary‘ deprivation of 
life.231 
General Comment No. 6 of the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) when 
read in light of the de Guerero Case sheds light on the provision that no one shall be 
‗arbitrarily deprived of his life‘.232 The UNHRC held that the law‘s failure to strictly control 
and limit circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his or her life is indicative of 
the arbitrariness of the resulting loss of life.233 This is expressive of a broad interpretation of 
Article 6 ICCPR which suggests that States need to adopt positive measures in protecting 
the right to life.234  
These may include, for instance, establishing mechanisms to verify intelligence 
information thereby reducing erroneous targeting decisions.235 This may also require an 
independent oversight body to scrutinize the planning, organization and control of targeted 
killing operations and to investigate any unlawful killings that may result.236 
Thus, for a targeted killing operation to be lawful, States must take all possible 
measures to restrict as much as possible the use of lethal force in accordance with the 
international law rules prohibiting resort to armed force and loss of innocent life.237 The 
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determination of whether or not a particular incident of targeted killing is arbitrary is a 
question of fact and has to be determined on a case by case basis.238 
Under human rights law, the permissibility of using lethal force is restrictively 
regulated by standards of absolute necessity and strict proportionality. Absolute necessity 
requires that lethal force should be indispensable to prevent a grave and concrete threat 
whose immediacy allows for no delay.239 Absolute necessity also requires lethal force to be 
used only when all less-lethal means (capture or non-lethal incapacitation) are incapable of 
preventing the expected threat.240  
Strict proportionality requires the use of lethal force to be justified by the gravity of 
the concrete threat being sought to be averted.241 It also requires lethal force to be used 
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prospectively as a defensive means rather than retrospectively as a retributive means.242 
Proportionality in this case should be measured not by the suspect‘s past offence but by the 
gravity of the threat which the individual continues to pose.243 Thus, (like in jus ad bellum) 
the objective of using lethal force must strictly be the prevention of an impending concrete 
threat rather than the killing of a suspect being the ‗sole objective‘.244    
The lawfulness of extra-territorial targeted killing operations by States raises concerns 
over the temporal and territorial scope of applicability of human rights law.245 It is possible 
to consider this concern from two perspectives: i) that of territorial control; and ii) that of 
States‘ obligations to respect the right to life.  
The use of lethal force under the territorial control perspective must be regulated to 
the extent that a State exercises effective or partial control over a particular territory.246 The 
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second perspective adverts to the negative obligation of a State to ‗respect‘ the right to life 
and suggests that this obligation is binding upon States wherever its agents operate.247  
Both of these perspectives suggest that States are bound to observe human rights 
obligations in cases where they exercise jurisdiction as well as cases where their agents 
engage in law enforcement activities. This is well supported by international 
jurisprudence.248  
Human rights law (especially the right to life) is applicable both in times of peace and 
in war.249 With the exception of specifically permitted derogations, human rights law 
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protects all human beings at all times.250 This was illustrated by the report of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which relied on the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion251 to rebuff Israel‘s position on the non-applicability of human rights in situations of 
armed conflict and occupation.252 International courts have maintained the applicability of 
States‘ obligations in situations of armed conflict, occupation and even in the extraterritorial 
exercise of jurisdiction.253  
This is consistent with the approach adopted by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in the La Tablada Case where it held those provisions of human rights which 
provide higher standards of protection than AP I of the Geneva Conventions to be regarded 
as applicable.254 International jurisprudence has also upheld the concurrent application of 
IHL and human rights.255  
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When internal violence reaches the threshold of an internal armed conflict, the law 
enforcement standards of human rights law may be inadequate. However, the 
impracticability of arrest and other less-than-lethal measures does not (necessarily) justify 
the killing of suspects.256 The present author argues that, in all situations where lethal force 
is resorted to (including in armed conflicts against non-legitimate military targets) human 
rights standards must be complied with.257  
Conduct which contravenes the regulatory regimes of human rights law and IHL 
engage the responsibility of the concerned State (and in some cases individuals).258 In the 
event that unlawful killings result from targeted killing operations carried out under law 
enforcement, responsibility attaches. This includes responsibility for both commission and 
omission.259 States are obliged to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of life and also to 
protect and preserve the right to life.260  
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Therefore, States must not only prevent but also actively try and punish deprivation 
of life resulting from criminal acts and the arbitrary conduct of the State‘s agents.261 Failure 
to do so would be ‗incompatible with effective protection of the right to life‘.262 
It is noteworthy that certain provisions of IHL and human rights law are jus cogens, 
and give rise to obligations erga omnes.263 Therefore, any violations of these norms also 
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engage both individual and State responsibility. Individual criminal liability also attaches 
specifically for ‗grave breaches‘ of IHL which may amount to war crimes.264 
c. The Law of Inter-State Use of Force 
The UN Charter is the principal international legal convention that governs the ‗use of 
force‘.265 The targeted killing of a selected individual on the territory of another State is an 
example of inter-State use of force. Targeted killing operations carried out on the territory of 
another State in the absence of the territorial States‘ consent falls under the customary 
international law prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.266 The 
UN Charter explicitly establishes a general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) 
which states:267 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other matter inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations. 
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The use of force in targeted killing operations may, however, be vindicated on 
grounds of self-defence and consent.268 Using force is also legitimized by the UN Security 
Council authorization.269 Therefore, in the absence of the above exculpatory circumstance, 
any targeted killing operation constitutes aggression which is prohibited in international 
law.270  
States usually engage in targeted killing operations as a defensive measure against 
transnational organized armed groups.271 The main precondition for self-defence is an 
‗armed attack‘.272 This requirement raises some difficulty regarding the threshold at which 
minor but persistent attacks by organized armed groups amount to an ‗armed attack‘ under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.273  
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In the Oil Platforms Case, the ICJ disallowed the United States‘ contention that the 
repeated attacks from the platforms constituted an ‗armed attack‘ in the aggregate.274 The 
high threshold for the qualification of low-intensity incidences as armed attack was 
reaffirmed in the Wall Advisory Opinion275 and in the Armed Activities in the Congo.276 Before 
responding with force to attacks by non-State actors, States should generally assess each 
attack on its merits with a view to determining whether it amounts to an ‗armed attack‘.277 
With the ever-increasing threats being posed by transnational armed groups, a 
popular construction of self-defence appears to be that of the Caroline Case (anticipatory self-
defence).278 This incident justified the use of force against non-State entities on the territory 
of another State, especially where the territorial State fails to prevent attacks emanating 
from its territory.279  
However, considerable problems arise with regard to the lawfulness of anticipatory 
targeted killings of non-State entities whose conduct does not engage the responsibility of 
any State.280 In many instances the attack against which the targeted killing operation is 
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conducted is neither occurring nor imminent, but is likely to take place in the near future.281 
This scenario places the burden of proving that the impending attack is of such gravity as to 
create a self-defence situation with the State which seeks to use force. 
Proponents of anticipatory self-defence hold that the ‗inherent‘ customary right of 
self-defence is unrestricted by Article 51 of the UN Charter.282 The textual formulation of 
Article 51 has been construed broadly to encompass not only an actual or imminent threats 
but also ‗continuing threats‘.283 This finds support in Security Council Resolutions 1367 and 
1373 which are affirmed in State practice.284  
In this regard, the proponents consider targeted killing to be permissible when the 
suspected terrorist is visible rather than only when the planned attack is already imminent or 
is being carried out.285 The contentions of the proponents of anticipatory self-defence should, 
however, be strictly regulated otherwise the Article 2(4) customary prohibition on the use of 
force would be diminished. 
Opponents of anticipatory self-defence take a more restrictive approach to 
interpreting Article 51 of the UN Charter. They hold that the use of force (especially 
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targeted killings) in the absence of an actual or imminent armed attack is unlawful.286 They 
view such use of force as being likely to be open to abuse leading to arbitrary killings on the 
basis of suspicion and unverifiable information provided by intelligence agencies.287 
Additionally, the broad and permissive interpretation of self-defence based on the ‗just‘ 
nature of the ‗broader cause‘ (for which force is used) may cause violations of IHL and 
human rights law.288  
Targeted killing under the law of the use of force is often vindicated under the 
notions of necessity and proportionality.289 These two grounds proceed from the premise 
that the harm sought to be averted is far greater than that which the killings seek to 
prevent.290 The above justifications thus appear as the standards by which the permissibility 
of violations of the targeted individual‘s right to life and of the territorial sovereignty of 
another State is measured.  
This implies that a targeted killing would be permissible if the threat posed by the 
(imminent or continuing) activities of the targeted individual outweighs the harm that 
would attend violations of: i) the individual‘s due process guarantees; ii) another State‘s 
sovereignty; and iii) the possibility of incidental civilian casualties. This argument 
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incorrectly ignores the parallel applicability of the law of the use of force with human rights 
law and IHL in situations of targeted killing.291  
Disregard for the rules of these other regimes in pursuit of self-defence objectives 
results in State and individual responsibility.292 Thus, using force in self-defence to the 
exclusion of the requirements of human rights law and IHL would be unlawful.293 
Extra-territorial targeted killings may quite obviously be justified if they are carried 
out on the basis of self-defence with the territorial State‘s consent.294 The existence of a 
legitimate self-defence situation is not, however, sufficient to legitimate a particular incident 
of targeted killing.295 This is because the law of self-defence determines the lawfulness of a 
targeted killing operation only with respect to the injured State. With regard to the injured 
individual, human rights law and IHL determines the lawfulness of the targeted killing.296 
Thus, targeted killing operations (even in legitimat  self-defence situations) must 
cumulatively conform to the rules of human rights law and IHL (where applicable). 
The upshot of the above discussion is that while the presence of consent legitimates 
resort to the use of force in self-defence, this does not absolve (both the consenting and the 
targeting) States‘ obligations to observe human rights and IHL regarding the use of lethal 
force against an individual.297 After a targeted killing operation, the consenting State should 
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carry out a follow-up investigation into the extent to which such killing is conducted in 
accordance with applicable human rights law and IHL.298 
In the event that a targeted killing operation is found to have unlawfully contravened 
restrictions on the use of force, liability attaches at two levels. First, a violation of the 
limitations on using force in self-defence engages both State and individual criminal 
responsibility for aggression.299 Secondly, any unlawful killing in violation of IHL may 
engage individual responsibility for war crimes.300 It is noteworthy that self-defence may not 
be invoked as a vindication of a State‘s conduct if it results in violations of IHL.301   
4. Legal Concerns Arising from the Notion of Targeted Killing 
The ascertainment of the identity of the target ordinarily precedes the decision to strike such 
a target.302 This is consonant with the principle of distinction which requires parties to an 
armed conflict to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives.303 However, in 
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the case of many transnational terrorist organizations,304 which are the main objects of 
targeted killing, the element of distinction becomes exceedingly blurred.305 To a large extent 
this results from the involvement of civilians in hostilities coupled with the exploitation by 
these terrorist organizations of the difficulty in determining their identities to dissimulate 
their activities.306  
The absence of uniforms within the ranks of the terrorist groups raises concerns 
about the ability to identify, with certainty, individuals as belonging to a hostile force.307 
Thus, the legal status and by extension the culpability of an individual not wearing a 
uniform but suspected of involvement in terrorism is far less easily ascertained.308 To 
compound this, the identification of individuals as terrorists grows more difficult as 
organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, become a network of small dispersed cells, or even 
individuals, thereby making the association with a hostile armed group even more 
tenuous.309 
Another legal issue that compounds the difficulties surrounding the classifying and 
evaluating of targeted killings is the fact that these operations are carried on outside the 
immediate theatre of the conflict.310 Examples include counter-terrorist engagements 
involving targeted killings in Yemen, Pakistan, or Somalia.311 A move towards the 
vindication of targeted killings in such situations brings about the unnecessary expansion of 
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the geographical scope of the armed conflict.312 Additionally, such a vindicatory move will 
be encumbered by rules concerning the peaceful relation of states, notably Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter.313  
The upshot of this legal concern is that, if unrestrained, targeted killings may 
increasingly be deployed against individuals or in territories that are much harder to 
justify.314 This may be illustrated by the furore raised over a US ‗hitlist‘ of drug lords alleged 
to have been bankrolling the Taliban in Afghanistan:315 
Recent reports about a U.S. ―hit list‖ of Afghan drug lords, even though 
supposedly taking place in an active combat zone, have sparked criticism that 
drug lords, even when they finance the Taliban, do not fit neatly within the 
concept of ―combatant,‖ and must instead be treated with law enforcement 
tools. 
A related legal concern that is germane to the very nature of targeted killing is the 
issue of incidental civilian casualties.316 Targeted killing operations aimed at terrorists 
invariably cause incidental harm to civilians and objects that are not legitimate military 
targets.317 The legitimacy of the extent of incidental harm to civilians in the course of an 
armed conflict is pegged on its proportionality to the anticipated military gain that stands to 
be achieved.318  
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In the Caroline incident, Mr. Webster indicated that the use of force in self-defence 
should not be ‗unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-
defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.‘319 The jus ad bellum 
proportionality flowing from Article 51 of the UN Charter has been interpreted as 
encompassing the means and method being used as well as the nature of the target against 
whom the attack is being directed.320 
5. Terrorist Threats: Terrorism and Targeted Killing in Contemporary Legal Doctrine 
The attacks on the twin towers in New York, of September 11, 2001, are regarded as having 
been the unveiling not only to America but also the rest of the world of a new and 
continuing threat.321 This threat was qualitatively different and far deadlier than previously 
known threats.322 In assessing the threats posed by terrorism and the contemporary legal 
doctrine concerning the lawfulness of targeted killing using drones, we must characterize the 
nature of the conflict. 
a. Defining and Characterizing Terrorism 
As Naftali and Michaeli hold, terrorism, like pornography, is much easier to recognize than 
it is to define.323 Terrorism defies the classical moulds that international law had set out for 
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situations of armed conflict.324 In its modern forms, categorizing terrorism as ‗international‘ 
or ‗non-international‘ armed conflicts may cause certain difficulties.325 This is primarily 
because the dynamic of present day terrorism is such that its conduct, actors, forms and 
manifestations, and its means and methods, are so dynamic as to be compatible with what it 
was earlier cut out to be.326  
A ‗terrorist‘ will in the present research be defined in terms of the following 
disjunctive criteria set down by the UN Security Council as individuals who commit 
criminal acts, including against civilians with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
injury, and/or; take hostages, with the purpose to provoke terror in general public or within 
a group of persons or particular persons; intimidate a population or compel a government or 
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act; or commit acts that 
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism.327  
A supplementary definition of terrorism was provided by former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan who stated in his Report In Larger Freedom as any act ‗intended to 
cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of 
intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to 
do or abstain from doing any act‘.328 
A better characterization of US conflict with al Qaeda would be an armed conflict of 
a transnational character.329 This is primarily because the concerned belligerents in such a 
conflict normally comprise individuals of varying nationalities and also the fact that the 
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location of hostilities would invariably transcend borders of states.330 Advantageous to such 
a characterization is the fact that it implicitly skirts the restrictive and state-centric textual 
formulation of Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.331  
This characterization, however, is not without its challenges. In the absence of 
explicit legal recognition of ‗transnational‘ armed conflict in any international treaty or 
agreement, there is no clarity as to the specific regulations that would be applicable in such a 
conflict.332 However, this challenge is not insurmountable as the law of international armed 
conflict is supposed to apply whenever a conflict is beyond the scope of internal armed 
conflict.333  
More important, is that fact that customary international law would definitely be 
applicable in this situation.334 This is consonant with the Martens Clause which states ‗the 
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized 
peoples,‘ would apply. Any assertion should be rejected that, insofar as international law 
has taken a gradualist approach in considering non-state actors as its subjects, its protections 
do not extend thus far.335 This is because with such recognition there is a contemporaneous 
recognition and protection of the rights of concerned individuals.336 The upshot of this is 
that however termed, in the engagements against terrorists, customary international law will 
come into play.337  
In this regard, we must note that the Geneva Conventions‘ extensive ratification 
elevates them to the status of rules of customary IHL.338 According to the ICRC Study 
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‗majority of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 3, are 
considered to be part of customary international law.‘339 It is noteworthy that many of the 
provisions of the Additional Protocols are considered as being reflective of customary law.340 
A salient example of this is Article 75 of AP I341 which has received scholarly 
endorsement.342  
b. (Counter-terrorist) Combat Engagements against Non-State Actors 
The notion of a war against terrorism or transnational terrorist organizations brings about 
the issue of whether a state can legitimately use force against a non-state actor.343 The use of 
force in this case will be dependent on whether force is used on a states‘ own territory, or on 
the territory of another state with or without consent. Classical international law 
emphatically rejects such a proposition. In 1758, Vattel stated that ‗the sovereign power 
alone is possessed of authority to make war‘344 while Jean Jacques Rousseau declared in 
1763 that ‗each State can have only other States, and not men, as enemies since no true 
relationship can be established between things of different natures.‘345  
Later developments in international law revealed an inclination towards the 
recognition of non-state actors as belligerents and thus parties to armed conflicts. The 
United States, for instance, engaged in armed conflict with guerrillas in the Philippines in 
spite of their lacking in sovereign status.346 This conflict significantly furthered the 
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development of IHL with the war crimes trials that were conducted in its wake under the 
concept of command responsibility.347  
The continued recognition of non-State actors as equal belligerents received support 
from the UN General Assembly‘s broadening of belligerent status to ‗national liberation 
movements‘ in international armed conflicts348 and the subsequent codification of this in the 
1977 Additional Protocols. This was a progressive development considering that initially the 
primary province of international law of armed conflict was regulating the intercourse of 
States. The recognition of non-State actors leads one to the conclusion that in combating 




c. Classifying Enemy Status in the ‘War on Terror’ 
The distinction of persons who are legally permitted to participate in hostilities is 
fundamental to the functioning of the law of armed conflict.349 This is essential to 
determining the varying degrees of protection due to an individual. One of the aspects of the 
‗war on terror‘, thus far a wellspring of much controversy, concerns the classification of 
enemy status.350 Thus, an important step to ensure adherence to the laws of armed conflict is 
the clarification of the legal status of those engaging in armed conflict.351  
This will promote better protections that are available to the parties to an armed 
conflict. IHL distinguishes between combatants and civilians and provides them with 
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protections that are peculiar to the status.352 There have also been calls for the staking out of 
another status of those combatants who are not privileged or properly so-called.353 The 
subsequent subsections undertake an analysis of the rules governing the eligibility of an 
individual for inclusion in these classifications and the legal implications of selection.    
i) Combatant Status 
The international law of armed conflict distinguishes between combatants and non-
combatants.354 One of the earlier attempts at distinction can be evinced from Francis Lieber 
who brought to attention the need for classification of guerrillas and prisoners of war.355 
Subsequent to this, Francis Lieber produced the Lieber Code which contributed significantly 
to the Brussels Declaration of 1874.  
The term ‗combatant‘ applies to those persons who are legitimately allowed to 
participate in armed conflict under international law.356 These include members of the 
regular armed forces (except medical personnel, chaplains, civil defence personnel, and 
members of the armed forces who have acquired civil defence status) and irregular forces 
under responsible command, who carry their arms openly and distinguish themselves from 
the civilian population.357  
In vindicating the targeted killings of suspected terrorists, the presumption of their 
‗unprivileged‘ combatancy is usually made by the party conducting the operation.358 This, 
however, needs to be ascertained as a matter of fact since the legality of such targeted 
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killings is hinged on the demonstrable nature of the selected individual as not being a 
protected person or a person who is immune to lawful attack.359  
Article 4(A)(2) of GC III stipulates which conditions must be met in order for one to 
qualify as a combatant. Kretzmer sets out these requirements thus: i) wearing a fixed 
distinctive sign; ii) carrying arms openly, and iii) conducting operations in accordance with 
the laws and customs of war.360 The criteria of Article 4(A)(2) of GC III criteria for 
combatant status effectively precludes members of terrorist groups from meriting combatant 
status.  
ii) Civilian Status 
Civilian status in customary international law is defined in the negative sense as person who 
is not a combatant.361 This negative definition is aptly captured in Article 50 of AP I which 
defines a ‗civilian‘ as any person ‗who does not belong to one of the categories of persons 
referred to in Article 4 (A) (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of 
this Protocol.‘ Kolb & Hyde explain that the negative formulation is significant as it defines 
a ‗civilian‘ from the relational perspective of ‗combatant‘ status so as to avert any 
uncertainty as to status which may ‗operate to the detriment of civilians.‘362  
The negative formulation of civilian status is captured in the ICRC definition thus: 
‗all persons who are neither members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict nor 
participants in a levee en masse‘.363 Schmitt notes the significance of this definition is to 
exclude all persons encompassed by Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Regulations IV,364 Article 
4(A)(2) of the GC III and Article 43(1) of AP I,365 thus presenting a classic understanding of 
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the term ‗civilian‘.366 Article 51 of AP I underscores the fact that civilian status is definitive 
of those non-combatants who neither take up arms nor participate in any way in 
hostilities.367  
Thus, it is discernible that the rights accorded to civilians as non-combatants entail a 
corresponding duty on their part to refrain from participating in hostilities.368 Dinstein 
underscores the fact that civilians are afforded a conditional set of protections under 
international law, for instance protection of life, dignity and personal liberty.369  
The conditional aspects discernible from Article 51 AP I which entitles civilians to 
protections ‗unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities‘370 are two-fold. 
There is a material condition which involves not only actual participation in hostilities but 
also active preparations for a planned attack, and a temporal condition which specifies that 
‗for such time‘ as the proscribed conduct subsists.371 Thus, if a civilian takes a direct part in 
hostilities all the rights and protections due to them under the Geneva Conventions shall be 
lost and the civilian will be categorised as an unlawful combatant.372 
iii) Unlawful Combatancy 
The preceding subsections on combatant and civilian status lead to the conclusion that the 
targeted terrorists qualify neither for combatant nor civilian status.373 In the Hostages Case, 
the tribunal used ‗unlawful combatants‘ to refer to members of resistance movements and 
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armed groups.374 Articles 75 and 45 of AP I (when read together) point to the fact of the 
presence of individuals who are neither combatants nor civilians.375 This creates some 
doubts as to what rights and protections due to these individuals.  
The status that appropriately fits the circumstances of this group is that of ‗unlawful 
combatant‘ which denotes engagement in hostilities of an individual in the absence of the 
legal sanction of IHL.376 The Court in Ex Parte Quirin determined that the law of armed 
conflict distinguishes between lawful and unlawful combatants.377 Thus, as unlawful 
combatants, the targeted individuals will not merit the full privileges of lawful combatants, 
for instance, the accordance of Prisoner of War status when they fall into enemy hands.378 
Unlawful combatants therefore enjoy only the minimum basic protections of Common 
Article 3 and Article 75 of AP I.379  
Consequently, shorn of the special protections due to civilians and combatants, the 
unlawful combatant is a legitimate target who may lawfully be subjected to attack.380 
However, it is noteworthy that the erstwhile civilian status of unlawful combatants can be 
regained upon their laying down of arms and discontinuing all activities related to 
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hostilities.381 So as not to engender a ‗revolving door‘ scenario the onus lies with the 
reformed unlawful combatant to unequivocally make evident his non-engagement in active 
hostilities.382 
6. An Overview of Targeting Principles in International Law 
The international legal regime governing targeting involves selection of the target and the 
limitations of incidental civilian harm. The applicable international law is found in two 
sources: (i) the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 which regulates the ‗means and methods‘ 
of warfare,383 and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.384  
Some commentators argue that the two Additional Protocols merged the Hague 
rules for regulating the methods of warfare with the Geneva rules for protecting victims of 
armed conflicts.385 In exploring the principles of targeting, the methods by which, as well as 
the circumstances in which the object of the attack may be targeted, will be considered. This 
sub-section explores the application of the principles of military necessity, distinction, 
proportionality, and precautions in the conduct of targeted killings.  
The international principles of lawful targeting have three premises.386 The first flows 
from the fact that a belligerent does not have an unlimited right to attack the enemy.387 The 
second is a prohibition on launching any kind of attacks on a civilian population.388 The 
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third is the need to distinguish between combatants and non-combatant with a view to 
sparing the latter from the adverse effects of hostilities.389  
Consequently, under lawful targeting, all ‗reasonable precautions‘ must be taken to 
ensure that only military objectives are targeted thereby avoiding unnecessary incidental 
civilian injury, death and destruction to property.390 These three principles are integral to the 
objective steps that are factored into the targeting process. They are essential in the 
determination of whether, when and how an object of an attack may be targeted. 
a. Necessity 
In jus in bello, jus ad bellum and also in human rights law, this principle restricts the use of 
force. It demands that less grave methods be attempted and found insufficient to ‗deter 
further attacks making up the terror campaign‘.391 Resort to targeted killing in the context of 
countering suspected terrorists must therefore preclude the presence of non-lethal 
alternatives.392 Targeted killings must thus only be resorted to when mere incapacitation is 
insufficient and when it is objectively indispensable to intentionally kill the targeted 
individual.393 
Under human rights law, necessity demands that any operation be in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim (other than killing of an individual) and it places a test of ‗absolute 
necessity‘.394 This implies that the force used must be: i) strictly unavoidable (qualitatively 
                                                             
389 Article 57(2)(a)(ii), AP I: ‗take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a 
view to avoiding, and in any event, minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage 
to civilian objects‘; Robert Kolb & Richard Hyde, ibid at 133. 
390 Article 57(2)(a)(ii), AP I, ibid; ECtHR, Bankovic v Belgium Application No. 52207/99. 
391 Rasul v Bush 72 USLW 4596 (2004); Michael N Schmitt ‗Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues‘ 
(2004) 34 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 83; Michael N Schmitt, supra note 316 at 525-554. 
392 Amos N Guiora, supra note 132 at 325; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, 23, paragraph 77. 
393 ECtHR, McCann, paragraph 149; Nils Melzer, supra note 3 at 228; Marko Milanovic, supra note 42 at 389: 
‗A civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is doing so, if a less harmful 
means can be employed. Thus, if a terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be arrested, interrogated, and 
tried, those are the means which should be employed. In the words of the Court, ‗‗Trial is preferable to use of 
force. A rule-of-law state employs, to the extent possible, procedures of law and not procedures of force.‖‘ 
394 UNHRC, Suarez de Guerero v Columbia (1982), paragraph 13.1 to 13.3; UNHRC, Baboeram et al. v Suriname, 
paragraph 14.3 and 15; IACiHR, Alejandre Case, paragraph 37 and 45; IACiHR, Chumbivilcas Case, paragraph 












necessary);395 ii) of such a minimal degree or manner as to achieve the legitimate purpose 
(quantitative necessity);396 and iii) that which, at the moment of its application, is used 
against a person who presents or continues to present a threat (temporal necessity).397   
Jus in bello necessity (military necessity) obliges States defending themselves against 
armed attacks to resort only to such measures as are required to achieve legitimate military 
objectives.398 Jus ad bellum necessity, on the other hand, requires States to assess whether 
they have means to defend themselves other than through armed force.399 Thus, the main 
aim of necessity is to enable the assessment whether force may be used as a means to 
counter the effects of an ongoing or future action.400 This underlies the idea that, rather than 
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being reactive, retaliatory and retributive, the targeted killing of a particular individual must 
be meant to prevent only ongoing or future attacks.401 
b. Distinction 
In jus in bello, the belligerent parties to an armed conflict must differentiate between military 
objectives, civilian objects and civilian persons.402 Attacks may be directed only against 
military objectives.403 With specific regard to targeting, the principle of distinction is derived 
from the IHL prohibition against indiscriminate attacks which, among other limitations, are 
‗not directed at a specific military objective.‘404  
A critical question posed in the conduct of targeted killing operations is whether 
members of transnational organized armed groups constitute military objectives.405 Targeted 
killing is only lawful when the target is a ‗combatant‘, ‗fighter‘ or a civilian ‗for such time‘ as 
they directly participate in hostilities.406 Members of organized armed groups may not 
qualify as combatants: although they may have a structure of command organized under a 
command responsible to a party to an armed conflict, they may fail to meet the visibility 
requirement for combatant status under Article 43 of AP I.407 
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The principle of distinction distinguishes between persons who may be legitimately 
targeted (military objectives) and those who are protected from direct attack (protected 
persons).408 This principle has attained the normative status of customary international 
law.409 Enabling provisions which restate the customary norm of distinction in international 
and internal armed conflicts are Articles 48 and 51(2) of AP I.410 
The import of the above provision is that, ‗the civilian population and individual 
civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations.‘411 
However, civilians are apt to lose the protection of international humanitarian law 
protection ‗for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.‘412  
By virtue of recurrent direct involvement with, and participation in, hostilities and 
activities amounting to a ‗continuous combat function‘,413 members of organized armed 
groups are usually not accorded civilian status and the protections attendant on it.414 Thus, 
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the targeting and subsequent killing of such individuals may amount to a legitimate military 
objective subject to the non-indiscriminate nature and regulated conduct of the attack.415 
c. Proportionality 
Proportionality (under IHL) limits the degree of force used and also requires that the only 
lawful object of an attack should be a resultant weakening of the enemy‘s military force.416 
Proportionality requires that an attack should be clearly kept within the necessity of the 
attack.417 Thus, from this flows the requirement that the conduct of hostilities must not 
cause disproportionate harm to the civilian population and civilian objects.418  
Civilians who may be within the vicinity of the attacks against legitimate targets are 
entitled to the IHL‘s protections.419 These civilians are protected from the harmful effects of 
such an attack, especially those incidental deaths or injuries, and collateral loss or damage 
to their property that arises in the wake of a targeted drone strike.420   
As can be expected, making a decision on the proportionality of a particular choice 
of target causes great difficulty because it assesses civilian injury or loss life against the 
expected objectives of an attack.421 The principle of proportionality balances the imperatives 
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of military necessity and the ‗inherent‘ human right to life.422 Thus, proportionality requires 
a value judgment as to whether the harm likely to be caused by the force used in an 
operation is justified in view of the expected gains.423  
Advances in modern warfare have refocused the principle of proportionality by not 
only proscribing indiscriminate attacks but also determining the ‗extent to which civilians 
are entitled to be protected from the collateral effects of war‘.424 Unmanned drones represent 
the great advantage which technological advancement (in smart and precision bombing) 
brings to the limitation of collateral damage. Drones have greater surveillance capabilities 
which afford better precision, and are thus better placed to limit civilian casualties and 
injuries.425  
However, the efficacy of this precision is largely dependent on human intelligence. 
Thus, precaution must be taken to ensure that the intelligence on which targeted killing 
decisions are based is accurate and is continuously being verified.426 
AP I goes on to elaborate the notion of an indiscriminate attack by outlining it as one 
which ‗may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.‘427  
Kretzmer identifies three aspects that need to be factored into the determination of 
the proportionality of the targeted killing of a suspected terrorist as follows: i) the danger to 
life posed by the continued activities of the terrorists; ii) the chance of the danger to human 
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life being realized if the activities of the suspected terrorist are not halted immediately; and 
iii) the danger that civilians will be killed or wounded in the attack on the suspected 
terrorist.428 
The customary nature of the principle of proportionality was affirmed in the Nuclear 
Weapons Case where the ICJ stated that myriad provisions of the AP I reflect customary 
international law.429 The ICTY reaffirmed this in the Kupreskic Case where it characterized 
the provisions of Articles 57 and 58 of AP I as constituting customary international law.430 
The import of these provisions is that proportionality may preclude an attack on a lawful 
target if the anticipated incidental injuries and collateral damage would be disproportionate 
to the expected military gain.431     
In the practice of targeting, proportionality is more oriented towards expected results 
(incapacitating or killing the would-be attacker) and less towards the limitation of the degree 
of force used (in view of the attacker‘s intention and the harm being averted).432 This 
expected result orientation is however prone to subjective determinations that are informed 
by individual evaluations of the operations commander.433  
As such, considerable latitude is afforded to (military or law enforcement) 
commanders thereby increasing their discretion when making evaluations. This does not, 
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however, affect the objective requirements of proportionality which aim at fostering 
accountability of commanders.434 Under IHL, proportionality necessarily requires parties to 
the conflict to consciously reflect on the adverse effects of any single targeting against the 
anticipated military gains.435 Under human rights law, requires an operation to be carried 
out for the purpose of preventing an unlawful attack on human life.436      
d. Precaution 
In recognition of the imperfections bedevilling even the latest and most advanced targeting 
technologies, IHL requires the observance of the principle of precaution.437 Article 57 of AP 
I sets out the precautions that need to be taken prior to an attack.438 Foremost in this 
requirement is that ‗in the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to 
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.‘439  
Further, persons undertaking the targeting should ‗do everything feasible‘ to make 
certain that the target is indeed a military objective and more importantly to ‗take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in 
any event to minimizing incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects.‘440  
In seeking to conform to the requirements of Article 57 when targeting, certain 
means are relied upon. These encompasses robust intelligence gathering, effective 
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verification of accuracy of information, and objectively estimating of collateral damage.441 
Should the envisaged use of a particular method of targeting fail to satisfy the requirements 
of IHL, its threat or use would be unlawful.442 
Under human right law, law enforcement operations (including targeted killings) 
must be planned, organized and controlled so as to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, 
recourse to lethal force. Operations which rely on intelligence information should ensure 
such intelligence is thoroughly verified before resorting to lethal force so as to prevent 
situations where individuals are killed on mere suspicion.443  
However, in recognition of the realistic circumstances of law enforcement agents, 
human rights law places a standard of ‗reasonableness in the circumstances‘.444 This enables 
resulting unintended loss of life to be defensible if they are a consequence of (an honest) 
mistaken belief in the prevailing circumstances at the time.445 
 
7. Targeted Killing, Law Enforcement and the Question of Extrajudicial Killing 
Targeted killings that are carried out during the absence of an armed conflict include those 
to which the law of self-defence applies and those to which it does not. Such killings are 
regulated under the law enforcement regime.446 In the later case, the restrictions of law 
enforcement are applicable and these require compliance with both international human 
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rights law and municipal law.447 Any killing that does not comply with these requirements 
amounts to extrajudicial and arbitrary killing, which is unlawful.448  
The domestic restrictions on the use of lethal force in law enforcement situations 
vary from State to State.449 However, there are certain fundamental principles which are 
common to all States. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials is a good example of the fundamental standards to be observed in law 
enforcement officials.450 It provides a model for the restriction of States‘ resort to potentially 
lethal law enforcement techniques.451 
Human rights law restricts resort to lethal law enforcement methods so as to 
safeguard the ‗inherent right to life‘ and further proscribes ‗arbitrary‘ deprivation of life.452 
Though not couched in the ‗arbitrary‘ formulation, Article 2 of the ECHR proscribes the 
‗intentional‘ deprivation of life unless it is ‗absolutely necessary‘ or ‗in defence of any person 
from unlawful violence‘.453  
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The regulation of targeted killing under law enforcement is guided by strict necessity 
and absolute proportionality. Strict necessity obliges the use of less lethal methods (arrest or 
non-lethal incapacitation) if they are available and reasonably likely to achieve the 
objective.454 Absolute proportionality requires the use of only that degree of force needed to 
achieve the legitimate end.455  
Schmitt notes that certain situations which meet the proportionality and necessity 
requirements, for instance a suicide bomber in a crowded area, may warrant the use of 
lethal force.456 This observation is borne out by the ruling of the European Court in the 
McCann Case where it was held that the targeted killing of three suspected IRA terrorists did 
not violate Article 2 of the European Convention.457 
In situations such as in McCann, where less-lethal methods are impractical without 
forewarning the suspected terrorist, targeted killing may be permissible.458 But, permissibility 
in this case would be subject to the reliability of information regarding the suspect‘s future 
intention to attack and the unavailability of any other opportunity to prevent the attack.459  
However, it must be noted that, in self-defence situations, the presumption of 
innocence applies thus requiring reliable information of the status of the target, his intention 
and ability to carry out an attack.460 This implies that law enforcement operations must be 
planned, organized and controlled in a way that minimizes, to the greatest extent possible, 
recourse to lethal force.461 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
respectively cited in Michael N Schmitt, supra note 203 at 529; ECtHR, Gül Case, paragraph 12; ECtHR, 
Sreletz, Kessler and Krenz v Germany (2001), paragraph 87, 97 and 102; ECtHR, Gülec v Turkey (1998) paragraph 
71, 73 and 83; ECtHR, McCann Case, paragraph 213. 
454 ECtHR, Ayetkin v Turkey (1997), paragraph 91. 
455 Michael N Schmitt, supra note 203 at 529. 
456 Michael N Schmitt, ibid at 529. 
457 ECtHR, McCann Case (Judgment of 5 September 1995) cited in Michael N Schmitt, ibid at 530. 
458 Michael N Schmitt, ibid at 530. 
459 Michael N Schmitt, ibid at 530. 
460 Michael N Schmitt, ibid at 530. 
461 ECtHR, McCann Case, paragraph 150 and 194; ECtHR, Nachova Case, paragraph 93; ECtHR, Andronicou and 












From the above scenario, a mistaken targeted killing resulting from using drones will 
only be consonant with human rights if the State agents were acting on the reasonable 
belief, under the circumstances that such action is necessary to avert an imminent attack by 
the targeted individual.462 If the requisite preconditions are not fulfilled, the lethal use of 
force would constitute an ‗extrajudicial killing‘ which is an unlawful deprivation of life.463  
8. Analysis of Contemporary Legal Doctrine on Targeted Killing 
The pages of history are interleaved with various accounts of sovereigns undertaking to 
dispose of selected individuals considered either as private or public enemies.464 On this 
subject, eminent historians, philosophers and jurists have written numerous volumes on 
assassination, political murder and tyrannicide.465  
In this regard, the notion of targeted killing is not an emergent concept, whether as a 
matter of fact or as a subject of legal discussion.466 The 21st century version of targeted 
killing has involved covert operations467 predominantly carried out by secret service agents 
and military undercover units.468 This has been a turbulent period which witnessed 
escalating incidents by terrorist groups which resorted to violent acts (including aerial 
hijackings, hostage takings and bomb attacks) as a forceful means of advancing political or 
ideological goals.469  
The resultant pressure on law enforcement agencies led to the development of 
specialized units within the extant police and security forces to deal with the terrorist 
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situations.470 In many instances these elite counter-terrorist units pursued ‗shoot-to-kill‘ 
policies which were largely criticised on grounds of its unlawfulness, illegitimacy and 
attendant allegations of collusion, corruption and arbitrariness.471 Owing to the doubtful 
legality of these operations and the non-accountability occasioned by the secrecy involved, 
targeted killing was couched in a ‗shadowy real of half-legality‘.472  
Currently, in contrast to earlier attitudes, targeted killing is gradually gaining 
legitimacy as a method of counter-terrorism and ‗surgical‘ warfare.473 Several States are, 
whether expressly or implicitly, acknowledging that in their efforts to contain terrorist or 
insurgent activities they have resorted to targeted killing.474  
In analyzing the contemporary legal doctrine on targeted killing, the permissibility of 
the practice will be discussed under three regimes namely; i) the law of inter-State use of 
force; ii) human rights law; and iii) IHL. With these systems of legal rules as the framework 
for analysis, the sources of international law (treaties, custom, general principles, judicial 
decisions and juristic teachings) will periodically be referred to in the exercise of clarifying 
contemporary debates on the subject of targeted killing.475   
 
a. Analysis of the Notion of Targeted Killing under the Law of Inter-State Use of Force 
Resort by a State to targeted killing of a selected individual, for instance a suspected 
terrorist, within another State is regulated by the UN Charter‘s prohibition on the use of 
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force under Article 2(4).476 Zengel contends that state-sponsored targeted killing should be 
considered as one of the many methods by which states use force and thus should be treated 
within the same circumstances and constraints that govern the use of force.477 Vindication of 
such use of force is legally permissible either in situations of self-defence,478 with the 
permission of the State on whose territory the attack is to occur,479 or with the permission of 
the UN Security Council.480  
Discussions of targeted killing under the law of inter-State use of force usually 
proceed from the premise of self-defence in two ways: first, targeted killing is resorted to as a 
pre-emptive and defensive strategy against attacks of transnational organized armed groups 
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operating within the territory of another State;481 and secondly, as a pre-emptive measure 
against the leader of a ‗rogue‘ State intending to acquire weapons of mass destruction.482 
Both of these scenarios, based as they are on self-defence have led to debate about 
the element of an ‗armed attack‘ which is a precondition for the exercise of self-defence.483 
With specific emphasis on transnational terrorist attacks a question is posed: when does a 
single incident, or a series, of terrorist attacks amount to an ‗armed attack‘ within the 
meaning of Article 51 UN Charter?484  
In answering this question, most authors take the interpretive approach used in the 
Caroline Case where the extent of force used in self-defence is required to be commensurate 
with the violation against which the self-defence is being employed.485 Thus, this leads one 
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to the conclusion that defensive and deterrent military action is warranted not only against 
States but also against non-State actors.486  
The ICJ decision in the Oil Platforms Case took into account the argument raised by 
the United States that the attacks launched by Iran represented a ‗cumulation of events‘ 
amounting to an armed attack warranting resort to force in self-defence.487 Additionally, this 
decision represents the acceptance of the lawfulness of self-defence action, particularly 
where the territorial State from which these non-State actors operate fails to prevent cross-
border attacks.488 
The anticipatory nature of pre-emptive targeted killings launched against suspected 
terrorists as an act of self-defence has not been without controversy.489 In some instances the 
attack by these terrorists is neither occurring, nor imminent, but is likely to occur in the near 
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future.490 Pre-emptive targeted killings are defended from a standpoint of the State‘s 
‗inherent‘ right of self-defence in customary international law undergirded by the argument 
that due to the clandestine nature of terrorist activities and of the potentially destructive 
effects of their attacks, targeted killings are permissible.491  
Thus, in light of the foregoing argument, the proponents of pre-emptive self-defence 
hold that targeted killing of individuals who pose grave threats to a State‘s security is lawful 
not only when the attacks are imminent or ongoing but also when these individuals are 
‗visible‘.492 
Those who are opposed to the notion of pre-emptive targeted killings of in self-
defence proceed from a position of the textual interpretation of Article 51 UN Charter 
which proscribes any inter-State use of force until a concrete ‗armed attack‘ actually occurs 
or is patently imminent.493 They contend that, if permitted, it would lead to an arbitrary use 
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of force based on speculation, or at best, unverifiable information494 provided by intelligence 
services,495 which is in contravention to Article 2(4) UN Charter.496   
b. Analysis of the Notion of Targeted Killing under Human Rights Law 
Wilful killing of selected individuals under human rights is a law enforcement issue 
governed by the notion of the inalienable right to life.497 The protection of every human 
being‘s ‗inherent right to life‘498 is a jus cogens norm widely recognized by most international 
human rights treaties as one of the highest rights on the normative hierarchy.499  
The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) clarified the non-derogability of the right 
to life in General Comment No. 29 by stating that the existence of an emergency does not 
vindicate the deprivation of an individual‘s right to life.500 General Comment No. 6 of the 
HRC further states that, apart from the negative obligation on States not to violate the right 
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to life, States are also obliged to prevent the deprivation of an individual‘s right to life by 
private actors and State agents.501  
Thus, States owe an obligation not only to persons endangered by terrorist attacks 
but also to the terrorists themselves.502 The obligations owed to suspected terrorists include 
the presumption of innocence,503 treatment of the suspects in accordance with due process,504 
and fair trial guarantees by an independently constituted court followed by sentencing in 
accordance with the law.505 This places a duty on State agents to objectively scrutinize each 
operation so as to avoid arbitrary or erroneous targeting which violate human rights.506  
A notable feature in contemporary international law is the growing complementarity 
between IHL and human rights law, both in law enforcement situations and in the conduct 
of hostilities.507 This complementarity is important as there may be law enforcement 
situations that involve targeting where IHL applies, but outside the conduct of hostilities 
(for instance in an occupied territory). 
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A noteworthy feature of the proscription on the deprivation of the right to life, for 
example in Article 6 of the ICCPR, is a qualification of the prohibition to instances where it 
is ‗arbitrary‘.508 A glaring omission is the absence of any definition of ‗arbitrary‘.509 This 
shortfall is cured by the textual interpretation of other human rights treaties, a notable 
example being Article 2 of the ECHR which proscribes intentional deprivation of life. This 
provision adopts a proportionality standard to determine whether the deprivation was 
‗absolutely necessary‘.510  
The ECtHR in the McCann Case clarified the preconditions for the lawful deprivation 
of life established by Article 2 of the ECHR511 as including ‗absolute necessity‘512 and ‗strict 
proportionality‘.513 The jurisprudence of the European Court has upheld the absolute 
necessity requirement in the Nachova Case514 and the strict proportionality requirement in the 
Gulec Case515 and Ergi Case.516 The above preconditions also require all reasonable 
precautionary measures to be factored into the organization of the operation to prevent the 
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deprivation of life being based on mere suspicion, or situations where less lethal measures 
would have sufficed.517 
In the Juan Carlos Abella Case, the Court clarified the ‗arbitrary‘ element by holding 
that lethal force need not be used against persons who no longer pose a threat to security.518 
Similarly, in Niera Alegria the Court clarified the necessity and proportionality elements by 
taking the view that disproportionate or excessive force leading to loss of life amounts to 
arbitrary deprivation of life.519 Additionally, the Court has held as ‗arbitrary‘ any deprivation 
of life resulting from the failure of domestic law to regulate the use of lethal force as well as 
the disregard for all reasonable precautionary measures.520 
Under human rights law, targeted killing is permissible only in the most extreme 
circumstances (when used for defensive purposes),521 for instance the prevention of a 
concrete and immediate danger of death or serious physical injury.522 The above 
circumstance must be premised on a strong presumption that the anticipated deprivation of 
life is in violation of the right to life.523 The upshot of this is that, under the law enforcement 
system of rules, targeted killing is not permissible, unless there is no other viable (or 
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available) opportunity to protect the individuals who are objects of the impending attack by 
apprehending the suspect.524  
c. Analysis of the Notion of Targeted Killing under IHL  
Most of the analysis concerning the lawfulness of targeted killings under IHL proceeds from 
the position that there is an ongoing ‗armed conflict‘.525 This begs the question whether a 
particular situation in which targeted killing is used can be classified as an international or 
internal armed conflict within the meaning of IHL.526 The question raised by the preceding 
statement has led to divergent conclusions drawn from the cases of the Israeli-Palestinian 
confrontation,527 and the US engagements in the ‗war on terrorism‘528 which has led several 
authors to suggest that the legal concept of an ‗armed conflict‘ in IHL requires further 
clarification.  
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Targeted killing in situations of occupation such as in the Israeli-Palestinian situation 
brings into question whether human rights should be observed by an occupying power in 
spite of the applicability of IHL.529 The contemporary consensus in international law is that, 
outside the conduct of hostilities, the use of lethal force against civilians must be governed 
by the human rights standard of strict necessity.530  
Within the conduct of hostilities, however, the targeted killing of selected individuals 
is only permissible insofar as the principle of distinction is observed and that those who are 
being targeted are legitimate military targets (including combatants or civilians directly 
participating in hostilities).531  
The nature of terrorist operations blurs the legal standards of distinction and ‗direct 
participation‘ in armed hostilities. In targeted killing operations there is considerable 
difficulty where the individuals being targeted are not visibly engaged in armed conflict at 
the time of targeting.532  
For purposes of distinction under IHL, the resultant question is whether terrorists in 
their legal position as organised non-State armed groups are to be regarded as civilians or as 
combatants.533 Regarding them as civilians makes their targeting legally permissible only ‗for 
such time‘ as they are directly participating in hostilities, whilst regarding them as 
unprivileged combatants would open them to attack at all times.534 Should terrorists be 
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found to be civilians, questions regarding the material and temporal scope of their 
participation in hostilities automatically arise in order to justify their targeting.535  
Considerable criticism, the most prominent being the shortcutting of the 
technicalities of IHL (thus creating more definitional problems than it resolves),536 has been 
levelled against the simplistic attribution of the status of legitimate military targets to 
suspected terrorists.537 This has led to consensus on the fact that each specific act (of 
suspected terrorists) should be assessed as to whether it amounts to direct participation so as 
to determine how long such individuals may be directly attacked.538      
Extant literature on the conduct of targeted killings under IHL elaborates the concept 
of military necessity and proportionality by requiring that such killing must offer a concrete 
military advantage.539 In addition, targeted killing can comply with IHL only if it is not 
treacherous or perfidious.540 The precision of targeting must also be borne in mind so as to 
so as limit as much as possible incidental deaths and injuries, and collateral damage 
resulting from erroneous targeting.541 
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The sum of all contemporary legal concerns flowing from an analysis of the legality 
of targeted killing under IHL revolves around the question of the qualification of the 
incident as an armed conflict,542 the clarification of the status of the participants in such a 
conflict,543 and the legal standards of precaution and proportionality.544        
9. Conclusion on the Contemporary Legal Doctrine on Targeted Killing 
This chapter has laid out the legal rules governing the use of lethal force so as to situate 
targeted killing within the context of the applicable international law. The critical 
importance of the interpretation of the combatancy status of suspected terrorists, the 
principles of (military and absolute) necessity, and (strict) proportionality has also been 
noted as significant. These standards should be applied concurrently and complementarily 
to the extent that they are applicable to the specific situation in question to avoid a gray area 
or half legality. The resulting standards would restrict the use of lethal force to situations 









                                                             
542 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 47; Harold Koh, supra note 39 at 3. 
543 Nils Melzer, ibid at 56-57; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 59.  
544 Nils Melzer, supra note 3 at 57; Malcolm N Shaw, supra note 136 at 1063; ECtHR, Bankovic v Belgium, 
Judgment of 12 December 2001; William J Fenrick ‗Targeting and Proportionality During the NATO 













III. PARADIGMATIC CONTEXTS OF TARGETED KILLING USING DRONES IN 
CONTEMPORARY STATE PRACTICE 
1. Introduction 
This section assesses the legality of targeted killings using drones in contemporary State 
practices using three systems of regulations. These comprise rules which govern certain 
situations where targeted killing may be applied (with a view to restrict targeted killing). The 
first one is the self-defence regime which governs the legality of transnational use of force. 
The second one is the law enforcement regime which deals with human rights implications 
of the use of lethal force in law enforcement. The third one is the hostilities regime which 
concerns IHL. 
2. Targeted Killing using Drones within the Rules Governing Self-Defence 
States dealing with terrorist threats (or attacks) face grave challenges with regard to the 
observance and respect for rules of internati nal law. It has been suggested by some that in 
international law, there are no rules dealing with terrorist organizations.545 This raises the 
issue of what, if any, norms of international law apply in the event that there is a military 
conflict between a transnational organized armed group (such as al-Qaeda) and a State. 
The hallmark of contemporary jus ad bellum is embedded and embodied in Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.546 It provides thus: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.547 
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The ICJ in the Nicaragua Case held that Article 2(4) reflects customary law while Dinstein 
contends that its proper construction is an all-encompassing one, thus disallowing the use of 
force for whatever reason.548 Nevertheless, resort by States to the use of force is made 
explicitly permissible upon Security Council authorization in response to ‗a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, act of aggression‘,549 or in the exercise of the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the 
UN.550 
Thus, the international regulation of contemporary jus ad bellum is premised upon the 
provisions of Articles 2(4), 39 and 51 of the UN Charter. Novel threats of terrorist attacks, 
especially by non-State entities such as terrorist organizations, raise questions whether jus ad 
bellum is capable of dealing with such threats. The present UN Charter-based and customary 
international law on the use of force indicates that recourse to force in self-defence in 
response to terrorist attacks is permissible under Article 51.551 It should be noted, however, 
that the strict wording of Article 51 limits use of force to a response to an ‗armed attack‘ and 
not to a mere threat to the peace.552  
Article 51 implies that use of force is to a large extent discretionary, since it requires 
no prior approval from the Security Council. Rather, the Article merely obliges the State 
concerned to inform the Council of its intention. Upon receipt of such a report, the Council 
may allow the action or it may order the State to cease and desist from any further action.553 
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Resort to lethal force under the law of inter-State use of force is regulated by certain 
standards. These include necessity, proportionality and imminence. These limitations to 
using lethal force in self-defence are discussed below. 
a. Necessity in Self-Defence 
Necessity in jus ad bellum is concerned with whether force may be used.554 This implies that 
other alternative less forceful measures must have been considered and found to be 
insufficient.555 Thus, the necessity requirement requires the absence of less severe 
measures.556 This requirement may be subdivided into two tests: i) the ‗means‘ test which 
means the adversary has, or is imminently about to possess, the capability to cause harm; 
and ii) the ‗intent‘ test which means the adversary is known to possess the intention to use 
that means against the state.557 In the absence of less lethal means, the use of lethal force will 
be permissible. However, caution needs to be taken since necessity is a question of fact and 
must be analyzed on a case to case basis.558 
A pertinent question concerns whether isolated attacks by terrorists meet the 
necessity precondition for the applicability of self-defence. The arising of a self-defence 
situation is contingent upon the attacks having risen to the level of an ‗armed attack‘.559 
Whilst States are obliged to exhaust all less grave measures for resolving their disputes 
before taking recourse resorting to armed force,560 this is largely impractical for terrorist 
situations. Terrorists‘ moti es are mostly irreconcilable with States‘ self-preservation as 
some aim at totally destroying a State.561  
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In this scenario Christine Gray notes that States may use force not in response to 
each incursion in isolation but to the whole series of incursions, since they collectively 
amount to an armed attack.562 Antonio Cassese argues that for terrorist attacks to reach the 
level of an ‗armed attack‘, each incident would have to form part of a consistent pattern of 
violent actions rather than just being merely isolated or sporadic attacks.563 He goes on to 
contend that the requirement for the use of force as a means of ‗last resort‘ suggests that 
isolated incidents of terrorist attacks would not sanction the use of force in self-defence.564 
While the above explanations are theoretically sound, they are ‗out of touch with the 
realities of State practice‘ and the threat posed by terrorism.565 A single isolated attack, for 
instance the September 11th attacks, as well as a series of sporadic attacks may have similarly 
devastating effects that may warrant a state‘s recourse to the use of force as a matter of 
necessity.566  
The above explanations adopt a narrow approach to determining necessity by 
examining the number of attacks, as opposed to a broad approach encompassing the ‗scale 
and effects‘ of the attacks and the nature of the attacker.567 Therefore, from a holistic 
perspective (absent feasible alternatives), an isolated attack as well as a series of small scale 
attacks may satisfy the necessity precondition for the resort the use of lethal force in self-
defence.568 
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b. Proportionality in Self-Defence 
Proportionality presents some challenges with specific regard to counter-terrorism 
engagements. An analysis is contingent upon whether the attack has already taken place, or 
is merely imminent.569 Should the attack be considered to be imminent, proportional force is 
which (is of a certain degree) as to be reasonably necessary to stop the attack, as measured 
against the anticipated gravity of an impending attack.570  
In the case of an actual attack, proportionality may be viewed in relation to the 
actual damage resulting from the attack, as well as the deterrence of future attacks by the 
terrorist organization.571 Any strategy that involves lethal force in self-defence should be 
centred primarily on the current terrorist threat rather than on punishing past conduct. It is 
noteworthy, however, that preventing grave threats that are with imminent future threats 
may also be a defensible reason for using lethal force.572  
Targeted killing when used as a self-defence strategy against attacks by transnational 
terrorist organisations raises the question concerning who can be legally targeted. In this 
respect, Brown notes that, when ‗a terrorist rganization is responsible for an attack, a State 
may use counter-force not only against the individuals, but also against the entire 
organization.‘573 
c. Imminence in Self-Defence 
Immediacy in jus ad bellum may be analyzed by the ‗imminence test‘ which requires the 
anticipated attack to be so imminent and of such magnitude that a State ‗cannot afford to 
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wait to absorb the first blow‘.574 Yoram Dinstein identifies ‗immediacy‘ as being distinct 
from ‗necessity‘ and ‗proportionality‘. However, he notes that ‗a State cannot be expected to 
shift gears from peace to war instantaneously‘.575  
While recognizing imminence as a ‗component and corollary of the requirement of 
necessity‘,576 David Rodin observes that imminence is inevitability rather than 
unavoidability and indispensability.577 In the final analysis, it would appear that the 
requirement of imminence, taken together with necessity and proportionality, impliedly 
enjoins States neither to act too early (as it would be pre-emptive) nor too late (as it would 
be retaliatory).578 Both of these responses are prohibited in international law.  
As indicated by the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case, for a self-defence situation to arise 
the threat must be of a certain level of severity. Thus, the determination of imminence of the 
threat must always be guided by its severity and additionally should be an objective question 
of fact assessed on a case by case basis. If this is not observed it would be an effective setting 
of a dangerous precedent.579 
3. Targeted Killing Using Drones within the Rules Governing Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement comprises all territorial and extraterritorial measures taken by States to 
maintain public security, law and order or to otherwise exercise its authority or power over 
individuals in any place or manner whatsoever.580 In the case of hostile military 
engagements between States and non-State actors considerable overlaps exist between the 
regulations of law enforcement and hostilities.581 These two regimes have, ‗as a matter of 
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factual concept‘,582 been described as being antagonistic but not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.583  
From the outset it is must be stated that this research focuses on the legality of the 
use of lethal force in international law and only uses domestic applications for illustration of 
international law requirements.  
a. Law Enforcement Rules: Human Rights Law and IHL 
As a system of regulation, law enforcement consists of rules, principles and standards of 
international law, that govern the conduct and determine the lawfulness of activities falling 
within the maintenance of security and order.584 Melzer states that the regime of law 
enforcement entails balancing ‗the collective interest in enforcing public security, law and 
order against the conflicting interest in protecting individual rights and liberties.‘585 The rules 
of law enforcement are also applicable in situations of belligerent occupation everyday 
maintenance of law and order.  
It is noteworthy that, in certain instances, the conduct of hostilities may be pursued 
with the aim of law enforcement.586 An example may be drawn from a situation where an 
armed conflict is mounted by a State so as to suppress an internal insurgency. In this case, 
the operation of the regime of law enforcement will not be disrupted so long as the violence 
does not reach the threshold of the conduct of hostilities.587 Kenneth Watkin observes in this 
regard that the European Court has repeatedly interpreted the right to life guaranteed by the 
European Convention to apply to the context of military use of lethal force‘.588 
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The standards of international law pertinent to rules of law enforcement are drawn 
principally from human rights law (and to a lesser extent IHL).589 When law enforcement 
involves armed conflict, the rules of human rights are supplemented by IHL.590 Note must 
however be made of the fact that IHL applies only for such time, and for such circumstances 
that law enforcement activities do not reach the level of the conduct of hostilities.591  
Another point that merits note is the fact that the lex specialis principle would require 
the lawfulness of activities undertaken within law enforcement to be governed by IHL.592 
This leaves the residual authority to the lex generalis of human rights law which protects the 
right to life in conditions of peace as well as situations falling short of the conduct of 
hostilities.593 Human rights law also ensures the due process guarantees of its subjects. 
b. Applicability of IHL under the Rules Governing Law Enforcement  
IHL reduces the effects of armed conflicts on specifically protected persons.594 It also 
provides a protective cover to individuals from arbitrary deprivation of the right to life 
outside the conduct of hostilities.595 With regard to international armed conflicts, IHL 
prohibits ‗wilful killing‘596 whereas in internal armed conflicts Common Article 3 prohibits 
‗murder‘.  
It is however important to note from the outset that regardless of the terminological 
difference, both the notions of ‗wilful killing‘ and ‗murder‘ are not substantively 
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dissimilar.597  The ICRC Commentary categorizes ‗wilful killing‘ as covering deaths that 
occur as a result of any wilful act or omission accompanied by an intent to cause death.598 
The constitutive elements in ‗wilful killing‘ are aptly illustrated by the ICTY in the Blaskic 
Case which defined ‗wilful killing‘ with reference to ‗grave breaches‘ of the Geneva 
Conventions system thus: 
For the material element of the offence [ie of wilful killing], it must be proved 
that the death of the victim was the result of the accused as a commander. 
The intent, or mens rea, needed to establish the offence of wilful killing exists 
once it has been demonstrated that the accused intended to cause death or 
serious bodily injury which, as it is reasonable to assume, he had to 
understand was likely to lead to death.599 
The Blaskic Case lays the foundation stones for the interpretive path that viewed 
‗wilful killing‘ from the perspective of the intent to occasion death or grievous bodily injury 
through a particular physical act or omission.600 This construction was reaffirmed by the 
ICTY in the Kordic & Cerkez Case where the mens rea requirement was indicated as requiring 
the establishment of the accused‘s intent to kill, or to inflict serious bodily injury in reckless 
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disregard of human life.601 The actus reus component required the death of the victim to be 
the result of the accused‘s acts or omissions.602 
Knut Dörmann identifies with an interpretive approach that considers the material 
and subjective elements that are constitutive of the notion of ‗wilful killing‘.603 In this regard, 
the material element describes unlawful acts or omissions occurring in relation to an armed 
conflict and causing the death of one or more persons protected under the Geneva 
Conventions.604 The subjective element, ‗wilful‘, on the other hand, includes ‗intent‘ and 
‗recklessness‘, but not ordinary negligence.605  
The prohibition of ‗murder‘ in non-international armed conflicts was clarified by the 
ICTR in the Musema Case which defined it as the ‗unlawful, intentional killing of a human 
being‘, and also where the requisite objective elements were identified.606 The objective 
elements for ‗murder‘ include the death of the victim as a result of the accused‘s or a 
subordinate‘s unlawful act or omission coupled with an intent requirement where the 
accused or a subordinate must have had the intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily 
harm on the deceased with the knowledge of its likelihood to result in the victim‘s death. 
Additional to this is a requirement that the accused is reckless as to whether or not the 
victim‘s death occurs.607  
The elements set out in the Musema Case were restated by the ICTY in the Vasiljevic 
Case and further held to be constitutive of the definition of murder ‗under customary 
international law‘.608 In the wake of this development came the Semanza Case where the 
ICTR clarified further on the mens rea requirement in internal armed conflict thus: 
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Murder under Article 4 refers to the intentional killing of another which need 
not be accompanied by a showing of premeditation. The Chamber reaches this 
conclusion having considered the use of the term ―meurtre‖ as opposed to 
―assassinat‖ in the French version of the Statute.609 
The comparative jurisprudence developed by the ICTY and ICTR with regard to the 
definition of ‗murder‘ in internal armed conflicts received judicial pronouncement by the 
Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Kristic Case.610 In this case a determination had to be made 
on whether ‗murder‘ within the meaning of Articles 3 and 5 of the ICTY Statute had been 
committed. The Court found this contention to be in the affirmative because ‗thousands of 
Bosnian Muslims‘ were murdered and ‗summarily executed on several sites within the 
Drina Corps.‘611  
With respect to the substantive content, there is no indication of the existence of a 
qualitative difference between ‗wilful killing‘ prohibitions in IACs and ‗murder‘ prohibitions 
in NIACs, as was argued in Isayeva et al. v The Russian Federation.612 The primary basis of the 
similarity between these two prohibitions is the idea of disallowing all intentional or reckless 
acts that lead to the death of persons protected by the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols.613  
In view of the foregoing, resort to the use of deadly force – whether in an IAC or a 
NIAC – against persons who are not legitimate military targets will be governed under the 
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law enforcement regime. Additionally, as Kleffner notes, there is merit in using IHL as the 
basis for interpreting human rights law as this improves compliance with IHL.614  
c. The Rules Governing Law Enforcement in Occupied Territories 
In situations of occupation the question of whether or not the territory is ‗occupied‘ within 
the international law of belligerent occupation615 is invariably a factual question. An 
illustration of this is Article 42 of the Hague Regulations IV which states thus: ‗[t]erritory is 
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The 
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can 
be exercised‘.616  
Melzer identifies two underlying assumptions that can be discerned from the 
definition of an occupied territory; i) that the occupier has effective control over the territory 
in question; and ii) that there exists no other independent authority, other than that of the 
occupant in the area.617 The existence of effective control is thus measured by the ‗factual 
ability‘ of the occupying State to assume responsibilities that attach to an occupying power 
such as the issuance and enforcement of directives to the inhabitants of the territory.618   
The scope of application of the ICCPR as stated in Article 2(1) enjoins State parties 
to ensure the rights of ‗all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.‘619 
The notion of ‗subject to its jurisdiction‘ is indicative of extraterritorial obligations to States 
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who may be exercising their authority across their territorial borders.620 The fact that it was 
placed immediately after ‗territory‘ is also particularly telling.  
The formulation of the provision of Article 2(1) ICCPR was clarified by the UN 
Human Rights Committee whose interpretation implied the contemplation of situations 
where a State exercises its jurisdiction over a foreign territory.621 The UN Committee stated 
that, ‗the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied 
Territories, for all conduct by the State party‘s authorities or agents in those territories that 
affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant.‘622  
In arriving at the determination that the human rights protections were due to the 
Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,623 UN Committee highlighted the 
‗exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeli security forces‘624 and more importantly, 
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consonant to the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,625 the fact that most protections provided 
by the ICCPR do not automatically end during war.626     
d. The Legality of Targeted Killing as a Means of Law Enforcement 
In some cases such as those involving insurgencies and internal strife, the situation of the 
violence may escalate to the threshold of non-international armed conflict.627 In such 
instances law enforcement operations by the State in bid to restore law and order will be 
governed by the normative construct of hostilities.628 This effectually places the resort to 
targeted killing by State agents within the remit of both human rights law and IHL.629  
The ruling in the Jesuits in El Salvador Case underscored the fact that the international 
responsibility attributable to the State for extrajudicial executions in El Salvador arose from 
both human rights and humanitarian law.630 The IACiHR decried the extrajudicial 
executions which ‗violated the right to life enshrined in Article 4 of the American 
Convention, together with the principles recognized in common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949‘.631 It was also held to be a violation of the right to human dignity.632 
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The above analysis of the rules governing law enforcement in situations of 
occupation suggests that, outside the conduct of hostilities, using lethal force including 
targeted killing is restricted. This is contrary to the idea that the laws of occupation modify 
the conventional human rights law thus increasing the latitude of the occupying powers‘ use 
of lethal force.633  
It is important to note, however, that the application of the legal restrictions on 
deprivation of life gives due consideration to the characteristic high levels of threats and 
other relevant circumstances prevailing in an occupied territory. Thus, in the interpretation 
and application of the standards of necessity, proportionality and precaution when dealing 
with deprivations of life,634 (to some extent) human rights law is modified by the laws of 




4. Targeted Killing Using Drones within the Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities 
a. Drone Strikes and the Principles of International Humanitarian Law 
i) Drone Strikes and the Principle of Distinction 
IHL has been specially designed to govern situations of armed conflicts. In such situations, 
certain categories of persons may be deprived of their right to life by ‗the deliberate or 
intended use of lethal force.‘635 Distinction is a cardinal principle of IHL which requires the 
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differentiation between non-combatants (who may not be subjected to any attack) and 
combatants (who may be lawfully targeted).636 Additionally, military objectives must be 
differentiated from civilian objects.637 Therefore, distinction obliges parties to an armed 
conflict to only direct attacks against combatants and military objectives.638  
It is noteworthy that distinction is both integral and complementary to the other IHL 
principles of military necessity and proportionality.639 On the one hand, military necessity 
prohibits intentional destruction of property, not necessitated by the imperatives of armed 
conflict,640 which in no way elicits a military advantage.641 On the other, distinction 
precludes incidental injury and loss to the civilian population that is disproportionate to the 
military advantage gained from the attack.642 On the issue of distinction, it is noteworthy 
that Leslie Green makes the convincing, if controversial, case that attacks upon non-
combatants are acceptable insofar as the harm done is proportional to the military gain 
achieved.643 
Drone attacks appear to satisfy the distinction requirement which proscribes 
‗indiscriminate attacks‘644 or employing ‗a method or means of combat the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required.‘645 Being precision weapons, drones may be defended as being 
capable of discriminating between combatants and civilians, and further directing ‗surgical‘ 
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attacks against specific individuals.646 However, in view of the possibility of some ‗incidental 
loss‘647 of civilian lives and property, proportionality requires any drone strikes to balance 
‗collateral damage‘648 against the ‗concrete and direct military advantage anticipated‘ with 
regard to the relevant circumstances of each strike.649   
ii) Drone Strikes and the Principle of Military Necessity 
The principle of military necessity as understood in contemporary legal doctrine draws from 
the Lieber Code of 1863 which allowed measures that are prerequisite to the securing of 
legitimate military victory.650 The provisions of Articles 55 and 35 of AP I are reflective of 
the definition of military necessity in the Article 14 of the Lieber Code which is also 
reaffirmed In re Wilheim List and Others.651  
The requirements in IHL for military necessity are dual: i) that the action is 
necessary for the achievement of a legitimate military purpose; and ii) that the action should 
not be inconsonant with IHL.652 International jurisprudence653 and contemporary legal 
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doctrine654 of IHL have confirmed the veracity of the above statement on these two 
requirements.  
Military necessity therefore requires commanders of a drone strike to assess whether 
the kind and degree of force used would objectively correspond to what is reasonably 
necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose of that operation.655 Considering that drones are 
principally used for the targeted killing of selected individuals, military necessity demands 
that either the individuals are combatants or that they directly participate in hostilities at the 
time of the attack.656 Additionally, all other requirements of IHL must be met cumulatively 
in order for a drone attack to be lawful.  
iii) Drone Strikes and the Principle of Proportionality 
 The customary principle of proportionality prohibits resort to military action, the effects of 
which outweigh the military advantage accruing from the damage brought upon the 
enemy.657 Thus, proportionality encompasses within prohibited acts or attacks, whose effects 
are unreasonable or excessive.658 Proportionality is reflected in Article 51(5)(b) of AP I 
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which proscribes any ‗attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life‘ 
the effects of ‗which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated‘.659  
Thus, proportionality limits belligerents‘ right to use armed force. Proportionality 
exhibits a realistic acceptance of the fact that a military attack would invariably be attended 
by, at least, some incidental civilian death, injury or loss of property.660 Proportionality is, 
thus, attributed with the accommodation of ‗the needs of humanity and the practical 
inevitabilities of warfare‘.661 This principle importantly establishes absolute ‗limits at which 
the necessity of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity.‘662 
Proportionality in a drone attack requires an objective value judgment as to whether 
the harm likely to be caused by the force used in the operation is justified in view of the 
expected military advantage.663 Thus, even an attack on a l gitimate military target would be 
unlawful if the incidental civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific 
military gain of the attack.664  
The proportionality of a drone attack would, therefore, be strictly determined using 
the resulting incidental harm vis-a-vis the concrete military gain. This implies that the 
determination of ‗proportionality in attack‘ must be objective. Also, the assessment of 
proportionality should factor in other values protected by IHL against the effects of 
hostilities.665 
iv) Drone Strikes and the Principle of Precaution 
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Integral to the test used in determining the proportionate nature of an attack is the 
reasonable care element which is impressed upon the attacking party by Article 57(1) of AP 
I.666 Prior to the use of precision weapons such as drones, incidental civilian loss and death 
was attributable to no less than three causes: i) a lack of full knowledge about the target; ii) 
inability to direct a minimum amount of force needed to destroy the target; and iii) an 
inability to guarantee the weapon hits only the target.667  
Therefore, when planning a drone attack, reasonable care and precaution need to be 
factored into the process of target selection, method of attack, and the assessment of tactical 
and strategic military advantage to be achieved with the target‘s destruction.668 
With specific reference to drone attacks, an initial observation elicits the conclusion 
that they are far more proportional as compared to other methods because of their ‗surgical‘ 
or pinpointed nature.669 This will, however, need to be balanced against the ‗concrete and 
direct‘ military advantage engendered by the attack.670 Thus, before launching a drone attack 
the circumstances at the time must be analyzed with a view to taking all feasible and 
reasonable precaution to ensure that the prospective subject of the attack is a legitimate 
military target and that the intended attack would not cause disproportionate collateral 
damage.671  
The formulation of the knowledge requirement in Article 57 of AP I restricts the pre-
attack analysis only to information that is available at the moment. This does not, however, 
preclude a ‗should have known‘ reading to the proportionality principle. That the provision 
of ‗precautions in attack‘ found in Article 57 AP I require the cancellation of an attack based 
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on a projection of the disproportional incidental harm likely to arise is particularly telling.672 
Implicit in this requirement is the contention that launching an attack in disregard to the 
eventuality of disproportionate incidental casualties when the attacking commander ‗knows 
or should have known‘ is a blatant disregard for the Article 57 AP I provision on the 
principle of proportionality.673  
Contemporary challenges posed by the use of drones for targeted killing revolve 
around the uncertainty of intelligence and the difficulty in establishing the legal status of a 
potential target.674 This would require the organization and control of a drone strike 
operation so that intelligence information is continuously reviewed for verification, and 
upon a finding of inaccuracy, the operation be cancelled or aborted.675  
b. When and Against Whom May Drone Strikes be Directed?: Deconstructing the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
The principle of distinction expressed in Article 48 and 51(2) of AP I entrenches the 
inviolability of civilians in situations of armed conflict thereby protecting them from 
attack.676 The only exception is in cases where civilians directly take part in hostilities,677 and 
it is noteworthy that this is a principle of customary international law.678 The principle of 
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distinction and the notion of direct participation in hostilities are the guidelines by which to 
determine who may be lawfully targeted in a situation of armed conflict.679  
Distinction acknowledges military necessity and provides for the temporary loss of 
civilian status for those who get involved in hostilities.680 This provides much clarification 
on questions of who can be categorized as persons who may lawfully be targeted and those 
who are protected from attack. Absent such a determinative guideline, the protective 
element of IHL will be compromised to a large extent.681 It is in this regard that mention 
must be made of the ICRC‘s efforts in clarifying these two principles.682 
The notion of ‗direct participation in hostilities‘ is capable of being elaborated so as 
to encompass the commission of a specific act specifically designed to support a party to an 
armed conflict, and which is to the detriment of another party. This is referred to as the 
belligerent nexus requirement.683 Also, direct participation in hostilities is identifiable when 
it is likely to cause direct harm to the military operations or military capacity of the other 
party, or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury or destruction on persons or objects not under 
the effective control of the acting individual.684  
Thus, another category of individuals (a ‗continuous combat function‘)685 has been 
suggested so as to include the actions of individuals which satisfy the ‗direct causal of harm‘ 
requirement used for establishing direct participation by a member of an armed group.686 
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i) The Temporal Element: ‘For Such Time’ 
The temporal element of direct participation in hostilities is derived from the words ‗for 
such time‘ in the text of Article 51 of AP I. The ICRC Commentary on AP I provides that 
direct participation includes ‗preparation for combat and return from combat‘,687 however, 
‗once he ceases to participate, the civilian regains the right to protection.‘688  
This appears to suggest that a civilian can be a ‗farmer by day, fighter by night‘689 
which has elicited criticism for engendering a ‗revolving door‘ scenario.690 The effect of this 
is that it leads terrorists to conceal themselves in civilian settlements thus encumbering 
efforts to combat terrorism.691  
To counter this demerit, the ‗membership approach‘ was suggested, whereby 
membership in an armed group casts one as a legitimate military target anywhere and at any 
time because of a ‗continuous combat function‘.692 Upon renouncing their membership, the 
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onus rests with the civilians to demonstrate their affirmative disengagement from the armed 
group and from the conduct of hostilities.693  
Insofar as the membership approach appears to contravene the substantive ‗direct‘ 
and the temporal ‗for such time‘ elements of direct participation in hostilities, this approach 
is gaining currency over the ‗revolving door‘ approach.694 However, the merits of focusing 
on a member of an armed groups‘ function (kind of acts) rather than status (combatant or 
unprivileged combatant) are lost with the prospect of their being targetable ‗all the time‘.695 
It is noteworthy that the temporal element of direct participation in hostilities retains 
a higher protective provision for civilians as compared to members of armed forces to whom 
the temporal limitation standard does not apply.696 This has sparked some criticism over the 
‗incongruity‘ in protection which would result in the disruption of the balance of ‗balance of 
military necessity and humanity that permeates IHL.‘697   
ii) The Substantive Element: ‘Directly Participate’ 
The substantive element ‗directly participate‘ requires a ‗direct causal relationship between‘ 
the actions of a civilian and ‗the harm done to the enemy at the time and place where the 
activity occurs.‘698 Schmitt notes that implicit in this is an underlying ‗but for‘ causation 
between the civilian‘s action and the resultant harm.699 This may be illustrated by an 
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example of civilians working in a munitions factory who would not be directly participating 
in hostilities, as contrasted with civilians preparing the weapon systems on the front line 
who would be directly participating in hostilities.700  
In this regard, Schmitt points out that while a civilian providing strategic intelligence 
analysis would not be directly participating in hostilities, a civilian providing tactical 
intelligence would be.701 This leads to the conclusion that in determining that a civilian, in 
fact, does ‗directly participate‘ in hostilities is a factual question to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis.702 
iii) The Substantive Element: ‘Hostilities’ 
The substantive element of ‗hostilities‘ lacks a clear and precise definition under the law of 
armed conflict.703 Some clarity was introduced by the ICRC Commentary which provides 
that hostilities ‗should be understood to be acts which by their nature and purpose are 
intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces.‘704  
On its face, this is a very narrow interpretation that would seem to exclude a terrorist 
attack on civilians which is similar to combat operations.705 The ICRC experts were 
generally of the opinion that ‗hostilities‘ was broader than ‗military operations‘, but 
narrower than ‗war sustaining activities‘ designed to sustain the general ‗war effort‘.706 Thus, 
it is apparent that these combat activities overlap with the substantive element of ‗direct.‘ In 
this regard, it is not far-fetched to suggest that in situations where civilian actions bear a 
direct belligerent nexus to an armed conflict, it qualifies as hostilities.  
c. Drones Strikes and the Location of Hostilities 
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Conventional armed conflicts were carried out either on the territory of the belligerent States 
or at sea. However, in the case of a non-State actor such as a transnational terrorist 
organization bereft of any territory to their claim, the dynamic of armed conflict changes.707 
This does not preclude a suspected terrorist from being targeted legitimately while on the 
territory of a State party with which the terrorist organization is engaged in armed 
conflict.708  
This begs the question whether such suspected terrorists may be lawfully targeted 
while on the territory of a State that is a not party to the armed conflict.709 In such 
circumstances it has been suggested that targeting may be permissible with either the 
permission of the State on whose territory the attack is to be launched or that of the UN 
Security Council.710 
A different criterion applies for situations in which the threshold for self-defence 
provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter is reached.711 Here, the injured State – that 
which has been subjected to terrorist attacks of such gravity – has a qualified right to engage 
the terrorist even if they are on the territory of a neutral State. The precondition for the 
exercise of the right to self-defence rests in the inability or unwillingness by the territorial 
State to prevent the terrorist organization from using its territory to launch attacks (or as a 
safe haven).712  
 
d. Civilian Involvement in Targeted Killing: The Question of State Agents and Private 
Military Contractors 
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The use of drones poses pertinent questions concerning the legal status of non-military 
personnel who engage in certain functions that are necessary for the proper functioning of 
the targeted killing operations.713 Civilian involvement in targeted killing may manifest itself 
through an agency relationship between the State and government personnel, for instance 
intelligence and police forces or private contractors who are authorised by the law to 
provide certain services to the State.714  
An important distinction to be made at this stage is that between de facto and de jure 
State agency which establishes the attributability of actions or omissions of individuals or 
entities to the State.715 De jure State agency typically involves persons who are ordinarily 
empowered to exercise authority on behalf of the State.716 These include police, 
paramilitary, military and other auxiliary State agencies.717  
De facto agency is ascribable to persons who are instructed or directed to act on behalf 
of the State (provided there is proof of State authorization).718 Within this group one is apt 
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to find private contractors, armed resistance groups and other military outfits that are 
connected to that State.719 Such a connection for attributing States responsibility is 
established on the basis of the State‘s acknowledgement or adoption of the operations of 
these organizations as being its own.720 This need not be may be expressly stated but may be 
inferred from State conduct as long as it is clear and unequivocal.721  
The rules of State responsibility recognize the attributability of conduct of a person or 
group of persons (such as civilian military contractors) to a State, provided that they are 
acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State.722 In the case of 
civilians who control the unmanned drone and carry out the actual targeting, their conduct 
will be attributable to the State to the extent that it is authorized by that State.723 
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Thus, the ramifications of the existence of a de jure or de facto agency is the 
responsibility of the State for the adverse effects of the agent‘s acts if that State neglected or 
refused to protect the rights of the injured States (or individuals).724 This also implies an 
obligation to make reparations or to take other remediary measures.725 
5. Summary on the Use of Drones for Targeted Killing in Contemporary State Practice 
This subsection has outlined the various regulatory regimes that have been used to analyze 
the permissibility of targeted killings using drone attacks. It highlights the ways in which 
these methods of analysis bring about concurrence and how they lead to dissimilarity 
thereby leading to different conclusions on the legality of the use of drones for targeted 
killing in international law. 
It seems rather tenuous to argue that the imperatives of self-defence can justify 
unlawful deaths resulting from the practice of targeted killing.726 Specifically, if the targeted 
individual‘s rights under human rights law are violated, the State‘s inherent right of self-
defence cannot supersede the unlawfulness of the killing.727 Rather, the killing would have to 
be vindicated within the regulatory regime f human rights.728 In this regard, any argument 
predicated on the non-applicability of human rights law (in self-defence situations) could be 
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rebutted by the counter-argument that human rights law is applicable at all times, and 
further that certain rights (like the right to life) are peremptory norms from which no 
deraogation (including in self-defence) may be had.729 
There is a serious need for the restriction of the predominant presumption under IHL 
that the use of lethal force is necessary when targeting members of organized armed groups 
such as terrorists or insurgents.730 A comparison of the legal preconditions for the lawful 
deprivation of the targeted individual‘s life, under human rights law and IHL, point towards 
some relative similarity.731 This may be illustrated by certain requirements, for instance the 
‗legitimate purpose‘ in human rights and ‗military objective‘ in IHL.732 
6. The Legitimation of Targeted Killings and its Implications on International Law 
a. The Continuity of Targeted Killings and the Formation of New Rules of Custom 
Given the present attractions of targeted killings in international law as an effective, if 
sometimes unlawful, method of eliminating individuals deemed to be enemies of the State, 
it would not be surprising if many more states adopted the practice.733  
Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute defines customary rules of internatonal law as 
those which have progressively been developed by the practice of States.734 The uniform 
continuity of States‘ conduct (on a specific practice for instance targeted killing) eventually 
crystallizes into ‗a general practice accepted as law‘.735 It is also important to note that in 
                                                             
729 Nils Melzer, supra note 3 at 55; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 93. 
730 Jan Römer, supra note 3 at 167. 
731 Malcolm N Shaw, supra note 136 at 1074; Jan Römer, ibid at 166. 
732 Jan Römer, supra note 3 at 166. 
733 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, supra note 45 at 9. 
734 Ian Brownlie, supra note 96 at 7; Malcolm N Shaw, supra note 136 at 69, 84; David J Harris, supra note 136 
at 19.  
735 Article 38, ICJ Statute; ICJ, Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) I.C.J Reports, 1950, 266; ICJ, Rights of Passage 












their practice, States observe and conform to these rules out of a shared sense of a legal 
obligation (or justification) to do so.736  
The ICJ in the Continental Shelf Case stated that customary international law is 
comprised of two elements which include:737 i) an objective element (usus) which is State 
practice;738 and ii) a subjective element which is the opinio juris.739 This outlines a dichotomy 
in which State practice is the material element of customary international law while opinio 
juris is its psychological element.740 Within this schema, whilst the material element is 
evinced by the practice and behavior of States, the psychological element is derived from the 
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subjective conviction held by States that the requisite behavior is necessitated by law and not 
subject to discretion.741   
b. Legal Status of Targeted Killing in Customary International Law 
Targeted killing has elicited both support and opposition. Shaw notes that the threshold for 
the emergence of a legally binding custom depends on the strength of the alleged new rule 
vis-a-vis the prior one and the opposition elicited by the new rule.742 Official statements in 
support of the practice and policy of targeted killing have been calibrated with guileful 
precision.743 However, the duty to protect and to respect life, both in domestic and in 
international law, must not be given the same parity of esteem as the international right of 
states to self-defence, but rather should precede it.  
Both the US position on targeted killing, as elaborated on by the Secretary of State 
Department Harold Koh, and the Israeli position, as elaborated by Chief Justice Barak in 
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v Israel, have lent added legitimacy to targeted killing 
in international law.744 In both accounts which are, as yet, the most precocious admissions 
of States‘ engagement in policies of targeted killing, the concerned States have attempted to 
defend their policies under international law.745  
The Israeli declared State policy and the US lethal covert operations involving 
targeted killing, though scarcely noticed, are an effective starting point for an emergent 
doctrine of targeted killing in international law. This may later evolve into customary 
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international law. Support for the emergence of new customary law on self-defence targeted 
killing may be drawn from the North Sea Continental Shelf Case which reaffirmed the position 
that a short passage of time would not prevent the formation of customary law.746  
The most essential element, however, of the North Sea Continental Shelf Case is that it 
underscores the importance of State practice being accompanied by opinio juris however little 
the time that has elapsed.747 This will flow from practice of other States justifying the taking 
up of such a policy as suggested in Nicaragua.748 The PCIJ underscored the prominence of 
opinio juris in the process of making customary international law in the SS Lotus Case.749 This 
was restated in the Nicaragua Case which presented a cogent summation of the 
complementary importance of state practice and opinio juris.750 
Opinio juris is, however, perennially plagued with evidentiary problems when the 
need arises to illustrate a change in the practice of States.751 More specifically is the question 
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regarding the determination of when a change in the extant custom has occurred. In dealing 
with this situation the onus of proving the existence of a practice has in most circumstances 
been left to the party alleging it.752  
For instance, Russia and Australia have positively indicated their interest in adopting 
the tactics used by Israel and US to counter enemies of the State.753 Additionally, as noted 
by Shaw, the fact that Israel and the US are ‗intimately connected‘ with targeted killing 
owing to their ‗special relationship with the subject-matter‘ creation of a new custom is 
possible.754  
The practice of targeted killing by Israel and the US which are ‗specially affected‘ has 
been ‗extensive and virtually uniform‘ and has been carried out in a manner suggesting that 
a general recognition of a legal obligation is involved.755 However, the practice of other 
States is (as yet) unclear to conclusively establish a rule of customary international law. 
It is important to note that non-treaty instruments may become evidence of customary 
obligations.756 In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ confirmed that the UNGA Resolutions may 
evince the formation of opinio juris.757 This evidentiary importance of UNGA Resolutions in 
establishing the formation of new rules of custom was reaffirmed in the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion thus:758 
even if they are not legally binding, (UNGA resolutions) may sometimes have 
normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence 
important for establishing the existence of a rule or emergence of an opinio juris. 
To establish whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is 
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necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also 
necessary to see whether opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a 
series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required 
for the establishment of a new rule 
This is a pertinent point considering that UN Security Council Resolutions 1368759 
and 1373760 (dealing with anti-terrorism measures) received unanimous support. These have 
been held by some commentators as being indicative of an instantaneous development of a 
new rule of customary international law with regard to anticipatory self-defence against 
terrorist attacks.761 Subsequently, the Security Council adopted ‗resolution after resolution 
reaffirming‘ 1368 and 1373, and thereby endorsing the consistency of anticipatory self-
defence (against non-State actors) with the law of self-defence.762  
The important point in the above argument would be the rate and breadth of 
acceptance, and the consistency of State practice.763 For instance, the unanimous adoption 
of both initial Resolutions by the UN Security Council and the subsequent endorsement of 
its contents by other States including regional organizations makes a credible case for the 
reflection of new custom.764 
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However, the practice of the ICJ has been that the proponent of a custom must prove 
that establishment of such a custom is to become binding on the other party.765 Thus, in 
determining whether a new rule of custom has occurred, the objective element of a sharing 
‗in principle‘ of the content of the alleged new rule must be satisfied.766 
c. Acquiescence: Legal Basis for a Developing Customary Rule of Targeted Killing? 
Acquiescence was defined in the Gulf of Maine Case as the ‗tacit recognition manifested by 
unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent‘.767 Thus, absent any 
protest, States‘ acquiescence to the conduct of other States leads to the assumption of the 
acceptance of such conduct as legitimate.768 Additionally, drawing from the Lotus Case this 
may be indicative of opinio juris.769  
The most popular legal basis on which targeted killing is vindicated is premised on 
States‘ ‗inherent‘ right to resort to the use of force in self-defence.770 The ‗inherent‘ textual 
formulation of self-defence leads to an interpretation that places Article 51 higher than 
Article 2(4) (prohibition of the use of force) in the normative hierarchy.771  
Article 51 of the UN Charter has been broadly interpreted by States to allow for 
anticipatory self-defence against future terrorist attacks. September 11th 2001 saw the Al-
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Qaeda‘s well coordinated attacks on the Twin Towers. Al-Qaeda had previously attacked 
two US embassies and the US warship USS Cole.772 In the wake of these attacks, non-State 
entities (especially terrorist organizations) became more significant in contemporary 
international law on the use of force.773 The principal aggressor in these incidences was a 
non-State entity: Al-Qaeda.774 
Subsequently, States appeared to have accepted a revisionist interpretation of Article 
51 which placed no limits on States to conduct anticipatory self-defence attacks on non-
States entities.775 The UN Security Council passed resolution 1368776 and (barely two weeks 
later) resolution 1373777 recognizing the right to individual and collective self-defence 
against terrorism (especially non-State actors). Regional organizations, for instance North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, at the invocation of its founding treaty‘s Article 5 provision 
on collective self-defence,778 and the Organization of American States also endorsed self-
defence as being applicable to terrorist attacks.779  
In addition to this, on the specific question of anticipatory self-defence, State practice 
(has since) indicated nothing but a continuing acceptance of the contention that large-scale 
terrorist attacks constitute ‗armed attacks‘ thus vindicating self-defence.780 The ensuing State 
practice,781 the adoption of a series of UNSC resolutions reaffirming Resolutions 1368 and 
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1373,782 and the adoption of resolutions by regional organizations783 to the same effect 
makes a compelling case for the continuing evolution of the acceptance of targeted killing as 
anticipatory self-defence by States against attacks by non-State entities. 
In view of the post-September 11 widening of the scope of the right to self-defence, 
the unanimous passing of UNSC Resolutions 1368 and 1373 authorizing use of ‗any means‘ 
against terrorists, and of the absence of any official protests (from the UN General Assembly 
or regional organizations) to the targeted killing of suspected terrorists, a strong case may be 
made for other States‘ acquiescence in a new rule of customary international law.784  
This is supported by the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case which suggested that States 
acting contrary to established customs with the acquiescence of other States are not bound 
by the prior custom.785 Thus, States, such as the US and Israel, may not be bound by earlier 
restrictions on the use of force. The practice of other States may very well buttress this new 
rule making it a concrete and substantive principle for States countering terrorist attacks.  
Russia, for instance, has deployed ‗seek and destroy‘ State agents to hunt down insurgents 
on the premise of its necessity in its ‗fight against terrorism.‘786 This may begin a trend. 
d. Conclusion on the Formation of a New Rule of Custom on Targeted Killing 
An analysis of State practice, particularly the case law, illuminates the contemporary 
prevalence of the practice of targeted killing generally, and specifically those resulting from 
the use of drones.787 As has been evinced by the cases (viewed throughout the research) , the 
prospect of anticipatory self-defence and other attendant benefits easily sway States into 
adopting targeted killing policies.788 Coupled with the allure of maintaining secrecy and of 
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the disregard to the ‗intrusive‘ prescriptions of human rights requirements, to States, 
targeted killing policies are enormously appealing.789 
The decisions in the cases mentioned (on targeted killings) are derived from the 
various different circumstances and can therefore be applied to a broad area of similar cases. 
This enables a critical examination of drone attacks. Thus (proceeding by analogy), the 
extent to which courts or tribunals would set the scales for the permissibility of the use of 
drones for targeted killing in international law can be deduced. Irrespective of the differing 
constructions of States on their international legal obligations (drawn from their practice 
and jurisprudence), there is some degree of similarity on their attitudes towards targeted 
killings using drones.790  
However, for a concrete determination of the existence of a uniform contemporary 
State practice of targeted killing using drone attacks, more evidence of the acceptance by 
other States of the practice will be required.791 Thus, in the final analysis, only the passage of 
time and the increased (and consistent) adoption of the practice of targeted killing by several 
States coupled with a subjective element of being bound, can a definite conclusion be of the 
formation of a new customary law be made.792 Presently, it can only suffice to say that there 
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IV. THE USE OF UNMANNED DRONES FOR TARGETED KILLING: WITHER 
THE RULE OF LAW? 
1. Main Findings and Conclusion 
While international law does not specifically prohibit targeted killing using drones, it places 
strict standards on circumstances under which lethal force may be resorted to. These 
standards protect individuals against intentional or arbitrary deprivation of life. This chapter 
provides a summary of the conditions and modalities of the lawfulness of the use of drones 
for targeted killing in international law.  
2. Targeted Killings Using Drones and Concerns for the Rule of Law  
States engaged in counter-terrorist or counter-insurgent operations usually come to the 
conclusion that the rule of law should defer to the imperatives of maintaining State 
security.793 Thus, in disregard of the restrictive standards by which the law constrains choice 
of means and tactics by which States may resort to using lethal force, such States usually 
adopt policies which are not in strict conformity with international law.794  
While States‘ observance of the rule of law may not necessarily guarantee absolute 
security (or justice), the principle stands as a safeguard against the arbitrary loss of life. 
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Without prejudice to the pragmatic difficulties facing States under threats of (or actual) 
terrorist attacks, the legal conditions and modalities on the use of lethal force must be kept 
strictly within the rule of law.  
Hence, there is a serious necessity for international law constantly to adapt to the 
competing needs, on the one hand, of States to protect themselves as well as their citizens 
both abroad and at home, and, on the other hand, to uphold international peace. 
So as to ensure that States using drones for targeted killings conform to the rule of 
law, certain preconditions must be satisfied. First, the objective legal requirements 
applicable to the peculiar circumstances of a particular targeted killing operation must be 
ascertained as having being cumulatively met. Secondly, the objective legal requirements 
need to be complemented by procedures that ensure compliance of States with these 
requirements.  
This second precondition includes an obligation on the State to investigate unlawful 
deprivation of life by State agents.795 The third precondition obliges States to conform to the 
values by which a democratic society would ordinarily use to confront threats to its security.  
3. Drawing Inferences from Targeted Killing in International Law 
The purpose of this research has been to analyse the question of the permissibility in 
international law of the use of drones for targeted killing in international law. It also sought 
to determine the various modes of international responsibility for drone-related breaches of 
international law. Additionally, the research set out to establish the threshold at which 
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culpability or liability lies in cases where breaches of international law occurs for complicity 
in the commissions of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations. 
Contemporary armed conflict, especially transnational terrorist attacks, presents 
novel challenges to jus ad bellum and jus in bello that have regulated the modalities of 
interstate use of force and the conduct of armed conflict.796 Although numerous arguments 
premised on the inadequacy of the current conduct of hostilities regime have been 
propounded, it appears that there is no absence of normative guidelines.797  
Extant international law has within its provisions a robust system of rules to govern 
new realities and challenges posed by armed conflicts of post WWII provenance. Most 
notably is the unique array of challenges that continually confront States engaged in armed 
conflicts with terrorist organizations.798  
The present framework of international law was crafted on a State-centric approach 
to international relations. It did not contemplate the non-State actor. But, upon a 
progressive reading and constructive interpretation, it offers a robust normative ensemble 
capable of governing contemporary inter-State use of force.799  
This law is capable of meeting the challenges posed by non-State organized armed 
groups. It allows for the defensive use of force to avert an imminent attack. Individuals who 
do not observe the laws and customs of war are not entitled to its protective privileges and 
thus assume the capacity of unlawful combatants. This proceeds from the logic that 
individuals who participate in terrorist acts should not be afforded the special status of 
persons protected under IHL. 
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 Thus, suspected terrorists who engage in armed conflict (unlawfully) may be 
targeted in accordance with IHL. However, the customary international law concepts of 
necessity, discrimination, and proportionality must be satisfied. This leads to the conclusion 
that targeted attacks against suspected terrorists do not necessarily constitute extrajudicial 
killings if they are legitimately carried out in self-defence, law enforcement or in active 
hostilities.  
Cast in this light, the law of inter-State use of force (ie self-defence) provides a 
regulatory regime to address the challenges posed by the emergence and unprecedented 
increase of non-State actors‘ attacks on states and the resulting response by States to use 
lethal force. 
The use of modern military precision technology and their weapon systems should 
work in concert with humanitarian and human rights law regulations. This enables the 
number of civilian casualties to be kept at a minimum in accordance with the laws of armed 
conflict. In deploying advanced methods of targeted killing such as drones, care must be 
taken to ensure that they do not occasion the unintended consequences of increasing the risk 
to specifically protected persons and objects.  
Improved technology and enhanced targeting capabilities will minimize targeting 
mistakes and the incidental civilian casualties. This will arguably improve compliance with 
the laws of armed conflict. 
4. Targeted Killing sing Drones in the Exercise of Self-Defence 
When conducted outside the territory of the targeting State, a targeted killing may, under 
certain circumstances, be defensible under the State‘s right to self-defence (including 
anticipatory self-defence).800 However legitimate a State‘s right to resort to the use of force 
for purposes of self-defence, the degree of force used is not unlimited.801 In this regard 
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whatever actions are taken in self-defence, it is imperative that the force deployed should be 
absolutely necessary and strictly proportionate.802 Thus in the event that targeted killings are 
adopted, these rules should be complied with. 
In sum, in order for a targeted killing to be permissible under international law under 
the regulatory system of hostilities, it must conform to certain requirements. A self-defence 
targeted killing should be necessary which implies an absence of less severe measures.803 It 
must also be for a strictly defensive purpose.804 Also, the degree of force used should be 
proportionally restricted to only that which is ‗reasonably required to foil an anticipated 
armed attack or defeat an ongoing one.‘805  
This obliges the targeting party to explore less forceful measures as indicated in the 
Caroline incident.806 A targeted killing in self-defence must also be so imminent and of such 
magnitude that a State ‗cannot afford to wait to absorb the first blow‘.807 The requirement of 
imminence, taken together with necessity and proportionality, impliedly enjoins States 
neither to act too early as it would be pre-emptive nor too late as it would be retaliatory.808 
In self-defence targeted killing situations, the severity of the threat level must be assessed 
objectively on a case by case basis.809 
5. Targeted Killing Using Drones in the Conduct of Hostilities 
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While targeted killing in the conduct of hostilities may appear to limit incidental harm by 
focusing on selected individuals, it may bring about the protraction of an armed conflict.810 
Unmanned drones present a distinct military advantage over the enemy and also provide a 
certain degree of protection to civilians.811  
However, extreme caution needs to be taken to ensure the presence of human control 
in such operations.812 While the technology used in precision attacks is a welcome addition 
to modern armed conflict, it must be strictly regulated by the law.813  
Thus, whilst certain individuals may be lawfully targeted in the conduct of hostilities, 
it is imperative to note that the right to attack is not unlimited. In some exceptional 
circumstances, no person can lawfully be killed.814 This points to the fact that the scope of 
targeted killing is restricted and that it applies only at the extreme end of permissible 
methods of conducting hostilities.815  
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In sum, in order for a targeted killing to be permissible under international law 
regulating hostilities, it must conform to certain requirements. A targeted killing, in both 
international and internal armed conflicts, must constitute an integral part of the conduct of 
hostilities.816 Such an attack must also not be directed against an individual protected against 
direct attack.817 This implies that any attack must be likely to contribute effectively to the 
achievement of a direct and concrete military advantage.818 
Additionally, the incidental death, injury or destruction should be proportional to the 
anticipated military advantage.819 This requires that non-lethal alternatives should be 
considered.820 In order for a particular operation of targeted killing to satisfy the 
international legal requirements, the following preconditions must be met cumulatively.821 
6. Targeted Killing Using Drones as an Exercise of Law Enforcement 
As a means of law enforcement, targeted killing creates a dilemma situation since on one 
hand it may, in extreme circumstances be justified for the prevention of an attack against 
human life.822 On the other hand, it leads to situations that are contrary to the very 
principles that underlie law enforcement (pr tection of the human life of everybody).823  
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Most cases of law enforcement appear to be the result of incomplete intelligence 
gathering, disregard for less-than-lethal measures and deficient organization of the 
operations.824 Thus, since resort to targeted killing is a use of force in extremis, it must be 
strictly regulated by the principles that are intended to protect individual life.825 
Additionally, States should carefully assess the long term consequences of using targeted 
killing in law enforcement.826 
Under law enforcement, the use of potentially lethal force to secure the 
incapacitation or arrest or a suspected terrorist is permissible.827 While potentially lethal 
force is permissible if used against persons whose past conduct indicates that they continue 
to pose a potential but unspecified threat to human life, the intentional killing of an 
individual can only be justified by the protection of human life from a concrete and specific 
threat.828   
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Khashiyev & Akayeva v Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, ECHR 24 February 2005; ECiHR, Ergi v Turkey, 
no. 66/1997/850/1057, ECHR 28 July 1998; Nils Melzer, ibid at 425-26: ‗Particularly, States that are 
regularly confronted with terrorist attacks may be tempted to adopt broad shoot-to-kill policies against 
suspected suicide bombers, and other persons likely to represent an extreme danger to the lives of their 
citizens.‘ 
824 Israel HCJ, Muhammad Abd al-Aziz Hamdan v The General Security Service (1996) HCJ, 8049/96, at paragraph 
6; Israel HCJ, Abd al-Halim Bilbeisi v General Security Service (1996) HCJ-VR 336/96; Nils Melzer, ibid at 426. 
825 Françoise Hampson ‗The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body‘ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 549; ICJ, 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, paragraph 25: ‗The Court observes that the protection of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the 
Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency‘; Nils Melzer, 
ibid at 426. 
826 Nils Melzer, ibid at 426. 
827 Israel HCJ, Muhammad Abd al-Aziz Hamdan v The General Security Service (1996) HCJ, 8049/96, at paragraph 
6; Israel HCJ, Abd al-Halim Bilbeisi v General Security Service (1996) HCJ-VR 336/96. 












In sum, targeted killing must only be resorted to in a very narrow set of 
circumstances and must be strictly controlled by the law.829 A targeted killing under law 
enforcement must be absolutely necessary (in qualitative, quantitative and temporal terms) 
to protect human life from unlawful attack.830 This implies that the operation should be 
organized such a way as to minimize to the greatest extent possible the recourse to lethal 
force.831 It must also have a sufficient legal basis and be for a strictly preventive purpose as 
opposed to a retributive one.832  
Importantly, the operation must pursue the legitimate aim of protecting life and 
should avoid having the killing of a suspect as the actual objective.833 In the event that an 
unlawful targeted killing does occur, the State whose agents conducted the operation is 
duty-bound to investigate.834 In order for a particular operation of targeted killing to satisfy 
the international legal requirements, the above preconditions must be met cumulatively.835  
                                                             
829 Nils Melzer, supra note 3 at 426: ‗Ultimately, it should be recognized that the term ―law enforcement‖ 
comprises the notions of both ―law‖ and ―force‖. Neither can ―law‖ be effectively protected without the 
possibility to resort to ―force‖ including in extremis, even the method of targeted killing. Nor can such ―force‖ 
be used without being subjected to the rule of ―law‖ and to the principles and values it endeavours to protect.‘ 
830 Article 58(c), AP I; Nils Melzer, ibid at 425; Article 57(3), AP I. 
831 Article 35, AP I; ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, paragraph 78; Article 57(3), AP I; IACiHR, 
Disabled People‟s International v United States (1996) Report No.3/96; Israel HCJ, Sakhwil et al. v Commander of the 
Judea and Samaria Region (1979) H.C. 434/79 reprinted in (1980) 10 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 345; 
Marco Sassoli & Antoine Bouvier, supra note 139 at 170; Nils Melzer, ibid at 425. 
832 UNHRC, General Comment No. 6 (1982), paragraph 3; UNHRC, de Guerero Case, paragraph 13.3; ECtHR, 
Streletz Case, paragraph 87 and 102; ECtHR, Makaratzis Case, paragraph 25, 67 and 70; UNHRC, Suriname 
Case, paragraph 14.3; UNHRC, Myrna Mack Case, paragraph 153; ECtHR, Nachova Case, paragraph 96 and 99; 
ECtHR, Ayetkin Case, paragraph 108; ECtHR, McCann Case, paragraph 154; Jörg Arnold, Nora Karsten & 
Helmut Kreicker ‗The German Border Guard Cases before the European Court of Human Rights‘ (2003) 11(1) 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 67, 82; Nils Melzer, ibid at 425. 
833 Nils Melzer, ibid at 416, 425; ECtHR, McKerr Case, paragraph 111; IACiHR, Abella Case, paragraph 244. 
834 UNHCR, General Comment No. 6 (1982), paragraph 3; ACHPR, Ouédraogo v Burkina Faso, 
Communication No. 204/97, Decision of 1 May 2001, 29th Ordinary Session, April/May 2001, paragraph 3; 
IACtHR, Myrna Mack Chang v Guatemala, paragraph 153; ECtHR, Ergi Case, paragraph 82, 86; ECtHR, Gülec 
Case, paragraph 77, 83; ECtHR, Isayeva and others Case, paragraph 208, 225; ECtHR, Jordan Case, paragraph 
105; ECtHR, Kaya Case, paragraph 86; ECtHR, Kelly and others Case, paragraph 94; ECtHR, McCann Case, 
paragraph 169; ECtHR, McKerr Case, paragraph 111; ECtHR, Orhan Case, paragraph 344, 348; ECtHR, Özkan 
Case, paragraph 193; ECtHR, Shanaghan Case, paragraph 88; UNHRC, Bleir Case, paragraph 13.3; UNHRC, 
General Comment No. 6, paragraph 4; UNHRC, General Comment No. 31, paragraph 15; UNHRC, Miango 
Muiyo Case, paragraph 9; UNHRC, Suriname Case, paragraph 14.2; IACiHR, Abella Case, paragraph 244; 
IACiHR, Alejandre Case, paragraph 47; ACiHPR, Civil Liberties Organisation v Chad, paragraph 22.  












7. Conclusion on the Use of Drones for Targeted Killing 
The lack of transparency by States engaged in targeted killing operations has been cited as a 
matter of deep concern.836 The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions has asserted that the transparency requirement is an obligation on 
States under both human rights law and IHL which ensures better accountability.837 Most 
States that conduct targeted killing operations using drones are rarely transparent about 
their policies or the procedural organization and control.838  
These States may (sometimes) have valid tactical or security reasons not to disclose 
the criteria for selecting targets. However, without the disclosure of the legal rationale as 
well as the bases for target selection, it would be impossible to confirm the authenticity or 
otherwise of intelligence relied upon, or to ensure that unlawful targeted killings do not 
result in impunity. This contravenes States‘ human rights law and IHL obligations regarding 
the right to life.839  
States also avoid disclosing information on who has been targeted, the attendant 
incidental harm, the full legal basis of their operations, and the procedural safeguards.840 
This creates an unacceptable ‗accountability vaccum‘ which gives States a virtual and 
impermissible license to kill.841     
                                                             
836 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 87. 
837 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 87; Philip Alston & Hina Shamsi, A Killer Above the 
Law?, The Guardian, 5 February 2010: ‗Accountability is an independent requirement of international law. 
When complete secrecy prevails, it is negated. Secrecy also provides incentives to push the margins in 
problematic ways.‘ 
838 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 87; Philip Alston & Hina Shamsi, A Killer Above the 
Law?, The Guardian, 5 Febryary 2010: ‗Drones lend themselves to secrecy. Used without fanfare in remote 
and inaccessible areas, they are invisible to all but their potential victims.‘ 
839Article 50, GC I; Article 51, GC II; Article 130, GC III; Article 147, GC IV; Articles 11, 85 and 87(3), AP I; 
ECOSOC, Resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989. 
840 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 91; Philip Alston & Hina Shamsi: ‗Drones lend 
themselves to secrecy. Used without fanfare in remote and inaccessible areas, they are invisible to all but their 
potential victims. The military advantages are obvious, but so too are the potential rule-of-law problems‘. 
841 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraphs 87, 88, 89, 90 and 91; Philip Alston & Hina Shamsi, 
ibid: ‗In a zone of secrecy, there is no way to know if the 90 people reportedly killed in 11 subsequent strikes 












This secrecy further frustrates any efforts to ensure the lawfulness of these killings. 
This is compounded by the absence of post facto accountability-seeking mechanisms to 
ensure the investigation, prosecution and punishment of wrongful killings.842  
The above situation violates the international legal framework that limits the lawful 
use of lethal force against selected individuals.843 Thus, in order to ensure compliance with 
the standards of international law, States must enhance transparency about targeted killing 
operations, especially those using drones. This will subsequently ease the attainment of 
accountability for wrongful killings.844 
The process of target selection must also be strictly controlled within the legal rules 
applicable to a particular situation. Individuals whose conduct gives support to the general 
war effort (including economic support, political advocacy and propaganda) should not be 
targeted since they are protected by human rights law and further, they are not directly 
participating in hostilities. For instance, the US has expanded its list of targets as to include 
some (alleged Taliban-supporting) Afghanistani drug lords.845 Such individuals do not 
constitute a ‗party‘ to an armed conflict and are, therefore, not legitimate targets. 
While human rights standards demand the use of less-lethal methods before resorting 
to lethal force, and further advocate for the incremental use of force, certain situations may 
                                                             
842 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 92; Philip Alston & Hina Shamsi, ibid: ‗Unless 
governments voluntarily disclose information, human rights monitors and independent journalists are unable 
to verify claims that there are limited or no civilian casualties, let alone to weigh them against credible reports 
that hundreds of innocents have died.‘ 
843 ICJ, Wall Advisory Opinion, paragraph 108-111: ‗ICCPR ―is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in 
the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.‖‘; UNHRC, Lopez v Uruguay (1984), paragraphs 12.1-
12.3; ECtHR, Kaya v. Turkey, Judgment of 19 February 1998, 1998-I R.J.D. 297, 140; ECtHR, McCann and 
others v. UK, ECHR, Judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A, No. 324, 140; IACtHR, Neira Alegria Case, 
Judgment of 19 January 1995, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 20 (1995); E/CN.4/2006/53, paragraph 35: 
‗States party to the ICCPR can be held responsible for violations of the rights under the Covenant when the 
violations are perpetrated by authorized agents of the State, including on foreign territory.‘; UNHRC, Alston 
Targeted Killings Report, 26, paragraph 87; Michael N Schmitt, supra note 140 at 134. 
844 Philip Alston & Hina Shamsi, A Killer above the Law?, The Guardian, 5 February 2010: ‗Accountability is 
an independent requirement of international law. When complete secrecy prevails, it is negated. Secrecy also 
provides incentives to push the margins in problematic ways. History contains numerous examples of 
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not allow this.846 Therefore, the municipal legal framework must be cognizant of the 
possibility that the threat is so imminent that graduated use of force is not possible. It must 
also ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place so that the assessment of imminence is 
reliably made.847 
The outcome of a targeting killing operation is usually dependent on its control and 
organization. The first element in organization is ensuring the reliability of information used 
to support the targeting decision.848 This will then be complemented by a structure to 
continuously verify the accuracy of such information and also the detection of any 
unreliable information.849  
Additionally, it is important to take into account the types of weapons used with 
keen attention being paid to their proportionality,850 and also to minimizing civilian 
casualties to the greatest extent possible.851 These operations must be organized in such a 
way that at the detection of an error, the operation can be cancelled or suspended.852  
In order to ensure accountability, the organization of a targeted killing operation 
must have an after-the-fact assessment in place to investigate alleged unlawful targeted 
killings and either to identify and prosecute perpetrators, or to extradite them to another 
State that has made out a prima facie case for the unlawfulness of a targeted killing.853 
It is submitted that, while Governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens 
against dangers arising from terrorist or other attacks, actions taken in this pursuit must 
                                                             
846 Israel HCJ, Muhammad Abd al-Aziz Hamdan v The General Security Service (1996) HCJ, 8049/96, at paragraph 
6; Israel HCJ, Abd al-Halim Bilbeisi v General Security Service HCJ-VR 336/96; UNHRC, Alston Targeted 
Killings Report, ibid at paragraph 74; HPCR Commentary, supra note 141 at Section G.32(a). 
847 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 74; UNHRC, de Guerero Case, paragraph 13.1-13.3. 
848 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 89; HPCR Commentary, Section G.32(a). 
849 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 89; HPCR Commentary, Section G.32(a)-(c) and 39. 
850 Yves Sandoz et al., supra note 185 at Section 2207; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, ibid at 
paragraph 89; Philip B Heymann & Juliette N Kayyyem, supra note 73 at 68. 
851 Article 57, AP I; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 89; Michael N Schmitt, supra note 
140 at 149-57; HPCR Commentary, supra note 141 at Section G.32(c). 
852 Article 57(2)(b), AP I; UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 89; UK Ministry of Defence, 
The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004) paragraph 5.32.9.  
853 Common Article 3; Article 49, GC I; Article 50, GC II; Article 129, GC III; Article 146, GC IV; Articles 3 












strictly conform to the standards of self-defence, human rights and humanitarian law.854 
Otherwise, States‘ actions (even in legitimate situations for using force) are likely to be 
‗more readily associated with criminal behaviour than with acceptable Government 
policy.‘855 The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
captures the above point thus:856 
Empowering governments to identify and kill ‗known terrorists‘ places no 
verifiable obligation upon them to demonstrate in any way that those against 
whom lethal force is used are indeed terrorists, or to demonstrate that every 
other alternative had been exhausted. While it is portrayed as a ‗limited 
exception‘ to international norms, it actually creates the potential for an 
endless expansion of the relevant category to include any enemies of the 
State, social misfits, political opponents, or others. And it makes a mockery of 
whatever accountability mechanisms may have otherwise constrained or 
exposed such illegal action under either humanitarian or human rights law. 
It is further submitted that, the increasingly prolific use of lethal robotic technologies 
by States, especially but not limited to targeted killing of suspected terrorists is a matter for 
serious legal, ethical and moral consideration.857 Particularly troubling is the inevitable ease 
with which the sanctity of life is violated by using autonomous or semi-autonomous ‗killer 
robots‘ such as unmanned Predator drones.858  
The onus, thus, rests with States which opt to use such lethal technologies to: i) 
publicly identify which rules of international law they rely on as bases for targeted killing; ii) 
to satisfactorily specify the legal rationale for deciding to kill rather than to capture; iii) to 
outline (where appropriate) the procedural safeguards that ensure targeted killing operations 
comply with the law, and also the remedial measures taken in the event that unlawful 
killings result.859  
                                                             
854 Report of the Special Rapporteur (Executions), 13 January 2003, E/CN.4/2003/3, paragraph 39. 
855 Nils Melzer, supra note 3 at 435; Georg Nolte, supra note 235 at 117 and 128. 
856 Report of the Special Rapporteur (Executions), 22 December 2004, E/CN.4/2005/7, paragraph 41. 
857 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 2.    
858 UNHRC, Alston Targeted Killings Report, paragraph 2. 
859 Philip Alston & Hina Shamsi, A Killer Above the Law?, The Guardian, 5 February 2010: ‗The US refuses 
to disclose the programme's legal justification, the safeguards designed to minimise civilian harm, or the 












This will effectively restrict circumstances under which States may justify unlawful 
conduct by asserting that they are preserving their national security against terrorist attacks. 
In such circumstances, the unlawful conduct is usually interpreted as a viable exculpatory 
circumstance (within the regulatory legal regime) even when it departs not only from the 
State‘s obligations applicable in situations falling short of an armed conflict, but also in the 
conduct of hostilities. 
There is general agreement, but not complete uniformity, in legal doctrine that lethal 
force should only be used in cases of legitimate self-defence, in the conduct of hostilities or 
where absolutely necessary in law enforcement situations. However, the reality of State 
practice is unfortunately different. Of grave concern is the fact that, the threshold at which 
lethal force may be used has decreased in the wake of this State practice.  
In this atmosphere, States will most likely interpr t the exculpatory circumstances 
allowing for their use of force in very broad terms. This would expand the individuals 
against whom, and the circumstance in which lethal force may be used beyond permissible 
limits, thus resulting in the excessively permissive application of the standards regulating the 
use of lethal force.  
Therefore, on a cautionary note, unless concrete measures are taken to arrest the 
prosecution of such a trend, with sustained State practice there would be high likelihood of 
the emergence of a new rule of custom on targeted killing. The above scenario provides a 
plausible answer to the research question: What implications does the use of unmanned 



















BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS 
Agnieszka Jachec-Neale ‗End Justifies the Means?: -Post 9/11 Contempt for Humane 
Treatment‘ in Roberta Arnold & Noёlle Quénivet (eds.) International Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law (2008) 58 
Martinus Nijhoff: Leiden. 
Alan Collins Contemporary Security Studies (2007) Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Albin Eser ‗Individual Criminal Responsibility‘ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John 
R.W.D (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Andrew M Exum et.al Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2009) 
Center for New American Security: Washington DC. 
Anthony Dworkin ‗Military Necessity and Due Process: The Place of Human Rights in the 
War on Terror‘ in David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista (eds.) New Wars, New 
Laws? Applying the Laws of War in Twenty-First Century Conflicts (2005) Transnational 
Publishers: Ardsley NY.   
Antoine Bouvier & Marco Sassoli How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and 
Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law (1999) 
International Committee of the Red Cross: Geneva. 
Antonio Cassese ‗General Round-Up‘ in Antonio Cassese & Joseph Weiler (eds.) Change 
and Stability in International Law-Making (1988) De Gruyter: Berlin. 
Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2008) Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Antonio Cassese International Law (2005) Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Armin Krishnan Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons (2009) Ashgate 
Publishing Limited: Surrey. 
BG Ramcharan ‗The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life‘ in BG Ramcharan (ed.) 
The Right to Life in International Law (1985) Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht. 
Barbara von Tigerstrom Human Security and International Law: Prospects and Problems (2007) 
Hart Publishing: Oxford. 
Bin Cheng General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1987) 
Grotius Publications Limited: Cambridge. 
Bruno Simma (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2002) C.H. Beck: 
München. 
CH Gibbs-Smith Aviation: An Historical Survey from its Origins to the End of World War II 
(1970) London: Her Majesty‘s Stationery Office. 
CK Boyle ‗The Concept of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life‘ in BG Ramcharan (ed.) The Right 












Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson (eds.) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in 
International Law (2003) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Christian Tomuschat Gezielte Tötungen (Targeted Killings): Zugleich en Kommentar zum 
Gutachten des Internationalen Gerichtshofs vom 9 Juli 2004 (2004).  
Christopher Greenwood ‗Scope and Application of Humanitarian Law‘ in Dieter Fleck 
(ed.) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (1995) Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. 
Conway W Henderson Understanding International Law (2010) Wiley-Blackwell: West Sussex 
DM Chirwa ‗State Responsibility in International Law‘ in Mashood A Baderin & Manisuli 
Ssenyonjo (eds.) International Human Rights Law: Six Decades After the UDHR and 
Beyond (2010) Ashgate Publishing: Ashgate. 
Daniel D Nsereko ‗Arbitrary Deprivation of Life: Controls on Permissible Depravations‘ in 
BG Ramcharan (ed.) The Right to Life in International Law (1985) Martinus Nijhoff: 
Dordrecht. 
David J Harris Cases and Materials on International Law (2010) Sweet and Maxwell: London 
David Kretzmer ‗Civilian Immunity in War: Legal Aspects‘ in Igor Primoratz (ed.) Civilian 
Immunity in War (2007) Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
David R Mets Aerial Power and Technology: Smart and Unmanned Weapons (2009) Book News 
Inc.: Portland Oregon. 
David Rodin War and Self-Defense (2002) Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
David Wippman & Mathew Evangelista (eds.) New Wars, New Laws?: Applying the Laws of 
War to 21st Century Conflicts (2005) Transnational Publishers: Ardsley, NY. 
Dieter Fleck (ed.) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1995) 210 Oxford 
University Press: New York 
Elinor Camille Sloan The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO 
(2002) McGill-Queens University Press. 
Emerhrich De Vattel ‗The Law of Nations‘ in Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore (eds.) 
The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law 
and on Luxury (2008) Liberty Fund: Indianapolis. 
Emily Crawford The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed Conflict 
(2010) Oxford University Press. 
Enrico Milano Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law – Reconciling Effectiveness, 
Legality and Legitimacy (2005) Brill: Leiden. 
Fausto Pocar ‗Human Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and Armed Conflict‘ in Vohrah et al Man‟s Inhumanity to Man: Essays in 
Honour of Antonio Cassese (2003) Kluwer Law International: The Hague. 
Frits Kalshoven & Liesbeth Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to 












Gary D Solis The Law of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law in War (2010) 
Cambridge University Press: New York. 
Tarcisio Gazzini The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law (2005) Man Uni 
Press: Manchester. 
George P Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin Defending Humanity: When Force is Justified and Why 
(2008) Oxford University Press: New York. 
HM Hensel Legitimate Use of Military Force: The Just War Tradition and the Customary Law of 
Armed Conflict (2008) Ashgate Publishing: Ashgate. 
Hans P Gasser ‗Protection of the Civilian Population‘ in Dieter Fleck (ed.) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (1995) Oxford University Press: New York 
Hellen Duffy The „War on Terror‟ and the Framework of International Law (2005) Cambridge 
University Press: London. 
Henry J Steiner & Philip Alston International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 
(2008) Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Ian Brownlie International Law and the Use of Force by States (1991) Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
Ian Brownlie Principles of International Law (2008) Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Ian Brownlie System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility (1983) Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
Ingrid Detter The Law of War (2000) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
International Committee of the Red Cross Montreux Document On Pertinent International Legal 
Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of private military and 
security Companies during Armed Conflict (2009) ICRC: Geneva. 
International Committee of the Red Cross Protecting Civilians in 21st Century Warfare: Target 
Selection, Proportionality and Precautionary Measures in Law and Practice (2001) ICRC: 
Geneva. 
J G Gardam ‗Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello‘ in L Boisson de 
Chazournes & P Sands (eds.) International Law, the International Court of Justice and 
Nuclear Weapons (1999) Cambridge University Press: London. 
James Crawford The International Law Commission‟s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002) Cambridge University Press: London. 
Jan Römer Killing in a Gray Area Humanitarian Law and Human Rights: How Can the National 
Police of Colombia Overcome the Uncertainty of Which Branch of International Law to 
Apply? (2010) Springer: Heidelberg. 
Jean Jacques Rousseau ‗Social Contract‘ in Roger D Masters & Christopher Kelly (eds.) The 
Collected Writings of Rousseau (1994) Cambridge University Press: London. 
Jean-François Quéguiner Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 












Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Loiuse Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Volume I: Rules (2005) ICRC, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Loiuse Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Volume II: Pratctice (2005) ICRC, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer ‗International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism‘ in Liesbeth 
Lijnzaad, Johanna van Sambeek & Bahia Tahzib-Lia (eds.) Making the Voice of 
Humanity Heard (2004) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Boston.  
Jean S Pictet (ed.) The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary , First Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (1952) ICRC: Geneva. 
Jean S Pictet (ed.) The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary , Second Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1960) ICRC: Geneva. 
Jean S Pictet (ed.) The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary , Third Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1960) ICRC: Geneva. 
Jean S Pictet (ed.) The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary , Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958) ICRC: 
Geneva. 
Judith G Gardam Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (2004) Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Kai Ambos ‗Article 25 - Individual Criminal Responsibility‘ in Otto Triffterer (ed.) 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2008) Hart 
Publishing: Portland, Oregon. 
Keith L Shimko The Iraq Wars and America‟s Military Revolution (2010) Cambridge University 
Press: London. 
Kenneth Watkin ‗Humans in the Cross-Hairs: Targeting, Assassination and Extra-Legal 
Killing in Contemporary Armed Conflict‘ in David Wippman & Mathew 
Evangelista (ed.) New Wars, New Laws?: Applying the Laws of War to 21st Century 
Conflicts (2005) Transnational Publishers: Ardsley, NY. 
Knut Dörmann Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Sources and Commentary (2003) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
L Moir Reappraising the Resort to Force: International Law, Jus ad Bellum and the War on Terror 
(2010) Hart Publishing: Oxford. 
Lauri Hannikainen Peremptory Norms in International Law (Jus Cogens), Historical Development, 
Criteria, Present Status (1988) Finish Lawyers Publishing Company: Helsinki. 
Liesbeth Zegveld The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (2002) 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 













Louis Henkin The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981) 
Columbia University Press: New York. 
M Cerasini The Future of War: The Face of 21st Century Warfare (2003) 123 Alpha: 
Indianapolis. 
Malcolm N Shaw International Law (2003) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights–CCPR Commentary (2005) N.P. 
Engel Publisher: Arlington. 
Marco Sassóli & Antoine Bouvier How Does Law Protect in War?: Cases, Documents and 
Teaching Materials on Contemporary International Humanitarian Law (1999) ICRC: 
Geneva. 
Marco Sassóli ‗Targeting: Scope and Utility of the Concept of ―Military Objectives‖ for the 
Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflicts‘ in D Wippman & M 
Evangelista (eds.) New Wars, New Laws? (2005) 181-210 Transnational Publishers: 
Ardsley New York. 
Menno t kaminga & Martin Scheinin The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International 
Law (2009) Oxford University Press: New York. 
Mary Ellen O‘Connell International Law and the Use of Force: Cases and Materials (2005) 
Oxford University Press. 
Michael Bothe, Karl Partsch & Waldemar Solf New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: 
Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1982) 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague. 
Michael Byers War Law: International Law and Armed Conflict (2005) Atlantic Books: London. 
Michael E Brown (ed.) The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (1996) MIT Press: 
Cambridge Massachusetts.  
Mathew J Machon Targeted Killing as an Element of US Foreign Policy in the War on Terror 
(2006) SAMS: Fort Leavenworth. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗―Direct Participation in Hostilities‖ and 21st Century Armed Conflict‘ 
in Horst Fischer, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Christian Raap (eds.) Crisis 
Management and Humanitarian Protection (2004) Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag GmbH: 
Berlin. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗Targeted Killing in International Law: Law Enforcement, Self-defense 
and Armed Conflict‘ in Roberta Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet (eds.) International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law 
(2008) 525 Martinus Nijhoff: Leiden. 
Michael N Schmitt, Charles Garraway & Yoram Dinstein ‗The Manual on the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict with Commentary‘ (2006), reprinted in (2006) 36 Israel 












Michael N Schmitt ‗The Law of Targeting‘ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau (eds.) 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (2007) 131-
168 Cambridge University Press: New York. 
Michael R Rip & James M Hasik Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare 
(2002) Naval Institute Press. 
Mordechai Kremnitzer ‗Preventive Killings‘ in Dieter Fleck (ed.) Legal Issues of Military 
Counter-Terrorist Operations (2004) 12 Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Nigel D White 'Self-Defence, Security Council Authority and Iraq' in Richard Burchill, 
Nigel D White & Justin Morris (eds.) International Conflict and Security Law: Essays in 
Memory of Hilaire McCoubrey (2005) Cambridge University Press: New York. 
Nils Melzer Interpretive Guidelines on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law (2009) ICRC: Geneva.  
Nils Melzer Targeted Killing in International Law (2008) Oxford University Press: New York. 
Nikolaos K Tsagourias Jurisprudence of International Law: The Humanitarian Dimension (2000) 
Manchester University Press: Manchester. 
Noam Lubell Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non- State Actors (2010) Oxford University 
Press: New York. 
Noëlle Quénivet ‗The History of the Relationship between International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law‘ in Roberta Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet (eds.) International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law 
(2008) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden. 
Noëlle Quénivet ‗The Right to Life in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law‘ in Roberta Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet (eds.) International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law (2008) Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: Leiden. 
Paul W Gormley ‗The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms 
of Jus Cogens‘ in BG Ramcharan (ed.) The Right to Life in International Law (1985) 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht. 
Peter W Singer Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (2009) 
Penguin Press. 
Peter Rowe The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces (2006) Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Commentary on the HPCR Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (2010) HPCR: Harvard. 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (2010) HPCR: Harvard. 
R Müllerson ‗The Interplay of Objective and Subjective Elements in Customary Law‘ in K 













Rebecca MM Wallace International Law (2008) Sweet and Maxwell: London. 
Rene Provost International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2002) 247-269 Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Robert Kolb & Richard Hyde An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts (2008) 
Hart Publishing: Oxford. 
Roberta Arnold ‗Terrorism and IHL: A Common Denominator?‘ in Roberta Arnold & 
Pierre Antoine Hildbrand (eds.) International Humanitarian Law and the 21st Century‟s 
Conflicts: Changes and Challenges (2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden. 
Roberta Arnold ‗Terrorism in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law‘ in 
Roberta Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet (eds.) International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law: Towards a New Margin in International Law (2008) Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: Leiden. 
Rodriguez-Villasante ‗Terrorist Acts, Armed Conflicts and International Humanitarian 
Law‘ in Pablo Antonio Fernández-Sánchez (ed.) The New Challenges of Humanitarian 
Law in Armed Conflicts: In Honour of Professor Juan Antonio Carrillo-Salcedo (2005) 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden. 
S Metz ‗Strategists and the Revolution in Military Affairs‘ in H Smith (ed.) The Strategists 
(2002) 100 Australian Defence Studies Centre: Canberra. 
Salah El-Din Amer ‗The Protection of Civilian Population‘ in Natalino Ronzitti & Gabriella 
Venturini (eds.) The Law of Air Warfare: Contemporary Issues (2006) 17-33 Eleven 
International Publishing: Utrecht. 
Thomas Burgenthal ‗To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible 
Derogations‘ in Louis Henkin (ed.) International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1981) Columbia University Press: New York. 
Thomas M Franck Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (2002) 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Thomas G Mahnken Technology and the American Way of War (2008) 186 Columbia 
University Press: New York. 
Torsten Stein ‗How Much Humanity Do Terrorists Deserve?‘ in Delissen & Tanja 
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead (1991) 567, 569 Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: London. 
United States of America, Department of Defense National Defense Strategy (2008) 
Department of Defence: US.  
United States of America U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs. 













Yoram Dinstein ‗Jus ad Bellum Aspects of the War on Terrorism‘ in Wybo P Heere 
Terrorism and the Military: International Legal Implications (2003) North Holland 
Publishing Company: London. 
Yoram Dinstein ‗Military Necessity‘ in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law (1997) North Holland Publishing Company: London. 
Yoram Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2004) 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Yoram Dinstein ‗The Right to Life, Physical Integrity and Liberty‘ in Louise D Henkin (ed.) 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981) Columbia 
University Press: New York. 
Yoram Dinstein ‗Unlawful Combatancy‘ in Fred Borch & Paul Wilson (eds.) International 
Law and the War on Terror (2003) Naval War College: New Port. 
Yoram Dinstein War, Aggression and Self-Defense (2005) Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Yutaka Arai-Takahashi ‗Fair Trial Guarantees in Occupied Territory – The Interplay 
between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law‘ in Roberta 
Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet (eds.) International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law (2008) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 
Leiden. 
Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann (eds.) Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1987) 
ICRC: Geneva. 
Wesley K Clark Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat (2001) Public 
Affairs: New York. 
 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND ACADEMIC REPORTS 
Al-HAQ (West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists), Willful Killing: The 
Assassination of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories by the Israeli Security 
Forces, Briefing Paper, February 2001. 
Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Israel Must End its Policy of 
Assassinations, 4 July 2003, AI Index: MDE 15/056/2003, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org (accessed 2 September 2010). 
Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: State Assassinations and Other 
Unlawful Killings, 21 February 2001, AI Index: MDE 15/005/2001, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org (accessed 2 September 2010). 
Amnesty International Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security, September 
2003, AI Index: MDE31/006/2003, available at http://www.amnesty.org (accessed 












B‘Tselem Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories, Report, May 1992, 
available at 
  http://www.btselem.org/Download/199205_Undercover_Units_Eng.doc (accessed 
2 September 2010). 
B‘Tselem, Demolition and Sealing of Houses as a Punitive Measure in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip During the Intifada, Report, September 1989. 
B‘Tselem, Israeli Violations of Human Rights of Lebanese Civilians, Report, January 2000. 
B‘Tselem, Palestinians who were the Target of an Assassination in the Occupied Territories, 
statistical data covering the period from 9 November 2000 to 8 April 2006, available 
at: http://www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Casualties_Data.asp?Category=19 
(accessed 2 September 2010). 
B‘Tselem, Israel‟s Assassination Policy: Extra-judicial Executions, Position Paper, January 2001, 
available at 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/200101_Extrajudicial_Killings_Eng.doc 
(accessed 2 September 2010). 
Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone 
Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010 (2010) New American Foundation. 
Human Rights Watch A License to Kill: Israeli Operations against "Wanted" and Masked 
Palestinians (1993). 
Human Rights Watch Civilians Under Assault: Hezbollah‟s Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 
War (2007) August 2007. 
Human Rights Watch Fatal Strikes: Israel‟s Indiscriminate Attacks against Civilians in Lebanon 
(2006) August 2006. 
Human Rights Watch LRA Conflict in Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan 2002, (2002) 
Background Briefing, New York, 29 October.  
Human Rights Watch Precisely Wrong: Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles 
(2009) June 2009. 
Human Rights Watch The Road to Abu Ghraib (2004) New York. 
Human Rights Watch, Turning a Blind Eye: Impunity for Laws-of-War Violations during the Gaza 
War Summary (2010). 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2000 (2000) Geneva: ICRC. 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Draft Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (1973) Geneva, October. 
International Law Association Initial Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International 














A Eide, A Rosas & Theodore Meron ‗Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts 
Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards‘ (1995) 89 American Journal of 
International Law 215-223. 
A John Radsan ‗An Overt Turn on Covert Action‘ (2009) 53 Saint Louis University Law 
Journal 485-552. 
AJ Lazarski ‗Legal Implications of the Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicle‘ (2002) 16 
Aerospace Power Journal 74. 
A P V Rogers ‗Unequal Combat and the Law of War‘ (2004) 7 Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 3-34. 
Abraham D Soafer ‗Terrorism, The Law and the National Defense‘ (1989) 126 Military Law 
Review 89-103. 
Adam R Pearlman ‗Legality of Lethality: Paradigm Choice and Targeted Killings in 
Counterterrorism Operations‘ (2010) (March 23, 2010). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583985 
Adam Roberts ‗Counter-terrorism, Armed Force, and the Laws of War‘ (2002) 44 Survival 
7. 
Aeyal M Gross ‗Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor‘s New Clothes of the 
International Law Occupation?‘ (2007) 18(1) The European Journal of International Law 
1-35.  
Alexander Orakhelashvili ‗The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and 
Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions‘ (2005) 16 European 
Journal of International Law 59-88. 
Alexander Orakhelashvili ‗The Interac ion between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: 
Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?‘ (2008) 19(1) European Journal 
of International Law 161-182. 
Alexandra Boivin ‗The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military Objectives in the 
Context of Contemporary Warfare‘ (2006) 2 Research Paper Series.  
Amy E Eckert & Manooher Modifi ‗Doctrine or Doctrinaire – The First Strike Doctrine and 
Pre-emptive Self-Defense under International Law‘ (2004) 12 Tulane Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 117. 
Anthony Cullen ‗The Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of Application 
Contained in Article 8(2)(f)‘ (2008) 12(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 419–445. 
Amichai Cohen ‗The Principle of Proportionality in the Context of Operation Cast Lead: 
Institutional Perspectives‘ (2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423254 
(accessed 2 September). 
Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany ‗A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application 
of the Principle of Proportionality in Targeted Killings Case‘ (2007) 5(2) Journal of 












Amos N Guiora ‗Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law: A Re-Evaluation‘ 
(2008) Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2008) 1–22. 
Amos Guiora ‗Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense‘ (2004) 36 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 319-34. 
Andrea Bianchi ‗The International Regulation of the Use of Force: The Politics of 
Interpretive Method‘ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 651–676. 
Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze ‗Assymetrical War and the Notion of Armed 
Conflict: A Tentative Conceptualization‘ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red 
Cross 95-125. 
Antonio Cassese ‗On Some Merits of the Israeli Judgment on Targeted Killings‘ (2007) 5(2) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 339-45 
Brian T O‘Donnell & James C Kraska ‗Humanitarian Law: Developing International Rules 
for the Digital Battlefield‘ (2003) 8(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 133–160. 
Carsten Stahn ‗―Jus ad Bellum‖, ―Jus in Bello‖… ―Jus post Bellum‖: Rethinking the 
Conception of the Law of Armed Force‘ (2006) 17(5) European Journal of International 
Law 921-943. 
Catherine Bloom ‗The Classification of Hezbollah in Both International and Non-
International Armed Conflicts‘ (2008) Annual Survey of International and Comparative 
Law 61-97. 
Charles J Dunlap Jr ‗A Virtuous Warrior in a Savage World‘ (2010) available at 
http://www.usafa.af.mil/dfl/documents/virwar.doc (accessed 2 September 2010)/ 
Charles S Maier ‗Targeting the City: Debates and Silences about the Aerial Bombing of 
World War II‘ (2005) 87 International Review of the Red Cross 429-444. 
Chia Lehnardt ‗Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under International 
Criminal Law‘ (2008) 19(5) European Journal of International Law 1015-1034. 
Chris Downes ‗Targeted Killing in the Age of Terror: The Legality of the Yemen Strike‘ 
(2004) 9(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 277-294. 
Chris Jenks ‗Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the Law of 
Armed Conflict‘ (2009) 85 North Dakota Law Review 649-671. 
Christian Tomuschat ‗Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law‘ (2010) 21(1) 
European Journal of International Law 15-23. 
Christine Gray ‗From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force 
against Iraq‘ (2002) 13(1) European Journal of International Law 1-19. 
Colin Warbrick ‗The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human Rights‘ (2004) 
15(5) European Journal of International Law 989-1018. 
Cordula Droege ‗The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International 













Curtis A Ward ‗Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the 
United Nations Security Council‘ (2003) 8(2) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 289–
305. 
Dakota S Rudesill ‗Precision War and Responsibility: Transformational Military 
Technology and the Duty of Care under the Laws of War‘ (2007) 32 Yale Journal of 
International Law 517-545. 
Daniel B Pickard ‗Legalizing Assassination: Terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency and 
International Law‘ (2001) 30 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 1-36.  
Daniel Byman ‗Do Targeted Killings Work?‘ (2006) 85(2) Foreign Affairs 95-111. 
Daniel Moeckli ‗The US Supreme Court‘s ―Enemy Combatant‖ Decisions: A ―Major 
Victory for the Rule of Law‖?‘ (2005) 10(1) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 75–99. 
Daniel O‘Donnell ‗International Treaties against Terrorism and the Use of Terrorism during 
Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces‘ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 
853-880. 
Daniel P Ridlon ‗Contractors or Illegal Combatants?: The Status of Armed Contractors in 
Iraq‘ (2008) 62 The Air Force Law Review 199-253. 
Daniel Statman ‗Targeted Killing‘ (2004) 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 179-98. 
Dapo Akande ‗Clearing the Fog of War?: The ICRC‘s Interpretive Guidelines on Direct 
Participation in Hostilities‘ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 180-
192. 
Dapo Akande ‗Nuclear Weapons, Unclear Law? Deciphering the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court‘ (1997) 68 British Yearbook of 
International Law 209. 
David Byman ‗US Counterterrorism Operations: A Taxonomy‘ (2007) 49(3) Survival 121-
150.  
David D Jividen ‗Jus in Bello in the Twenty First Century: Reaping the Benefits and Facing 
the Challenges of Modern Weaponry and Military Strategy‘ (2004) 7 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 113-152. 
David Kretzmer ‗Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or 
Legitimate Means of Defence?‘ 16(2) European Journal of International Law 171-212. 
David Turns ‗Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law‘ 
(2006) 11(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 201–237. 
David W Glazier ‗Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda within the Law of War‘ 
(2009) 51 William & Mary Law Review 957 
Derek Jinks ‗September 11 and the Laws of War‘ (2003) 28 Yale Journal of International Law 
1-28. 
Dieter Fleck ‗International Accountability for Violations of the Jus in Bello: The Impact of 
the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law‘ (2006) 11(2) 












Elisabeth Decrey-Warner ‗Non-State Actors and Weapons‘ (2008) 37 Collegium 64-73 
Emanuel Gross ‗Democracy in the War against Terrorism–The Israeli Experience‘ (2002) 
35 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1161-1216. 
Emanuel Gross ‗The Struggle of a Democracy against the Terror of Suicide Bombers: 
Ideological and Legal Aspects‘ (2004) 22 Wisconsin International Law Journal 1161-
1216. 
Emanuel Gross ‗Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or their 
Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights vs. the State‘s Duty to 
Protect its Citizens‘ (2001) 15 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 196-
256. 
Enzo Cannizzaro ‗Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the 
Lebanese War‘ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 779-792. 
Eric P J Myjer & Nigel D White ‗The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-
Defence?‘ (2002) 7 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 5-17. 
Eric Rosand The UN-Led Multilateral Institutional Response to Jihadist Terrorism: Is a 
Global Counterterrorism Body Needed? (2006) 11(3) Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law 399-427. 
Eric Wyler ‗From ―State Crime‖ to Responsibility for ―Serious Breaches of Obligations 
under Peremptory Norms of International Law‖‘ (2002) 13(5) European Journal of 
International Law 1147-1160. 
Erick T Jensen ‗Unexpected Consequences from Knock-On Effects: A Different Standard 
for Computer Network Operations‘ (2003) 18 American University International Law 
Review 1145-1188. 
Federico Speroto ‗The Use of Force against Terrorists: A Reply to Christian J Tams‘ (2010) 
20(4) The European Journal International Law 1043-1048. 
Francisco Martin ‗The Unified Use of Force Rule Revisited: The Penetration of the Law of 
Armed Conflict by International Human Rights Law‘ (2002) 65 Saskatchewan Law 
Review 405-10. 
Fransisco F Martin ‗Using International Human Rights Law for Establish‘ (2001) 65 
Saskatchewan Law Review 451-468. 
François Bugnion ‗Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Non-international Armed Conflicts‘ (2003) 
6 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 167-198.   
François Bugnion ‗Just Wars, Wars of Aggression and International Humanitarian Law‘ 
(2002) 84 International Review of the Red Cross 523-546. 
Françoise J Hampson ‗The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body‘ (2008) 90 
International Review of the Red Cross 549-572. 













Frédéric Mégret ‗―War‖? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence‘ (2002) 13 European 
Journal of International Law 361-399. 
Gabor Rona ‗An Appraisal of US Practice Relating to ‗Enemy Combatants‘‘ (2007) 10 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 232-250. 
Gabriella Blum ‗The Laws of War and the ―Lesser Evil‖‘ (2008) Harvard Law School 
Faculty Scholarship Series 1-82 available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard faculty/24 
Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann ‗Law and Policy of Targeted Killing‘ (2010) 1 Harvard 
National Security Journal 145-170. 
Gary Solis ‗Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict‘ (2007) 60(2) Naval War College 
Review 127-146. 
Geoffrey S Corn ‗Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to 
Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict‘ (2007) 40(2) Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 295-355. 
Geoffrey S Corn ‗Unarmed but How Dangerous?: Civilian Augmentees, the Law of Armed 
Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for Permissible Civilian Battlefield 
Functions‘ (2008) 2 Journal of National Security Law and Policy 257-297.  
Geoffrey S Corn ‗Viewing Hamdan through a Military Lens‘ (2008) 33 Oklahoma City 
University Law Review 101-112. 
Geoffrey S Corn & Chris Jenks ‗Conduct Versus Status Based Targeting in Non-
International Armed Conflicts: Exposing the Flawed Foundation of the Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Interpretive Guidance‘ (2010) Working Paper Series.  
Geoffrey S Corn & Eric T Jensen ‗Transnational Armed Conflict: A ―Principled‖ Approach 
to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations‘ (2009) 42 Israel Law Review 
1-34. 
George Norman & Joel P Trachtmant ‗The Customary International Law Game‘ (1999) 
The American Journal of International Law 541-580. 
George P Fletcher ‗The Law of War and its Pathologies‘ (2006-2007) 38 Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review 517-546. 
Gordon A Christenson ‗The World Court and Jus Cogens‘ (1987) American Journal of 
International Law 93-101. 
Gerald L Neuman ‗Counter-terrorist Operations and the Rule of Law‘ (2005) 15(5) European 
Journal of International Law 1019-1029.  
Hans-Joachim Heintze ‗The European Court of Human Rights and the Implementation of 
Human Rights Standards During Armed Conflicts‘ (2002) 45 German Yearbook of 
International Law 60-77. 
Hans-Peter Gasser ‗Acts of Terror, ―Terrorism‖ and International Humanitarian Law 
(2002) 84 International Review of the Red Cross 547-570. 












Helen Duffy ‗Human Rights Litigation and the ―War on Terror‖‘ (2008) 90 International 
Review of the Red Cross 573-597. 
Helen Keller & Magdalena Forowicz ‗A Tightrope Walk between Legality and Legitimacy: 
An Analysis of the Israeli Supreme Court‘s Judgment on Targeted Killing‘ (2008) 21 
Leiden Journal of International Law 185–221. 
Hilly M Even-Khen ‗Can We Now Tell What ―Direct Participation in Hostilities‖ is?: HCJ 
769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel‘ 
(2007) 40(1) Israel Law Review 213-244.  
Howard A Wachtel ‗Targeting Osama bin Laden: Examining the Legality of Assassination 
as a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy‘ (2005) 55 Duke Law Journal 677-710. 
Hyder Gulam & Simon Lee ‗Uninhabited Aerial Combat Vehicles and the Law of Armed 
Conflict‘ (2005) 3(2) Australian Army Journal 124. 
International Committee of the Red Cross ‗A Guide to Legal Review of New Weapons, 
Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 931-956. 
International Committee of the Red Cross ‗Action by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross in the Event of Violations of International Humanitarian Law or of Other 
Fundamental Rules Protecting Persons in Situations of Violence‘ (2005) 87 
International Review of the Red Cross 393-400. 
International Committee of the Red Cross ‗International Humanitarian Law and Challenges 
of Contemporary Armed Conflict‘ (2007) presented at the 30th International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. 
International Committee of the Red Cross ‗Improving Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law‘ (2004) Background Paper prepared for Informal High-Level 
Expert Meeting on Current Challenges to International Humanitarian Law, 
Cambridge, June 25-27, 2004. 
JT Gathii ‗Assessing Claims of a New Doctrine of Pre-emption under the Doctrine of 
Sources‘ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1-34. 
James G Stewart ‗Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict‘ (2003) 85 
International Review of the Red Cross 313-350. 
Jan E Aldykiewicz & Geoffrey S. Corn ‗Authority to Court-Martial Non-U.S. Military 
Personnel for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
During Internal Armed Conflicts‘ (2001) 167 Military Law Review 1-61. 
Jan K Kleffner ‗Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law through the 
Establishment of an Individual Complaints Procedure‘ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 241. 
Jasmine Moussa ‗Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello?: Reaffirming the Separation of the 












Jason S Wratchford ‗The 2006 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Aggression, Self-Defense, or a 
Reprisal Gone Bad‘ (2007) 60 Air Force Law Review 30. 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts ‗Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Response to US 
Comments‘ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 473-488. 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts ‗Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A 
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed 
Conflict‘ (2005) 857 International Review of the Red Cross 175-212. 
Jean-René Bachelet ‗Address by General Jean-René Bachelet‘ (2008) 90 International Review 
of the Red Cross 211-219.  
Jeff McMahan ‗The Basis of Moral Liability for Defensive Killing‘ (2005) 15 Philosophical 
Issues 386-405. 
Jeffery F Addicott ‗Proposal for a New Executive Order on Assassination‘ (2003) 37(3) 
Richmond Law Review 751-785. 
Jens Meierhenrich ‗Analogies at War‘ (2006) 11(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 1–40. 
Joan Fitzpatrick ‗Speaking Law to Power: The War against Terrorism and Human Rights‘ 
(2003) 14(2) European Journal of International Law 241-264. 
John B Bellinger III & William J Haynes II ‗A US Government Response to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International 
Humanitarian Law‘ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 443-471. 
John C Dehn ‗The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal Offence: The 
Common Law Origins of ―Murder in Violation of the Law of War‖‘ (2009) 7 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 63-82. 
John J Klein ‗The Problematic Nexus: Where Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles  
and the Law of Armed Conflict Meet‘ (2003) Air and Space Power Journal 37.  
Jonathan Somer ‗Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents in Non-
International Armed Conflict‘ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 655-690 
Jonathan Ulrich ‗The Gloves Were Never On: Defining the President‘s Authority to Order 
Targeted Killing in the War Against Terrorism‘ (2005) 45 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 1029-1063. 
Jordan J Paust ‗The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights‘ 
(1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 147-164. 
Jordan J Paust ‗The Right to Life in Human Rights Law and the Law of War‘ (2002) 35 
Saskatchewan Law Review 411-425. 
Jörg Arnold, Nora Karsten & Helmut Kreicker ‗The German Border Guard Cases before 
the European Court of Human Rights‘ (2003) 11(1) European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 67-92. 
Jörg Kammerhofer ‗The Armed Activities Case and Non-state Actors in Self-Defence Law‘ 
(2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 89–113. 












Joshua Raines ‗Osama, Augustine and Assassination: The Just War Doctrine and Targeted 
Killings‘ (2002) 12 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 217-243. 
Kenneth Anderson ‗Law and Terror‘ (2006) 139 Policy Review 1-24. 
Kenneth Watkin ‗Assessing Proportionality: Moral Complexity and Legal Rules‘ (2006) 8 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3-53. 
Kenneth Watkin ‗Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian Issues: 
Landmines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted Killing‘ (2005) 15 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 281-314. 
Kenneth Watkin ‗Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in 
Contemporary Armed Conflict‘ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 1-34. 
Kristen E Eichensehr ‗On Target?: The Israeli Supreme Court and the Expansion of 
Targeted Killings‘ (2006-20007) 116 Yale Law Journal 1873-1881. 
Knut Dörmann ‗The Legal Situation of ―Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants‖‘ (2003) 85 
International Review of the Red Cross 45-74. 
Kyle K Bradley ‗A Mending Wall: A Critical Look at the International Court of Justice‘s 
Analysis in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory‘ (2005) 19 Temple International & 
Comparative Law Journal 419-448. 
Laurie Calhoun ‗The Strange Case of Summary Execution by Predator Drone‘ (2003) 15(2) 
Peace Review 209-214. 
Leo van den Hole ‗Anticipatory Self-Defence in International Law‘ (2003) 19 American 
University International Law Review 69-106. 
Leila Nadya Sadat ‗An American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of 
(International) Law Seriously‘ (2005) 4 Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 329-343. 
Leslie Greene ‗Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law‘ (1995) 5 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 319-371. 
Leslie Green ‗The ―Unified Use of Force Rule‖ and the Law of Armed Conflict: A Reply to 
Professor Martin‘ (2002) 65 Saskatchewan Law Review 427-450. 
Lindsay Moir ‗Grave Breaches and Internal Armed Conflicts‘ (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 763-787.  
Louis R Beres ‗Assassinating Saddam Hussein: The View from International Law‘ (2003) 
13(3) Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 847-869. 
Louis R Beres ‗The Newly Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can It Include 
Assassination?‘ (2002) 31(2) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 157-177. 
Louise Doswald-Beck ‗The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does International 













Lucy Martinez ‗September 11th, Iraq and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense‘ (2003) 
72 UMKC Law Review 123-191. 
Luther S Turner, Jason T Adair & Louis Hamel ‗Optimizing Deadly Persistence in 
Kandahar: Armed UAV Integration in Joint Tactical Fight‘ (2009) 2(2) Colloquium 1-
19. 
MH Hoffman ‗Terrorists are Unlawful Belligerents, not Unlawful Combatants: A 
Distinction with Implications for the Future of International Humanitarian Law‘ 
(2002) 34(2) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 227–230. 
Marcello Di Filippo ‗Terrorist Crimes and International Cooperation: Critical Remarks on 
the Definition and Inclusion of Terrorism in the Category of International Crimes‘ 
(2008) 19(3) European Journal of International Law 533-570. 
Marco Odello ‗Commentary on the United Nations‘ High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change‘ (2005) 10(2) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 231–262. 
Marco Sassóli ‗State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law‘ 
(2002) 846 International Review of the Red Cross 401-434. 
Marco Sassóli ‗The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and 
Inherent Challenges‘ (2007) 10 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 45-
73. 
Marco Sassóli & Laura M Olson ‗The Relationship between International Humanitarian 
and Human Rights Law where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of 
Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts‘ (2008) 90 International Review of the 
Red Cross 599-627.  
Mark David ―Max‖ Maxwell ‗The Law of War and Civilians on the Battlefield: Are we 
Undermining Civilian Protections?‘ (2004) Military Review 17-25. 
Marko D Öberg ‗The Absorption of Grave Breaches into War Crimes Law‘ (2009) 91 
International Review of the Red Cross 163-183. 
Martin L Cook ‗Ethical and Legal Dimensions of the Bush ―Preemption‖ Strategy‘ (2004) 
27(3) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 797-816. 
Mary Ellen O‘Connell ‗Combatants and the Combat Zone‘ (2009) 43 University of Richmond 
Law Review 101-119. 
Mary Ellen O‘ Connell ‗Evidence of Terror‘ (2002) 7(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
19-36. 
Mary Ellen O‗Connell ‗Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War 
on Terror‘ (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 435-458. 
Mary Ellen O‘Connell ‗To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror‘ 35 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 325-332. 
Matthew Lippman ‗Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: 
Technology and Terror from World War I to Afghanistan‘ (2002) 33(1) California 












Michael Byres ‗Terrorism: The Use of Force in International Law after 11 September‘ 
(2002) 51 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 155-170. 
Michael Byers ‗The Shifting Foundations of International Law: A Decade of Forceful 
Measures Against Iraq‘ (2002) 13(1) European Journal of International Law 21-41. 
Michael C Bonafede ‗Here, There and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine 
and U.S. Use of Force after the September 11 Attacks‘ (2002) 88 Cornell Law Review 
155-214. 
Michael J Dennis ‗Human Rights in 2002: The Annual Sessions of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights and the Economics and Social Council‘ (2003) 97 American Journal of 
International Law 364-386. 
Michael J Glennon ‗The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter‘ (2002) 25 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 
539. 
Michael L Gross ‗Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-
Defence?‘ (2006) 23(3) Journal of Applied Philosophy 323-335. 
Michael L Gross ‗Fighting by Other Means in the Mideast: A Critical Analysis of Israel‘s 
Assassination Policy‘ (2003) 51 Political Studies 350-368. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law‘ 62 The 
Air Force Law Review 1-41. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗Counter-terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law‘ (2002) 32 
Israeli Yearbook of Human Rights 53-116. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗―Change Direction‖ 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the 
International Law of Self-defense‘ (2009) 29 Michigan Journal of International Law 127-
164. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗Effects-Based Operations and the Law of Aerial Warfare‘ (2006) 5(2) 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 265-293. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private 
Contractors or Civilian Employees‘ (2005) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 511. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law‘ (2005) 87 
International Review of the Red Cross 445. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗Preemptive Strategies and International Law‘ (2003) 24 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 413-448. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗Proportionate and Discriminate Use of Weapons: Challenges for a 
Military Commander‘ (2008) 37 Collegium 53-63. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law‘ 
(1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 609-685. 
Michael N Schmitt ‗Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues‘ (2004) 34 Israel 












Michael N Schmitt ‗The Interpretive Guidelines on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis‘ (2010) 1 Harvard National Security Journal 5-44. 
Michael N Schmitt, ‗US Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment‘ (2004) 27 Harvard Journal 
of Public Policy 737-763. 
Michael P Scharf ‗Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological 
and Chemical Weapons through Sanctions, Use of Force and Criminalization‘ 
(1999) 20 Michigan Journal of International Law 477-521. 
Michelle A Hansen ‗Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare: Halting the Expansion of 
Human Rights Law into Armed Conflict‘ (2007) 194 Military Law Review 1. 
Mikael Nabati ‗International Law at a Crossroads: Self-Defense, Global Terrorism, and 
Preemption (A Call to Rethink the Self-Defense Normative Framework)‘ (2003) 13 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 771. 
Natasha Balendra ‗Defining Armed Conflict‘ (2008) 29 Cardozo Law Review 2461-2516. 
Nathan A Canestaro ‗American Law and Policy on Assassination of Foreign Leaders: The 
Practicality of Maintaining the Status Quo‘ (2005) 26 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 457. 
Nathan A Canestaro ‗Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision 
Warfare‘ (2004) 37 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 431-484. 
Neve Gordon ‗Rationalizing Extra-Judicial Executions: The Israeli Press and the 
Legitimization of Abuse‘ (2004) 8(3) International Journal of Human Rights 305-24. 
Niaz A Shah 'War Crimes in the Armed Conflict in Pakistan' (2010) 33 Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 283-306. 
Nicholas J Kendall ‗Israeli Counter-Terrorism: ―Targeted Killings‖ Under International 
Law (2002) 80 North Carolina Law Review 1069-1088. 
Nigel D White ‗Defending Humanity: When Force is Justified and Why by George P 
Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin‘ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 379. 
Nils Melzer ‗Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response 
to Four Critiques of the ICRC‘s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities‘ (2010) 42 New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics 829-916. 
Noam Lubell ‗Challenges of Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict‘ (2005) 87 
International Review of the Red Cross 737. 
Noam Lubell ‗Parallel Applications of International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law: An Examination of the Debate‘ (2007) 40(2) Israel Law Review 
648-660. 
Noam Neuman ‗Applying the Rule of Proportionality: Force Protection and Cumulative 
Assessment in International Law and Morality‘ (2004) 7 Yearbook of International 












Noel Sharkey ‗Death Strikes from the Sky: The Calculus of Proportionality‘ (2009) 28 IEEE 
Technology and Society 16-19. 
Noëlle Quénivet ‗You are the Weakest Link and We will Help You!: The Comprehensive 
Strategy of the United Nations to Fight Terrorism‘ (2006) 11(3) Journal of Conflict and  
Security Law 371–397. 
Norman G Printer Jr ‗The Use of Force against Non-State Actors under International Law: 
An Analysis of the U.S Predator Strike in Yemen‘ (2003) 8 University of California Los 
Angeles Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 331- 383. 
Oliver Kessler & Wouter Werner ‗Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management‘ (2008) 39 
Security Dialogue 289-308. 
Oscar Schachter ‗The Right of States to Use Armed Force‘ (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 
1620-1634. 
Orna Ben-Naftali ‗A Judgment in the Shadow of International Criminal Law‘ (2007) 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 322-331. 
Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren Michaeli ‗Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. 
Government of Israel‘ (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 459. 
Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R Michaeli ‗‗‗We Must not Make a Scarecrow of the Law‘: A 
Legal Analysis of Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings‘ (2003) 36 Cornell International 
Law Journal 233-292. 
Orna Ben-Naftali & Noam Zamir ‗The Shooting of a Handcuffed, Blindfolded Palestinian 
Demonstrator‘ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 155-175. 
Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany ‗Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in 
the Occupied Territories‘ (2003-2004) 37 Israel Law Review 17-117. 
Oscar Schachter ‗The Right of States to Use Armed Force‘ (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 
1620. 
Patricia Zengel ‗Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict‘ (1991) 134 Military Law 
Review 123-155. 
Patrick Gallahue ‗The Targeted Killing of Drug Lords: Traffickers as Members of Armed 
Opposition Groups and/or Direct Participants in Hostilities‘ (2010) 1 International 
Yearbook on Human Rights and Drug Policy 1-15. 
Peter M Cullen ‗The Role of Targeted Killing in the War against Terror‘ (2008) 48 JF 
Quarterly 22-29. 
Peter Rowe ‗The Effect on National Law of the Customary International Humanitarian 
Law Study‘ (2006) 11(2) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 165–177. 
Philip Alston, Jason Morgan-Foster & William Abreisch ‗The Competence of the UN 
Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures in relation to Armed Conflicts: 
Extrajudicial Executions in the ―War on Terror‖‘ (2008) 19(1) European Journal of 












Philip B Heymann & Juliette N Kayyem ‗Long-Term Legal Strategy Project for Preserving 
Security and Democratic Freedoms in the War on Terrorism‘ (2004) 67, joint project 
of John F Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Law School April 2003-
November 2004, available at www.ksg.harvard.edu/bscia/longtermlegalstrategy and 
www.mipt.org/Long-Term-Legal-Strategy (accessed 26 July 2010). 
Randy W Stone ‗Protecting Civilians During Operation Allied Force: The Enduring 
Importance of Proportional Response and NATO‘s Use of Force in Kosovo‘ (2001) 
50 Catholic University Law Review 501. 
RE Chapman ‗Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle: Dawn of a New Age‘ (2002) 16 Aerospace 
Power Journal 60. 
RY Jennings ‗The Caroline and McLeod Cases‘ (1938) 32 American Journal of International 
Law 82. 
Richard B Lillich ‗The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights 
Law‘ (1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 1-30. 
Richard D Rosen ‗Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian 
Immunity‘ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 683. 
Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan ‗Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists‘ 
(2009) 31 Cardozo Law Review 405-450. 
Robert Cryer ‗Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel: The Influence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study (2006) 11(2) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 239–263. 
Robert Cryer ‗The Fine Art of Friendship: Jus in Bello in Afghanistan‘ (2002) 7(1) Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 37-83.  
Robert F Turner ‗It‘s Not Really ―Assassination‖: Legal and Moral Implications of 
Intentionally Targeting Terrorists and Aggressor-State Regime Elites‘ (2003) 37(3) 
University of Richmond Law Review 787-810. 
Robert J Beck & Anthony Clark Arendt ‗‗Don‘t Tread on Us‘‘: International Law and 
Forcible Trends on Terrorism‘ (1994) 12 Wisconsin International Law Journal 153. 
Robert J Mathews ‗The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: A Useful 
Framework Despite Earlier Disappointments‘ (2001) 83 International Review of the Red 
Cross 991-1012. 
Robert Kogod Goldman ‗America Watch‘s Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed 
Conflicts‘ (1993) 9 American Journal of International Law 49-94. 
Robert Sparrow ‗Predators or Plowshares?: Arms Control of Robotic Weapons‘ (2009) 28 
IEEE Technology and Society 25. 
Robin Geiß ‗Armed Violence in Fragile States: Low-intensity Conflicts, Spillover Conflicts, 
and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third Parties‘ (2009) 91 International 












Robin Geiß ‗Asymmetric Conflict Structures‘ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 
757-777. 
Rogier Bartels ‗Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution of the Legal 
Divide between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts‘ (2009) 91 
International Review of the Red Cross 35-67. 
Ronald F White ‗A Prolegomenon to a General Theory of Assassination‘ (2001) 5(1) 
Assassination Research 1-22. 
Rosa E Brooks ‗War Every: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict 
in the Age of Terror‘ (2004) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 671-761. 
Roy S Schöndorf ‗Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is there a Need for a New Legal Regime?‘ 
(2004) 37(1) International Law and Politics 1-78. 
Richard D Rosen ‗Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian 
Immunity‘ (2009) 42(3) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 683-777 
Rudolf Geiger ‗The German Border Guard Cases and International Human Rights‘ (1998) 9 
European Journal of International Law 540-49. 
Ryan Goodman ‗The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict‘ (2009) 103 American Journal 
of International Law 48. 
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War 
on Terrorism (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 2653-2662. 
Sabine von Schorlemer ‗Human Rights: Substantive and Institutional Implications of the 
War Against Terrorism‘ (2003) 14(2) The European Journal of International Law 265-
282. 
Samuel Vincent Jones ‗Has Conduct in Iraq Confirmed the Moral Inadequacy of 
International Humanitarian Law?: Examining the Confluence between Contract 
Theory and the Scope of Civilian Immunity during Armed Conflict‘ (2006) 16 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 241-298.  
Sean D Murphy ‗Aggression, Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court‘ (2009) 20(4) 
European Journal of International Law 1147-1156. 
Sean D Murphy ‗International Law, the United States, and the Non-military ―War‖ against 
Terrorism‘ (2003) 14(2) The European Journal of International Law 347-364.   
Sharon Weill ‗The Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh: From Gaza to Madrid‘ (2009) 7 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 617-631. 
Sonjar Starr ‗Extraordinary Crimes at Extraordinary Times: International Justice Beyond 
Crisis Situations‘ (2007) North Western University Law Review 1257. 
Stephen G Rademaker ‗Use of Force after 9/11‘ (2004-2005) 5 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 461. 













Stéphane Kolanowski ‗The Obligation to Conduct Legal Reviews (Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I)‘ (2008) 37 Collegium 105-113. 
Steven R David ‗Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing‘ (2002) 51 Mideast Security 
and Policy Studies 1-28. 
Steven R Ratner ‗Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello after September 11‘ (2002) 96(4) The 
American Journal of International Law 905-921. 
Steven Ratner ‗Predator and Prey: Seizing and Killing Suspected Terrorists Abroad‘ (2007) 
15(3) The Journal of Political Philosophy 251-275. 
Suzzane Uniacke ‗A Critique of the Preference Utilitarian Objection to Killing People‘ 
(2002) 80(2) Austarlasian Journal of Philosophy 209-217. 
Sylvain Vité ‗Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal 
Concepts and Actual Situations‘ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 69-94. 
Theodore Meron ‗The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti: Extraterritoriality of Human Rights 
Treaties‘ (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 78-82. 
Theodore Meron ‗The Humanization of Humanitarian Law‘ (2000) 94 American Journal of 
International Law 239-278. 
Theodore Meron & A Rosas ‗A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards‘ (1991) 
81 American Journal of International Law 375. 
Tom Ruys ‗License to Kill? State-Sponsored Assassination under International Law‘ (2005) 
44(1-2) Military Law and Law of War Review 13-49. 
Tom Ruys & Sten Verhoeven ‗Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence 
(2005) 10(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2005) 289–320. 
Tyler J Harder ‗Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Order 12,333: A Small 
Step in Clarifying Current Law‘ (2002) 172 Military Law Review 1-39. 
Vincent-Joël Proulx ‗If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for your Life: 
Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists‘ 
(2004-2005) 56 Hastings Law Journal 802-900. 
W Michael Reisman ‗Some Reflections on International Law and Assassination under the 
Schmitt Formula‘ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 687-690. 
W Michael Reisman ‗The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections on its Lawfulness and 
Implications‘ (1994) 5 European Journal of International Law 120-133. 
Walter G Sharp ‗The Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism: American Hegemony or 
Impotence?‘ (2000) 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 37-48. 
William Abresch ‗A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court 
of Human Rights in Chechnya‘ (2005)16(4) European Journal of International Law 741-
767. 
William C Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen ‗Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. 












William H Ferrell II ‗No Shirt, No Shoes, No Status: Uniforms, Distinction, and Special 
Operations in International Armed Conflict (2003) 178 Military Law Review 94-140. 
William H Taft IV ‗The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features‘ (2003) 
28 Yale Journal of International Law 319. 
William H Taft & A Buchwald ‗Pre-emption, Iraq and International Law‘ (2003) 97 
American Journal of International Law 557. 
William Hays Parks ‗Air War and the Laws of War‘ (1990) 32 Air Force Law Review 1-225. 
William J Fenrick ‗The Targeted Killings Judgment and the Scope of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities‘ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 332-338. 
Wolff Heinschel von Heinegg ‗The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: 
Factors in War to Peace Transitions‘ (2004) 27 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy 868-869. 
Yael Stein ‗By Any Name Illegal and Immoral: Response to ―Israel‘s Policy of Targeted 
Killing”‘ (2003) 17 Ethics & International Affairs Journal 127. 
Yigal Mersel ‗Judicial Review of Counter-terrorism Measures: The Israeli Model for the 
Role of the Judiciary during the Terror Era Reports (2006) 38 International Law and 
Politics 67-120. 
Ziyad Motala & David T Butle Ritchie ‗Self-Defense in International Law, The United 
Nations, and the Bosnian Conflict‘ (1995) 57 University of Pittsburg Law Review 1. 
 
OTHER ARTICLES 
Amnesty International Livewire ‗Faulty Intelligence, Wanton Recklessness, or a 
Combination of the Two‘ (2009)  
available at http://livewire.amnesty.org/2009/02/02/faulty-intelligence-wanton-
recklessness-or-a-combination-of-the-two/ (accessed 2 September 2010). 
Antonio Cassese ‗Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of 
International Law‘ European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum 
available at http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny.cassese.html (accessed 2 
September 2010). 
Anthony Dworkin ‗Obama Administration Announces Legal Basis for Drone Attacks‘ 
(2010) available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/news-obama2.html (accessed 2 
September 2010).  
Brett H. McGurk ‗Lawyers: A Predator Drone‘s Achilles Heel?‘ (2010) available at 
http://www.harvardnsj.com/2010/03/lawyers-a-predator-drone%E2%80%99s-












David Hambling ‗Air Force Completes Killer Micro-Drone Project‘ (2010) available at 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/01/killer-micro-drone/ (accessed 2 
September 2010). 
David Kilcullen & Andrew McDonald Exum, Death From Above, Outrage Down Below, 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?pagewanted=1&_r=
1 (accessed 2 September 2010). 
David Skinner ‗The New Face of War‘ The New Atlantis available at 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com (accessed 2 September 2010).  
Federico Sperotto ‗Illegal and Ineffective? Drone Strikes and Targeted Killing in ―the war 
on terror‖‘ available at http://www.opendemocracy.net (accessed 2 September 
2010). 
Frederic L Kirgis ‗U.S.-British Air Strikes on Targets in Iraq‘  
available at http://www.asil.org/insigh62.cfm (accessed 2 September 2010).  
Giorgio Gaja ‗In What Sense Was There an ―Armed Attack‖?‘ European Journal of 
International Law Discussion Forum,  
available at http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny.gaja.html (accessed 2 September 
2010). 
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State ‗The Obama Administration 
and International Law‘ 25 March 2010 
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (accessed 2 
September 2010).  
International Committee of the Red Cross ‗Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions & 
Answers‘ available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-
participation-ihl-faq-020609 (accessed 2 September 2010).  
Jane Perlez & Pir Zubair Shah ‗Drone Strikes Pound West Pakistan‘ (2010) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/world/asia/12pstan.html?scp=2&sq=&st=n
yt (accessed 2 September 2010).  
Jordan Paust ‗The United States‘ use of Drones in Pakistan‘ (2009) available at 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-united-states-use-of-drones-in-pakistan/ (accessed 2 
September 2010).  
Joshua M Weeks ‗Drones Under Attack: Congress Debate the use of UAVs in the War on 
Terror‘ (2010) North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology available at 
http://jolt.unc.edu/blog/2010/04/09/drones-under-attack-congress-debate-use-
uavs-war-terror-0 (accessed 2 September 2010).   
Juan Gonzalez ‗UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston Responds to US Defense of Drone 
Attacks‘ Legality‘ (2010)  
available at http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/1/drones (accessed 2 












Kenneth Anderson ‗A Follow-On Drone Hearing‘ (2010)  
available at http://volokh.com/author/kenneth/ (accessed 2 September 2010). 
Kenneth Anderson ‗Acquiring UAV Technology‘ (2010)  
available at http://volokh.com/author/kenneth/ (accessed 2 September 2010).  
Kenneth Anderson ‗Clandestine Military Operations‘ (2010)  
available at http://volokh.com/author/kenneth/ (accessed 2 September 2010). 
Kenneth Anderson ‗Drone Warfare: The Upbeat News About the Obama Administration‘ 
(2010) available at http://volokh.com/author/kenneth/ (accessed 2 September 
2010). 
Kenneth Anderson ‗Is Harold Koh‘s Defense of Drones also Defence of Targeting a US 
Citizen?‘ (2010) available at http://volokh.com/author/kenneth/ (accessed 2 
September 2010).  
Kenneth Anderson ‗The Changing Conflict in Pakistan and Targeted Killing‘ available at 
http://volokh.com/author/kenneth/ (accessed 2 September 2010). 
Lauren Wilcox ‗Body Counts: The Politics of Embodiment in Precision Warfare‘ available 
at 
http://www.polisci.umn.edu/pdf/Body%20Counts%20Theory%20Colloquium.doc 
(accessed 2 September 2010). 
Marko Milanovic What‘s in a Name: The GWOT, Redefinition Accomplished (2009) 
available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/what%E2%80%99s-in-a-name-the-gwot-
redefinition-accomplished/ (accessed 2 September 2010).  
Nathan Hodge ‗Drone Attacks Are Legit Self-Defense, Says State Dept. Lawyer‘ (2010) 
available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/03/drone-attacks-legit-self-
defense-says-administration-lawyer/ (accessed 2 September 2010). 
Nathan Hodge & Noah Shachtman ‗Drone Pilots Could Be Tried for ―War Crimes,‖ Law 
Prof Says‘ (2010) available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/drone-
pilots-could-be-tried-for-war-crimes-law-prof-says/ (accessed 2 September 2010).  
National Security Journal ‗Turning Off Autopilot: Towards a Sustainable Drone Policy‘ 
(2010) at http://www.harvardnsj.com/2010/03/nsj-analysis-turning-off-autopilot-
towards-a-sustainable-drone-policy/ (accessed 2 September 2010). 
Philip Alston & Hina Shamsi, A Killer Above the Law?, The Guardian, 8 February 2010 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/feb/08/afghanistan-
drones-defence-killing (accessed 2 September 2010). 
Robert F Turner, International Law and the Use of Force in Response to The World Trade 
Center and Pentagon Attacks, Jurist,  
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew34.htm (accessed 2 












Ted Rall ‗U.S. Drone Planes Have a Nearly Perfect Record of Failure‘ (2006) available at 
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0118-32.htm (accessed 2 September 
2010). 
Tom Englehardt ‗Drone Race to a Known Future Why Military Dreams Fail -- and Why It 
Doesn't Matter‘ available at 
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175155/tomgram:_droning_on/ (accessed 2 
September 2010). 
 
 
